

THE PHILOSOPHY
OF
KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

Encounters and Creative Constructions



KALYANKUMAR BAGCHI



**UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
2013**

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
Cub-H105409-61-G146770

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PUBLISHED BY THE REGISTRAR, UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA,
87/1, COLLEGE STREET, KOLKATA – 700 073

AND

PRINTED BY SRI PRADIP KUMAR GHOSH,
SUPERINTENDENT, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS,
48, HAZRA ROAD, KOLKATA – 700 019

Printed in the year 2012

Price : Rs.200/-

G-146770

**TO
THE MEMORY
OF
MY MOTHER**

All philosophy is systematic symbolism and symbolism necessarily admits of alternatives.

— Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya
(‘The Concept of Philosophy’. 1936)

Philosophy is self-evident elaboration of the self-evident and not a body of judgements.

— Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya
(‘The Concept of Philosophy’. 1936)

‘.... if the Modern Indian Mind is to philosophise at all to any purpose, it has to confront Eastern thought and Western thought with one another and attempt a synthesis or a reasoned rejection of either.....’

— Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya
(‘Swaraj in Ideas’. 1928)

From the desk of the Head of the Department

It is indeed a happy coincidence that the University of Calcutta is going to publish a book on the philosophy of Late Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya on the eve of the centenary of the Department of Philosophy in this University. An original thinker, Professor Bhattacharyya had an in-born analytical bent of mind, and was blessed equally with a strong power of imagination. He was well known for his presentation of serious discourses replete with “quips and sallies”, and also for his cryptic writings, much comparable to puzzles (*Vyāsakūta*) of **The Mahabharata**. His extensive writings, as observed by his eldest son, the great teacher and scholar of philosophy, Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya, are of two kinds : (a) constructive interpretation of other systems, and (b) construction of his own new system. The best illustration of the second kind is the concept of Self which can only be negatively approached. It gradually speaks of three layers of subjectivity – bodily, presentational and spiritual. It will not sound strange if we say that his phenomenological approach has an affinity with that of Edmund Husserl. As a matter of fact, Krishna Chandra read Husserl’s book **Ideas I**, in translation, which was found in his library at Amalner, and in which he made many sympathetic marginal footnotes. His own understanding, however, was enriched by numerous revolutionary original ideas that contribute not only to the shaping of his concept of Self as Freedom but also to the philosophical development in reading theories of Kant and Vedanta in a more mature way.

The present work is the magnum opus of Professor Kalyan Kumar Bagchi who – inspired by his own doctoral thesis – has been religiously associated with his life-long project on the philosophy of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya. It is because of the association with his supervisor, Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the third son of Krishna Chandra, that the author got the privilege of making an otherwise difficult attempt to understand, in his own way, the exact logic of Krishna Chandra’s writings. One of the important reflections found in this book is that, unlike many admirers of Krishna Chandra, the author does not consider the little tract “The Subject as Freedom” as the final version of Krishna Chandra’s thinking. Following Gopinath Bhattacharyya, the author also opines that the essays of the book **Studies in Philosophy** show that Krishna Chandra’s work outgrew the concept of Subject as Freedom to the concept of objective apriori.

In this work, the author has elaborately discussed Krishna Chandra's ideas on various topics, and provides remarkable reflections by Krishna Chandra upon the widely accepted interpretations of different philosophical systems – both east and west. The author has distinctly mentioned several limitations of his work and reminds us politely not to indulge in the utopian fascination to map everything that Krishna Chandra discussed. It is, however, one thing to write on his rigorous philosophy, and another thing to complete the whole work including the work of Appendix and Bibliography. We are grateful to Professor Bagchi who, with his indomitable spirit at his age, has done the second task which is the most onerous one. I am sure that this book will provide unconditional sustenance to the intellect for the scholars and teachers, both of philosophy and other academic disciplines.

We are grateful to our Hon'ble Vice-Chancellor, Professor Suranjan Das and our Hon'ble Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Academic), Professor Dhrubojoyti Chattopadhyay for taking all the initiative to publish the work. I sincerely thank all the faculty members of the Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University for taking the unanimous resolution to publish the book. I owe a special debt to Professor Subirranjan Bhattacharyya of this Department for his suggestions in preparing the manuscript. I sincerely thank Professor Uma Chattopadhyay, present Faculty Head, for entrusting me with the power to approach the University authorities in this respect, even after my tenure of headship was over. I convey my gratitude to Professor Prabir Kumar Hui who, because of his year-long association with this Department, has constantly kept on inspiring us to pay tribute to a great Indian philosopher in the most befitting manner. I thank all our friends of Calcutta University Press who have worked hard so that the book finds light of the day. We sincerely hope that by their unfailing support and endeavour the thoughts of an original philosopher of contemporary India could reach the scholars all over the world.

Manidipa Sanyal

Kolkata

6th March, 2012

Department of Philosophy

University of Calcutta

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PREFACE

This book seeks to give a connected account of the philosophical writings of the late Professor Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, spread out from 1907 to 1949 with the aim of establishing how Bhattacharyya, as a philosopher, envisaged worlds of thought, constructed new idioms of thinking in terms of which he envisioned traditional problems which had appeared (before him) to be intractable, added to the corpus of philosophical thought in respect of problems on knowledge, logic, metaphysics, freedom, value, aesthetics, *et al.*

The present study of Bhattacharyya's philosophical writings is based on the two volumes of his STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY edited by the late Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya in 1956 and 1958 and two other writings of Professor Bhattacharyya. These latter are the two articles entitled 'Neo-Hegelian Conception of the Individual Self', which was read by Professor Bhattacharyya at the Calcutta Philosophical Society in 1919, and 'Mind and Matter' which I had chanced to find in some unpublished manuscripts of Bhattacharyya and was subsequently published by me in the JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (9), 1981, (Dordrecht, Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Co) with the kind permission of my teacher, the late Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya. Insights of Bhattacharyya's last tract on Kant written in Bengali a little before his demise have been incorporated into his English writing on Kant.

Some explanations are called for.

- 1) Bhattacharyya, in the final reckoning, views philosophical thought-structures as alternatives. But that does not preclude one from presenting his thought in a system. One need only remember that 'systematic' thought is not 'systemic', *a la* Hegel. Bhattacharyya himself has found fault with Hegel's 'systemic' dialectic in his famous paper 'Place of the Indefinite in Logic'.
- 2) I have not studied Bhattacharyya's thoughts in their chronological order. My endeavour throughout has been to see if Bhattacharyya's many writings help generate new insights into dimensions of philosophy, philosophical problems on knowledge, issues on semantics, place of metaphysics in philosophy, distinctiveness of

aesthetic consciousness, value-theory *et al.* I have tried to interlock Bhattacharyya's apparently disparate writings as far as possible.

- 3) Following Bhattacharyya's insightful observation that 'exegetical interpretation shades off into philosophic construction', I have tried to show how his philosophic construction(s) and exegeses act and re-act on each other.

I have tried to study, what Bhattacharyya calls, his 'problematic constructions', viz., his exegetical interpretations of Vēdānta, Sāṅkhyā, Yoga, Jaina Anekāntavāda and Kant and his independent philosophical reflections. And I have tried to show that while a large number of these works of his foreshadow and even determine the point of view of his book THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM, yet this book, important as it is in striking the viewpoint of subjective freedom, is supplemented by other writings of Bhattacharyya. It is not fair therefore to restrict our understanding of Bhattacharyya to this book. It is time to supplement one's understanding of Bhattacharyya with a close reading of his many other writings. For one thing, such reading is striking as it brings to light the relevance of Bhattacharyya's thought even today, i.e., more than sixty three years after his death in 1949 to many contemporary philosophical discussions on 'meaning', 'truth', 'error', 'classification of unactual entities' *et al.*

While I have let Bhattacharyya speak for himself, I have, in conformity with the way Bhattacharyya himself adopted to study his philosophical compeers, tried to situate him in the philosophical perspectives of his time and also in the contemporary philosophical perspectives. So my exposition has been analytical, critical and comparative. This is the only way in which a philosopher can be understood: it goes without saying that the task of a philosophical interpreter is not just to record the doctrine or doctrines of a philosopher but 'to wrest from words the thoughts they contain'¹: and this makes the demand upon the interpreter that he philosophises on his own. Here exegesis resolves into 'philosophic construction'.

And it is now for the reader to judge whether my attempt, successful or unsuccessful, is worth making.

Interest in Bhattacharyya's philosophy was created in me by my mother who was a close student of his in the early thirties of the last century. This book is dedicated to her memory. Fondly do I remember my mother's responses, couched in Bhattacharyya's diction, to my queries when I was a student of the graduate school at the University of Calcutta. Since then my interest in Bhattacharyya has not waned a bit and not a day has passed when I have not derived some 'enlightenment', if I may use that word, from my study of Bhattacharyya. And here I cannot but recall the many sessions on Kant I had with the late Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya which gave me insights into many important aspects of Bhattacharyya's philosophy : it was Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya who brought home to me the unique idiom of thinking and language of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya.

I had long been toying with the idea of writing on Bhattacharyya's philosophical thought. My kind friend Professor Debi Prosad Chattopadhyaya, formerly Chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and now Director of the Centre for Studies in Civilizations at New Delhi, literally pestered me to complete writing the book. His patience was not to be taxed by my procrastination. I am indeed grateful to him.

The other friend of mine to whom I am thankful and who too was anxious that I write on Bhattacharyya is Professor R. Balasubramanian.

Mr Prabir Hui, formerly of the West Bengal Education Service, combines in himself interest in literature and in philosophy. As good as my mentor that he has been, his watchful eyes on the progress of my work I just could not dare ignore.

Parts of the book – especially those related to Bhattacharyya's notion of subjectivity, the body-subject, knowledge, knowledge of absence etc. – were read to the Philosophy Faculty, University of Calcutta in February 2010. I am thankful to the then Faculty Dr Manidipa Sanyal and her colleagues for inviting me to lecture on Bhattacharyya. My seminars were made interesting through the responses of both the faculty members and the research fellows and students of the faculty who attended the course. I am grateful to Professor Suranjan Das, Vice-Chancellor, University of Calcutta for this eagerness to see the book published as soon as possible. He has

almost been pestering me to get the book ready for the press. He would brook no delay.

I am thankful to the present Head, Faculty of Philosophy, Professor Uma Chattapadhyay who has kindly allowed me some good margin of time to complete the material for the press when I was hard-pressed for time on account of my wife's illness.

No word is enough for the kindness shown to me by Professor Manidipa Sanyal. She has read the entire book, cautioned me against inadvertent slips, corrected the proof-sheets, designed the format of the book and, what is more, suggested ways of giving a garb to the book that bespeaks the aesthete in her.

What can be a matter of greater pride to me when this University, my Alma Mater, accepts this book for publication ? And again what can be greater fortune to me than the fact that this book is going to be published a little before the Centenary of the Philosophy Faculty where the late Professor Bhattacharyya, greatest of the twentieth century philosophers of India, taught ?

When everything seemed to go awry for the hopelessly disorganised man in me, my wife Nilakshi sustained me and helped me complete the book.

Kalyankumar Bagchi

Santiniketan

India.

February, 2012

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Radhakrishnan S: INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, Vol I (London, George Allen & Unwin. 1929) p. 672.

Bhattacharyya writes in the Introduction to his STUDIES IN VEDANTISM that exegetical task in the present context 'shades off into philosophic construction'.

Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya: A Philosophical Biography

A biography of one is nothing if it cannot place one in one's context, one's historical and cultural milieu. The context, however, is considerably moulded by one's mental make-up, the level of one's perception of one's situation, one's imaginative insight etc.

Professor Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, King George V Professor of Philosophy in the University of Calcutta in the late thirties of the last century, was born in the latter part of the nineteenth century in 1875 when India's contact with the West had already been established. Hailing from a family noted for its scholarship in Sanskrit, Bhattacharyya yet did not belong to the orthodox genre. His sensitive mind immersed itself in the movement towards the crystallization of the perspective demanded of the Indian philosophers when the west made its impact upon India. Bhattacharyya realised that what was needed philosophically, at that juncture of history, was no revival of Indian thought, nor any understanding of Indian thought in Western terms but *creative reaction* to Western thought so that Indian philosophy could be *situated* in the global philosophical perspective and 'a full open-eyed struggle', which Bhattacharyya envisaged in his 1928 - address to his students entitled 'Swaraj in Ideas', allowed to develop between Indian and Western philosophy.

Without such struggle, there could be no vital 'assimilation' of western ideas into our culture; they would, on the contrary, induce in us a 'shadow mind that functions like a real mind except in the matter of genuine creativeness'. Creativity may entail acceptance of western concepts or rejection of them or even 'reasoned rejection of either' *a la* Bhattacharyya. But whatever it may entail, it cannot at all emerge unless the Indian philosopher adopts an attitude of critical reserve and not of docile acceptance of Indian philosophical concepts and unless he immerses himself into his 'vernacular mind', bores down to the depth of its concepts and categories, understands their distinctive rationale or logic, compares and contrasts them with those of western philosophy, and -- if needed -- even sets up a genuine 'conflict' with them or again, without accepting them, 'respects them from a distance'. While for Bhattacharyya 'no idea of one cultural language can be exactly translated into another cultural language', such impossibility of

intertranslation does not forestall one's respect of a culture from a distance: it is a genuine possibility for Bhattacharyya.

The much-needed creative reaction to western philosophy was possible on Bhattacharyya's part because, while he did react with a traditional mind (if one may say so), he did not continue traditionalism. As a true philosopher who does not ignore his cultural or philosophical milieu, Bhattacharyya exploited the big jolt that Indian philosophy received from the west by trying to formulate, *initially in western terms*, the logic of the concepts of Indian thought and *then* bring out the *differentia* of that logic. Only thus is one's mentality restored to oneself. Only thus is any originality in thought possible. That Bhattacharyya could shape into the most creative philosopher of India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was because he had the imaginative understanding of Indian philosophical concepts, or he could re-construct Indian thought by supplying from his imagination concepts or ideas which would generate a vision or a new understanding of any system of thought he happened to interpret. His task may be described as one of hermeneutical exercise through which an entire system of thought flashes anew before one's mind's eye.

In the address referred to, Bhattacharyya regretted, 'one would have expected that after a century of contact with the vivifying ideas of the west there should be a vigorous output of Indian contribution in Indian style'.

Well, Bhattacharyya's hopes have not been belied. He died early in 1949, a little less than two years after Indian independence in August 1947. His mentality has, so to say, permeated the practitioners of philosophy in many departments of philosophy in Indian Universities. The lead he gave to assessing philosophical theories and concepts independently, i.e. irrespective of their indigenous or foreign *locale*, has been taken up by many philosophers in India. We have now in India independent philosophical interpretations, independent philosophical perceptions, novel philosophical concepts which not only entail addition to the corpus of existing philosophical theories but also help the philosophers construct independent philosophical theories.

INTRODUCTION

The philosophical writings of Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya fall into two kinds. Some are ‘problematic constructions’ as he describes them: others are his independent philosophical reflections. The student of Bhattacharyya’s thought comes to be confronted with three problems, viz, (1) ‘What *latitude* can be given to problematic constructions ?’ (ii) ‘What are those constructions *vis - a - vis* Bhattacharyya’s general philosophical position, if any, and (iii) ‘Does one discern one single philosophical concern or one articulated philosophy in *all* Bhattacharyya’s writings?’

Thanks to Gadamar, the notion of a ‘horizon’ of interpretation is something we have been familiarised with. And it is in this light that we should appreciate Bhattacharyya’s problematic constructions on Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Kant, Jaina Philosophy, Neo - Hegelianism *et al.* As far back as 1901 when he wrote his work *STUDIES IN VEDANTISM*, Bhattacharyya distinguished between a historical study and a philosophical study of a school of thought. His words in this connection are well worth quoting:

The historical study of a school of thought must have methods and aims different from those of a philosophical study the historian here cannot begin his work at all unless he can live in sympathy into the details of an apparently outworn creed and recognize the truth in the first imperfect adumbrations of it.¹

And further:

If the history of philosophy were rightly studied, it would show that many of the modern speculative *discoveries* are but re-affirmations of old truths, and that the present day commonsense itself is a complex structure in which are imbedded types of thought which are ordinarily taken to be outworn and superseded.²

Further still :

A philosophic commentator, especially on unsystematised texts embodying speculative truths, has a far wider latitude than a literary

commentator. Exegetical interpretation here inevitably shades off into philosophic construction.³

A philosopher may study a thought by supplying from his constructive imagination a certain concept or concepts that may generate a vision about the system concerned. The philosophical interpreter may re-create a thought-system in terms of a certain concept. And this is no intellectual dishonesty. After all, Strawson has his Kant, so too has Bennett. Bhattacharyya himself has his Kant and Vedānta. However divergent the interpretations of a thought- system may be, if they are *within a definite horizon*, they may be admitted as so many points of view between which *philosophically rewarding encounters* may take place.

Now, the philosophical constructions that Bhattacharyya makes out of different philosophical systems *and* his independent philosophical writings involve some recurrent concepts. These are those of 'freedom', 'negation', 'subjectivity' and 'alternation'; weaving them together, Bhattacharyya founds, what may be called, his *philosophy of Absolute Freedom*.

To the extent these concepts can be spotted in his earliest philosophical writings and way through in his latest ones, they may be in regarded as central to his philosophic thought.

STUDIES IN VEDANTISM (1907) understands waking, dream and dreamless sleep to constitute '*the* one dimension of existence in which the deepest of all distinctions, viz., that between the subject and object, has place.⁴ Later on, we find that Bhattacharyya's book on *THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM* (1930) distinguishes between grades of subjectivity and objectivity and comes to the conception of the free subject.

'MIND AND MATTER' (1907) understands the *given* identity of the self and body to be a *problem* when the self or subject is only 'thought' and not known. Yet the thought is demanded to be *actualized* or *realized*.

'SOME ASPECTS OF NEGATION' (1914) maintains that through culture of 'negative attention', of withdrawl, all *being* can be denied and such denial or negation is realising the point of view of the subject.

‘THE PLACE OF THE INDEFINITE IN LOGIC’ (1916) criticises Hegel’s dialectic on the ground that it fails to account for the particularity of the given. Later, in ŚĀNKARA’S DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ, this shortcoming of the dialectic is sought to be removed through the idea of truth as *not given*, as *self-shining* truth.

‘NEO-HEGELIAN CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL SELF’ (1919) takes reason, *contra* Hegel, to be itself *given* and thus to be expression of unpredictable freedom.

‘ŚĀNKARA’S DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ’, (1925) proceeds from the idea of the illusory content as ‘what is unthinkable given’ to the idea of truth as what is *not* given, not object but subject.

‘KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH’ (1928) takes truth to be *the* self-evident that marks off epistemological reflection from other kinds of reflection.

THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM (1930): Here it is that the concept of the subject, spread in Bhattacharyya’s early writings, comes to the made *explicit* and the distinctive subjective point of view made articulate.

‘THE CONCEPT OF THE ABSOLUTE AND ITS ALTERNATIVE FORMS’ (1934) maintains that truth, freedom and value are, alternatively, absolutes for knowing, willing and feeling.

‘STUDIES IN KANT’ (lectures delivered in 1935-36) finds the roots of Kant’s philosophy in transcendental reflection in which free self, realised in moral apprehension, is seen to be constitutive of object: the lectures maintain that moral apprehension implies that free causality is realised in the world.

‘THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY’ (1936) elaborates the different grades of theoretic consciousness symbolising itself and taking such symbolising to be oriented to the apprehension of truth which oversteps all symbolising and is Absolute.

‘THE ADVAITA AND ITS SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE’ (1936) builds on the spiritual experience of oneself as the subject and as yet appearing as *object*.

STUDIES IN SĀNKHYA PHILOSOPHY (Lectures delivered in 1937) applies the reflective method, but *contra* Kant and Vedānta, uses the method to uncover the object (and not the subject).

STUDIES IN YOGA PHILOSOPHY (Lectures delivered in 1937) upholds the point of view of *asamprajñātasamādhi* conceived as free will, i.e., freedom.

The other articles are not of a piece with the works cited above although they are marvellous exercises in philosophical reasoning.

It is clear that as Bhattacharyya proceeds from his *STUDIES IN VEDĀNTISM TO THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM*, he is steadily consolidating the point of view of the subject.

Here, however, three important considerations have to be borne in mind.

First, 'KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH' (KT) (1928) which *antedates* THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM (SAF) (1930) is also philosophically prior to it. For 'KT' provides the definitive point of view for epistemology; it shows that epistemological reflection, in laying bare the emergence of the idea of self-evident truth, motivates the dialectic of subjectivity in SAF. So the meta-epistemological concept of truth regulates the entire exercise (of elaborating grades of subjectivity and objectivity) in SAF.

Secondly, freedom that is conceived in SAF is cognitive. In this book, Bhattacharyya not only commits himself to the *notion* of the Vedānta subject but also conceives the freeing process as a knowing process after Vedānta. But we must take Bhattacharyya's thought in its totality. In STUDIES IN YOGA PHILOSOPHY (SY), Bhattacharyya is concerned with (i) the will to seek freedom, (ii) will *not* to will and finally (iii) *not* willing to will.

Bhattacharyya also points out that apart from the Yoga which conceives the freeing process as willing, there are bhakti - systems in which it is conceived as feeling.

And thirdly, in ‘THE CONCEPT OF THE ABSOLUTE AND ITS ALTERNATIVE FORMS’ (‘CAAF’) (1934) ‘knowing’, ‘feeling’ and ‘willing’ are understood as ‘alternative’ attitudes.

And so it appears that Vedānta, Bhakti-systems and Yoga conceive freedom, alternatively, as knowing, feeling and willing.

But, the climax is reached when Yoga, as interpreted by Bhattacharyya,⁵ moves to the farthest limit of understanding absolute freedom as *freedom from the will to be free*. And *so for Bhattacharyya, absolute freedom is beyond all alternation*.

Hence Bhattacharyya’s philosophy is to be regarded as the *philosophy of Absolute Freedom*.

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2. *ibid.*, p.2.
3. *ibid.*, p.4.
4. *ibid.*, p. 29.
5. *ibid.*, p. 227.

CHAPTER - 1

The Philosopher's Exegeses on Native Traditions

I

The Vedānta

(i)

PSYCHOLOGY¹

Bhattacharyya maintains that the Vedānta 'psychology of waking, dream and dreamless sleep'², constitutes the 'pivot'³ of the Vedāntic system. For him, this psychology is an addition to empirical psychology and opens out to wider possibilities. It points, according to him, to a 'new dimension of existence'⁴ transcending the waking state and consummating in *Samādhi* or ecstatic intuition in which Brahman or self is realised in knowledge and is seen as 'informing'⁵ all our ordinary experiences beginning from waking to dreamless sleep. In the scheme that Bhattacharyya has mapped out, dream and dreamless sleep stand midway between waking and ecstasy.

Dream therefore engages Bhattacharyya's attention at the outset of his enquiry into the possibility of rising to ecstasy.

Bhattacharyya maintains that 'physiological explanations do not touch the speciality of the phenomenon'⁶ of dream. For dream-world is wider in *possibility* than the waking world⁷, though the idea of the object known in ordinary experience is 'not known to be a mere idea'.⁸ this possibility of the ecstatic intuition of the self is explored by Bhattacharyya.

With regard to the question of dream having wider possibility than waking experience, Bhattacharyya first points out that although in dream images are roused by sensory presentations, 'the *absence* of an ideal suggestion cannot be absolutely proved'.⁹ Imaginative constructions are freer¹⁰ in dream than in waking life. This leads to the suggestion that dream world is wider in possibility than waking experience. But Bhattacharyya is *realistic enough* to locate the level or levels *in normal experience* which make the suggestion binding upon us to the extent of urging us on to realise *Samādhi* or ecstatic intuition of the self. In waking experience, there are of

course illusions and hallucinations but initially at least, i.e., before taking any flight to *Samādhi*, Bhattacharyya *recognises* that in such experiences ideational elements are ‘copies’¹¹ of previous percepts. Then again, though in reflection the ‘unconscious working of the idea,¹² is known to ‘animate’¹³ sensation, yet the sense-conditioned consciousness ‘informed’¹⁴ with the idea is ‘felt to be higher in point of truth than the mere idea set over against it’,¹⁵ but that is ‘because the self is not yet dissociated from the body...’,¹⁶ How then to proceed towards the higher truth which is still (on the level of sensation or perception or waking life) a *possibility*? Even in dreams ‘we have copies of waking percepts’.¹⁷

To make the advance from waking experience, Bhattacharyya points out that, notwithstanding the fact that dreams are ‘copies’ of waking percepts, one can build on ‘the consciousness of knowing as distinct from thinking or imagining’,¹⁸ which is ‘brought out in dreams’¹⁹. The phenomenon of dream is thus unique. Even hallucination is not unique because here too sense- excitation cannot be ruled out.

No doubt, dreams are illusory. But dreams do indicate the possibility of exercising control on our part ‘ over the riotous dance of images ...’²⁰; through such control we *could* ‘find secure anchorage in a freer, purer, more comprehensive self’²¹ Such anchorage is not indeed as yet a *demonstrated* fact.

Yet ‘Most of our dreams are self-conscious. Here the self’s relation with the object is peculiarly different from its relation with waking life.’²² Thus (i) ‘here the self is or seems at least to be free from the body;’²³ (ii) ‘sometimes it even sees the body lying asleep’; it is not located anywhere and yet looks at space’.²⁴ (iii) Again, in conscious dream there is the ‘possibility of perception without sensation...’²⁵

It may however be asked: if images indicate or point to the freedom of self, how can we account for the definite order in which they come, their ‘specific combination’²⁶ which Bhattacharyya does take notice of?

The reply would be that there are different *karma*-seeds which determine one’s perception of his world: ‘every man freely accepts, if not makes, his circumstances,’²⁷ Again, on the level which is later than --

historically, not spiritually -- dream, there is dreamless sleep in which the self is 'dissociated not only from body but also from the mind'²⁸

So the freeing movement that starts on the level of dream continues on the level of *susupti* or *dreamless sleep*. When one wakes up from dreamless sleep, one becomes aware of 'absence of knowledge'²⁹, aware that one knew nothing in the dreamless sleep; of course, he knows this from memory; but memory is based on some presentation. So the 'absence of knowledge' must have been presented to one in one's dreamless sleep (for one to *know* the absence of knowledge during one's dreamless sleep). Thus a *negation was presented* to that one's self. One's empirical consciousness lapses altogether in such a state. One's self is confronted with a 'blank homogeneity'³⁰ on this level of consciousness which is *susupti*. Here one reaches (i) the conception of pure self or *caitanya* and (ii) *avidyā* or the primal blank....'³¹

No doubt, the self knows itself on this level and knows also that it *was* existent, not non-existent during dreamless sleep. It knows itself retrospectively on this level as *having been* present even when it was *not* self-conscious, when it *was* mind. And now on this level, it knows, again retrospectively, that its being mind was illusory. It frees itself from *karma* matter, from all empiricity or objectivity. And it retrospectively testifies that *it*, as it *now* is cognisant of dreamless sleep, 'informed'³³ its previous stage (of being mind).

But in *susupti* the self is after all presented with a blank, though it did not know anything specific. In a way, *susupti* is comparable to the dream-state in that in neither has the self any control over itself. But the hint of freedom on the level of *susupti* may be cultured so as to actualise freedom. Hence the level of *susupti* may be conceived, from the point of view of whatever freedom has been the acquisition so far, to be transcended through 'control'³³ of the self so that *samādhi* or ecstatic intuition is attained. Bhattacharyya imaginatively construes the difference between³⁴ *susupti* and *samādhi* thus: 'The one represents the greatest dispersion of attention, the other its utmost concentration'. There is dispersion of attention in the former as there is no specific object for the self to know : it knows 'blank homogeneity' ; there is, however, concentration on the latter level of *samādhi*.

as here the self is absorbed into itself, realises itself. On the former level, there is still the knowledge of *avidyā*, on the latter, *avidyā* itself is transcended. On the former level, *avidyā* is presented as ‘negation’³⁵; on the latter, even negation is transcended. Their differences become more pronounced through the reports that the self makes about itself *after* awakening from *susupti* and *after* awakening from *samādhi*. In the former case, the self reports about itself as having been in the attitude of knowing object³⁶ which, however, was *avidyā* or negation; in the latter case, the self reports that it was the object³⁷, the only object, *the absolute subject which is not only not related to object but also does not negate the relation to objects*. In *samādhi*, the self realises itself as absolute freedom. It is ‘ecstatic identity of thought and being’³⁸.

It now remains for us to ask ourselves ‘what kind of psychology is it that Bhattacharyya has in mind to explicate the levels of consciousness in the Vedāntic light?’ Indeed, Bhattacharyya’s psychological analysis presented here is marvellous, permeated as it is throughout with imaginative insight. Is it not strikingly imaginative when Bhattacharyya points out that in dream the self sometimes ‘sees the body lying asleep’³⁹, that on this level it is ‘not located anywhere and yet it looks at space’⁴⁰? This appears to be the beginning of the detachment from *objectivity*. It appears that the kind of psychology that Bhattacharyya has in mind is a sort of *phenomenology* where levels of consciousness are successively disclosed through an in-depth subjective, reflective analysis. As we start from the waking stage and proceed way through to dream, to ecstasy, we uncover, in phenomenological language, the subjectivity hidden in every stage. Hence such phenomenological disclosure has both an objective side and a subjective side. It is, in other words, *emanation* of the levels of consciousness and not analysis of subjective *presuppositions* of knowledge as is Kant’s programme.

However, one does not do proper justice to Bhattacharyya’s insights if one regards the analysis here presented as *merely phenomenological*. For the levels which are distinguished, disclosed, made explicit - or whatever they may be in phenomenological diction - are not just grades of subjectivity and objectivity but ‘grades of existences’⁴¹. The grades of subjectivity constitute the different *tattvas* of knowledge , which reveal the basic subjectivity of knowledge. Here is another point of difference of

Bhattacharyya from Kant. Kant was rest content with epistemology. But Bhattacharyya explicates the *metaphysics* of epistemology, if one may say so. What Bhattacharyya seeks to do through his analysis is to uncover the levels of *being*, *tattvas* of the Vedāntic system. The uncovering of the different grades of existence is *pari passu* with the uncovering of the different layers of consciousness -- from the utmost objective stage to the absolute subject of ecstatic intuition. In the waking stage, the self, so to say, completely 'forgets itself';⁴² gradually, it rises through dream and dreamless sleep or *susupti* to ecstatic intuition or *samādhi* in which the *self not only denies the existence of everything else but also denies the denial itself* ...⁴³ Being firmly entrenched in ecstasy, the self may realise 'the different grades of noumena (*devatā*) ...⁴⁴ The Vedāntic concept of different *devatās* is interpreted by Bhattacharyya as noumena in different grades. In its ecstasy, the self may first review the whole realm of determinate objects. The self may wake up, so to say, from *samādhi* and realise itself in determinate phenomena. It is *devatā* in relation to that *loka*, i.e. the panorama of phenomena. 'Every *devatā* demands a *loka*.⁴⁵ On the first level of absolute consciousness of *samādhi*, the determinate phenomena in their totality constitute the object or *loka* in relation to the ecstasy of the self which is *devatā*. This, according to Bhattacharyya, is the highest stage of *savikalpa-samādhi* which is only indeterminate consciousness of indeterminate realm of phenomena, of object in general. But this first level of indeterminate consciousness comes to be transcended on a level in which this indeterminate consciousness is 'actualised'⁴⁶ in *nirvikalpa-samādhi* or 'intuition of the reality transcending all determinateness'.⁴⁷ This Vedāntic level of consciousness, according to Bhattacharyya, oversteps the level of Hegel's Absolute Idea, the most adequate reason picture of the thing-in-itself....⁴⁸ as Kant, whom Bhattacharyya quotes approvingly, would say. But the demand arises for the Vedānta, as interpreted by Bhattacharyya, that the most complete reason-picture of the world, which is *picture* nevertheless, be *realised concretely* in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*. For the level of utmost determination, *Iśvara* or God is the ultimate. But the level of consciousness in which all determination is transcended, reason-picture is transcended, is *Brahman*.

It is thus through the uncovering of the different levels of consciousness -- directed as such uncovering is by the consciousness of self -- that Bhattacharyya uncovers the different 'grades of existence'. Every stage in the uncovering of consciousness is an achievement of the being of self or consciousness, achievement of *Brahman*, the *Real*. At every stage, there is indeed the duality of the subject and object, - object discovered as having a subjective core implicit in it and the subject again becoming object on the next higher level of consciousness. But this duality is not the ordinary duality of the subject and object in our experience. Bhattacharyya does not *start from* this duality with which a phenomenologist, e.g. might start, though afterwards the phenomenologist 'brackets' the object. There is no need for 'bracketing' in Bhattacharyya's analysis. For here, the ordinary duality between the subject and object is regarded as *part of the most pervasive duality* between self realised in *samādhi* and objectivity as such, the duality that 'transfigures every stage of existence'.⁴⁹ As Bhattacharyya says, the ordinary conceived duality of the subject and object 'gives place in Vedānta to the conception of a gradation of existences, one pole of which is the stage of the mere object, and the other stage of the pure subject.'⁵⁰ If therefore Bhattacharyya's analysis is phenomenological, it has to be supplemented by the ontology of the Vedānta. It is indeed a metaphysic of experience : the passage from the waking stage to the state of *samādhi* is really self's 'elaboration' of its freedom, to use the diction of Bhattacharyya's later work *The Subject As Freedom*.⁵¹ But as in the latter, so also in the former study of the Vedānta, self or *Brahman* is for Bhattacharyya the apex of freedom, conceived after Vedānta.

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(ii)

METAPHYSICS

In this section, Bhattacharyya starts with the metaphysical or ontological point of view which was struck at the end of the previous section. The ‘primary duality’ of self and negation, Bhattacharyya has already maintained, ‘transfigures every stage of existence’. Bhattacharyya now tries to lay bare such transfiguration of the duality in question in our experience.

But till this duality is reflectively realised, i.e., realised through an in-depth analysis or an inward vision of our normal experience, the different stages of existence become only ‘co-ordinate’¹ with each other. Thus in the waking stage, the different aspects of existence come out as co-ordinate with each other. These distinctions are intelligible only in the light of a metaphysical view ‘dimly traceable’² in the Upanisads. Commentators have not elaborated this view. Bhattacharyya sets forth a ‘hypothesis’³.

It is important to see that in the way of setting forth a hypothesis, Bhattacharyya accords philosophical importance to the mythological notions of *adhyātma*, *adhibhuta*, *adhideva* and *adhiloka*. The philosophically important point that Bhattacharyya makes is that the metaphysical truth of duality (between self and negation) must have a concrete basis in our experience. Bhattacharyya tries to bring this out through the following considerations:

1. There are the notions of *adhyātma* and *adhibhuta*. They are co-ordinate with each other. Their unity has its reflection in the body and the objects of sense-experience. In the unreflective attitude, the body is the subject or *adhyātma* and the objects of sense-experience constitute the *adhibhuta* aspect. Their distinction gives place to ‘the *identity* of the different sentient elements of the body with the different aspects of the object’.⁴
2. This unity or identity is to be contemplated in a medium which must be ‘an eternal shining world’⁵ (*div*), a world in which a *devatā* shines. Thus ‘Every *devatā* demands a *loka*’⁶.

From (1) and (2), it appears that the truth of the identity of the subject and object must be realised. And the concepts of *devatā* and *loka* answer to this demand.

But Bhattacharyya is not satisfied just with the answer to the demand that absolute identity of the subject and object, *devatā* and *loka* must be realised. What he insists on is that the *devatās* or identities must be recognised as universals or ‘absolutes of the senses ...’⁷ Bhattacharyya thus gives a novel interpretation of the basal *devatās* as *a priori universals of sense*. His statement in this connection is worth quoting. As he says, without an absolute intuition-continuum, the thought cannot be real and the *devatā* is therefore the *sense* reality, divested of its limitation of unconsciousness’.⁸ The different sense-aspects, viz., visibility, audibility etc., have each their universals.

These sense-aspects are the ‘primal matters’⁹: they constitute the central substance of the world of names and forms. When one rises to absolute consciousness, one can *see* them, *intuit* them as ‘basal *devatās*’,¹⁰ of which objects are but illusory modifications. *But since they cannot be real without an intuition-medium, they are quite unlike Platonic ideas.* Bhattacharyya’s view of *devatās* as universals seems to have some similarity with Whitehead’s doctrine of ‘eternal’ entities as ‘ingressed’ in actual objects.¹¹ It also seems to be a kind of phenomenological ontology. Professor J.N. Mohanty has drawn attention to this aspect of Whitehead’s thought in his book *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead*. (Calcutta. Progresive Publishers. 1958).

But then, Bhattacharyya’s view is a phenomenological only to an extent. For the phenomenologist has only a façade of similarity with Bhattacharya. Both admit the programme of gradual and successive disclosure of levels of consciousness. But, as we have already pointed out, such disclosure for Bhattacharyya goes beyond phenomenology in conceiving of absolute consciousness or *samādhi* which elaborates itself on the different levels of the disclosure of consciousness. The phenomenologist has no conception of *absolute consciousness’ self-elaboration*.

We have seen, following Bhattacharyya, how the Vedānta doctrine of universals is distinguished from the Platonic doctrine of universals. Plato

conceives of *Universalia ante rem*; Vedānta accords, according to Bhattacharyya, intuition-medium to them. But Bhattacharyya calls our attention to a *second* important difference between the Platonic doctrine and the Vedānta doctrine. It is this that for Vedānta, the ideas (the *devatās*) are not only universals but 'substantial matters'¹² of different phenomena.

Now, phenomena for Bhattacharyya are distinguished - better, stratified - into different grades. The same matter 'persists'¹³ on different grades. The grades are distinguished from the point of view of the degree of their materialisation which again is understood from the point of view of the absolute immaterial subject or *Brahman*. Thus keeping in mind the programme of progressive attainment of subjectivity as referred to earlier, it may be said that dreamless sleep, dream etc. are the 'successive materialisations'¹⁴ of the same immaterial reality of *Brahman*. Now, if the same matter 'persists' on the different grades of materialisation, if the same *devatās* or universals are immanent in those grades, the question arises 'how to account for the differentiation of the grades?'.

Here Bhattacharyya brings in the famous principle of *māyā*. We shall first give an exposition of his views on the point; and then we shall see how his speculations imply a fundamental difference between Hegelian Absolutism and Vedāntic Absolutism.

Bhattacharyya maintains that at the apex of the different grades of materialisation is the 'pure subject (as) the formless matter'¹⁵. And he remarks, in the way of understanding how the pure subject *vis-à-vis* the world arises by way of materialisation, 'The pure subject is the formless matter..... The full-blown reality minus this is absolute negation, the very principle of illusion'¹⁶.

Yet it appears that a satisfactory explanation is not given by Bhattacharyya of materialisation from the point of view of formless matter, i.e. self or *Brahman*.

No explanation can in fact be given. As Bhattacharyya says, 'Of the forms which constitute individuality, no explanation is possible except that illusion is at its root. No universal can exhaust the infinite variety of the individual each step in the differentiation would be unintelligible. It is the

very essence of differentiation to escape the universal. To recognise the necessity of this unknowability is to recognise the principle of *māyā*¹⁷.

What Bhattacharyya says here may be connected with his criticism of the Hegelian Dialectic in his later publication, viz., his article on ‘The Place of the Indefinite in Logic’.¹⁸ That the dialectic cannot explain how or why a particular is *given* is what is highlighted in the article.

However, there is an important difference between Bhattacharyya’s deliberations of Vedānta and the article in question. The work on Vedānta manifestly sides with the Vedānta theory of *māyā*. It is out and out in sympathy with the ontology of Vedānta. But the article in question would treat the Vedānta view as *one alternative theory among indefinitely many alternative theories* in metaphysics. In the present context of discussion, there is a contrast between one metaphysical theory, Vedāntic Absolutism with another, viz, Hegelian Absolutism; in the article in question, however, there is the contrast between *commitment to metaphysical theory as such* - Hegelian theory included - and *neutrality as between metaphysical theories*.

Now to go back to the point about the *devatās* or universals being ‘substantial matters’¹⁹ of phenomena. Vedānta for Bhattacharyya is distinguished from Plato’s or the Naiyāyika’s theory of universal in this that in contrast to either it holds that universal-individual distinction is substance-attribute distinction. If Plato’s or Nyāya’s language is to be used, then Vedānta, on Bhattacharyya’s interpretation, would maintain that the universal or *jāti* is both identical with and different from the individual or *vyākti*. To quote Bhattacharyya’s remarks on the Vedānta theory :

It understands the *jāti* not as the denotational real but as the connotational real, not as co-ordinate with or distinct from the *vyākti* or individual but *identical* with it on the one hand and of a different grade of reality on the other.²⁰

Mark the words ‘grade of reality’. Nyāya would not make such distinction of grades between the universal and the individual. Would Plato do that? No. That the primal matter or universal is the substance and the individual its illusory modification would not be admitted by Plato. Plato would of course relegate the individual to the realm of ‘Non-Being’ but non-

being is no illusory modification of ‘Being’. The expression ‘illusory modification’ is meant in Vedānta to convey the idea that the primal substance, the pure self does not really undergo modification into ‘names’ and ‘forms’ or individuals having those names and forms, that the individuals are only ‘emanations’²¹ of the pure self, as Bhattacharyya would say. Differentiation, materialisation, individualisation - call it as one wills to- of the pure self are all illusory. The real thing, the substantial matter is pure self, *Brahman*. Differentiations etc. are not nothing, not like ‘*bandhyāputra*’ i.e. son of a barren mother nor like square circle. Neither of these latter *appears*, but differentiations etc. *do appear*. But their reality is the reality of *Brahman*. As Bhattacharyya says, ‘the world is real in the reality of *Brahman*’.²² The grade of reality of the differentiations is of course *not* the grade of reality of *Brahman*, but still they *have* a grade of reality. This conception is arrived at by the consideration that the materialisation may be reflectively viewed as the *subject’s* materialisation *and* as subject’s elaborating itself into them. An in-depth understanding of those materialisations would reflectively and *retrospectively disclose*; make *explicit* the self in them; and the same in-depth understanding would *prospectively* view those materialisations to be subject’s materialisation. On the grade of reflection, those materialisations are discovered to have a subjective core in them and, through a return movement of reflection itself (as it were) those materialisations are as though viewed from a distance. On the subjective grades of reflection, there is the gradual emergence of the point of view of self, and the materialisations are, figuratively speaking, *retracted* into the subject; and on the attainment of pure subjectivity, the whole process of uncovering the layers of subjectivity, the whole process of uncovering the layers of subjectivity *in object* is retrospectively viewed and *owned* by the subject. In such retrospection, the materialisations would be viewed as ‘*informed*’,²³ to use Bhattacharyya’s expression, by the subject. Thus grades of subjectivity and objectivity are *writ*, so to say, in the whole panorama of existence. To recall Bhattacharyya, the duality of subject and object ‘transfigures every stage of existence’²⁴. – ‘every stage of existence’ meaning every grade of existence, every grade in the achievement of subjectivity and every grade retrospectively looked at from the point of achieved subjectivity. *Bhattacharyya’s concept of grades of existence or stages of existence cannot be understood except through the*

application of reflective method he employs when he distinguishes waking, dream, dreamless sleep and *samādhi* or ecstatic intuition as stages in the progressive achievement of the *being* of the subject.

From the point of view of the conception of grades of existence, a contrast may be made between Vedānta and Plato and also between Vedānta and Hegel.

Once the materialisations are assigned ‘grade of reality’, they cannot be consigned or relegated to ‘Non-Being’ of Plato’s conception; the grades, to recall Bhattacharyya’s words, ‘transfigure every stage of existence’.

On the same question of the status of materialisations *vis-à-vis* the real, differences between Hegel and Vedānta are acute. For Hegel, the materialisations are the negations through which the Absolute affirms itself. For Vedānta, *Brahman* or the Absolute is the ‘truth of the grades of materialisation’²⁵. But for Vedānta, these materialisations are not negated by the self; they are contained in the *bodied being* of the self. But the self does not *need to affirm itself* through its bodied being. As reflectively does it *retract* itself from its bodied being as it, when it was *un-reflective*, put forth its bodied being.

Lest Bhattacharyya should not be misunderstood in respect of his view of pure self *vis-à-vis* materialisation, we should dispose of an objection that may be anticipated. It may run thus : Bhattacharyya has opined that materialisation out of pure immaterial self cannot be explained except through the principle of *māyā*. But do not the materialisations find some *place* in his programme of the subject’s self-clarification through grades of objectivity ? If they do, they are not to be explained by *māyā*. Why, then, should *not* Vedānta and Bhattacharyya uphold the theory that materialisations are creations out of self? If, however, the theory of creation is not acceptable to Vedānta and Bhattacharyya, then the materialisations must be said to fall *outside* the subject’s process of self-clarification. And if this latter is admitted, where can any longer be any objection to the acceptance of Plato’s theory of Non-Being?

Bhattacharyya steers clear of the creation-theory and Plato’s theory of Non-Being. Two expressions of his are particularly relevant here, viz.,

'emanation' and 'informs'. Thus grades of existence are said to be emanatory by him.²⁶ Again, he says about the stages of existence that 'each stage unconsciously informs the lower state'²⁷. The grades do not *really* emerge, are not creations. Writes Bhattacharyya: "...creation, according to Śaṅkara, is emanation (*vivarta*).."²⁸ In clearing the concept of emanation, we may seek help from a string of statements that Bhattacharyya makes in "The Advaita and its Spiritual significance". Thus :

..... this manifold that is manifested by him (i.e. *Brahman*) is manifested as in fact as much retracted as created.²⁹

Again:

..... His creativity is like that of a magician His freedom or Śakti is neither absolutely real nor unreal.³⁰

So the idea of free creation, creation out of sheer sport as is a magician's creation, i.e., creation that has *no reason* explains emanation to some extent. The self freely *puts forth* the materialisations and as freely *frees itself* from those materialisations. It is the *mystery of freedom*, if may use some such expression, that helps up understand creation as emanation.

But were not materialisations real when they were put forth? Did they not *then* affect the self?

The reply must be in the negative. Being free creations, the materialisations do not affect *Brahman* just as the magician's creations do not affect him.

But do not the materialisations *fall within* the process of subject's self-elaboration? In reply, Bhattacharyya would hold that the higher stage of existence 'informs' the lower stage. The higher one 'informs' the lower one in the sense that it lends its own reality, so to say, to the lower one : whatever reality the lower one has, it has it on account of its being 'informed' by the higher. In the retrospective moment of self-elaboration when the self views the materialisations from a distance, it understands them as being 'informed' by itself and does *not* understand itself as affected *by* them: they do not affect because they are real outside the context of self's actualizing of itself.

We have considered at length Bhattacharyya's view of grades of emanatory existences. And we have seen how the grades emerge in self-conscious reflection.

We now go back to the point that Bhattacharyya has made about the relation of universals i.e. 'basal devatās'³¹ or 'primal matters'³² as he calls them to the world-appearance. At different stages of emanation, we have different universals, different basal devatās. They belong to different emanatory grades. But the point is that ultimately, i.e., at the apex of gradationary existences we have *Brahman* or pure self. So it can be indifferently said that devatās are given or universals are given or *Brahman* is given. This view has two important consequences, one philosophical and another doctrinal.

The first consequence *situates* Bhattacharyya's interpretation of *devatās* or universals or *Brahman* in the context of a philosophical view according to which *a priori* priorities are given. We have already had an idea of this affiliation when we referred to Bhattacharyya's view that *devatās* must be recognised as 'absolute of the senses.....'³³ Kant, e.g., maintained the *a priori* forms of our knowledge are given in transcendental reflection. Bhattacharyya's view of Vedānta universals or *devatās* of Vedānta conception can of course be affiliated to the Kantian theory but subject of course to a *proviso* : Kant maintained that in transcendental reflection the *a priori* forms are given as forms that *anticipate matter*. For Bhattacharyya, the forms are known as forms, i.e., they can be known in *themselves* (apart from reference to matter) in *upāsana*.³⁴

The second consequence relates itself to the doctrinal matter of Vedānta. The conception of forms, universals, devatās --- *Brahman* in fact, being *given* - helps Bhattacharyya interpret the world - appearance in a way that entitles him to be recognised as a *novel interpreter of Vedānta*. The novelty is two - fold.

First, if the forms are *given*, given as forms - and not as forms of matter - in sense-intuition, if *Brahman* is given in world - appearance, then the appearance is neither nothing as a nihilist interpreter of Vedānta might say, nor real appearance as a realistic interpreter of Vedānta might maintain. On the contrary, the given appearance itself suggests, points to, symbolises

Brahman. Appearance has thus a novel status for Bhattacharyya which is different from the one usually accorded to it. He calls the world ‘absolute appearance’ in his essay “The Advaita and its Spiritual Significance.”³⁵ In connection with this interpretation of world appearance, a statement that he makes is relevant, viz., ‘..... the world (is) unreal apart from *Brahman* and real in the reality of *Brahman*. The latter side is frequently overlooked’.³⁶

The second novelty of Bhattacharyya’s interpretation is that he regards *māyā* as ‘absolute negation’³⁷. *Māyā* is variously described by Bhattacharyya : as darkness’,³⁸ ‘dark ground’,³⁹ ‘negation’,⁴⁰ etc. *Māyā* as ‘absolute negation’ is *not nothing*. It is lighted by pure consciousness or *Brahman*.

Bhattacharyya’s statements in this connection are worth quoting:

..... it is darkness only that can be at once revealed and destroyed by light. This is the famous principle of *māyā*.⁴¹

As *Brahman*, the undifferenced intelligence shines on *māyā*; it turns it into object⁴²

What label should, then, be given to Bhattacharyya as an interpreter of Vedānta ? Labelling of a philosopher, like comparison, is odious as it ignores his distinctiveness. However, let us ask ourselves, one after another, some questions and find out which answer fits Bhattacharyya’s interpretation the best.

Is Bhattacharyya a nihilist? No, the world-appearance is *given* for him.

Is he, then, a *realist*? No, the world for him is no real evolute of *Brahman* but only its *emanation*.

It is distinctive of Bhattacharyya that he maintains *both* that the world - appearance is *given* and that the appearance suggests its own *transcendence*. Bhattacharyya, then, gives a new interpretation to ‘appearance’.

Should we then say, keeping in mind his view of world - appearance as suggesting its own transcendence, that Bhattacharyya is an acosmist ? But if he is an a cosmist, does he regard world - appearance as *tuchha* or absolute

nought ? He does, at least in ‘Śankara’s Doctrine of *Māyā*’⁴³. But the distinctiveness of Bhattacharyya lies in this that for him there is the consciousness of *tuchha* in the experiencing of the world (on the part of one who has realised *Brahman*), an appearance of *tuccha* in the world-appearance. When *tuchha* is understood to be *tuchha* and understood yet as appearing, the *tuccha* itself points to the way the boundary of our knowledge is to be transcended. One can then peep over the limits of one’s knowledge of the world. Bhattacharya’s interpretation is therefore acosmic, but it is *acosmism that is based on the given*. Bhattacharyya’s Vedānta - interpretation therefore is to be understood on its own terms. Labels for his thought are to be made in terms of his distinctive theory. No borrowed label fits him as it does not fit any philosopher.

The point of view of *acosmism as based on the given being struck*, it is easy to see now how it determines Bhattacharyya’s handling of other concepts and their relation to the concept of *Brahman*.

A similar point of view is struck by Bhattacharyya in his article ‘Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of *Māyā*’. Here he observes that the illusory content is ‘given’ and he implies that in being given, it suggests the idea of *Brahman* as the ‘self-shining truth’ that is not given. Our knowledge of the world helps us peep over its limit or boundary. This is an idea that is found in Bhattacharyya’s ‘Mind and Matter’ and it is in sharp contrast to the idea that the limit of knowledge is to be drawn outside. Knowledge for Bhattacharyya, *transcendence of knowledge can be seen from within knowledge*.

The point of view of acosmism as based on the given is really the restatement of the view that *a priori universals are given*, that *Brahman* is given and given in its transcendence. From this point of view, the relation of *Brahman* to *Īśvara* may be understood after Bhattacharyya in the following way :

‘*Īśvara* is not in reality different from *Brahman*’⁴⁴. *Īśvara* is conceived as wielder of *māyāśakti* and therefore as transcendent of *māyā*, while *Brahman* is transcendent even of such transcendence. Reference may be made to Bhattacharyya’s speculations in ‘The Advaita and its Spiritual Significance’⁴⁵ and also to the present chapter⁴⁶. Here Bhattacharyya parts company with the interpretation of some scholiasts who distinguish between

Iśvara as lower God and *Brahman* as higher God. *First*, the distinction between lower God and higher God, if drawn at all, would be a distinction *within Iśvara*, between *Iśvara* as wielder of *māyā* and as transcendent of *māyā* and *not* between *Iśvara* and *Brahman*. *Second*, while *Iśvara* transcends *māyā*, *Brahman* transcends such transcendence. To quote from Bhattacharyya's article "The Advaita and its Spiritual Significance":

Brahman is the eternal self that has not only no positive determination, but has not even the negative determination of consciously rejecting positive determination.⁴⁷

Again, - this is another point of difference of *Brahman* from *Iśvara* - *Iśvara* is free from *māyā*, whereas *Brahman* is freedom, i.e., *free even from the freeing process*. To quote Bhattacharyya:

The self or the absolute is not a thing having freedom but freedom itself.⁴⁸

The distinction of *Brahman* from *Iśvara* may be further elaborated, as Bhattacharyya does, with reference to *parā-prakrti* and *aparā- prakrti*.⁴⁹ The primal intelligence or *Brahman* entering *māyā* becomes diversified into determinate intelligence or subject *and* object, *Iśvara* and *aparā - prakrti*. *Iśvara* is self - affirming intelligence, but *Brahman* is beyond even self - affirmation, - it is pure consciousness. This self - affirming, undifferentiated intelligence, which is within itself, is the absolute of *savikalpa-samādhi*, being self - affirming. But *Brahman*, being *beyond* self-affirming consciousness or being pure consciousness, is not *Iśvara* : *Brahman* is realised only in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*. *Parā - prakrti* is the 'intelligence of *Iśvara*'⁵⁰ or 'self as shining on *māyā*'.⁵¹ But while *Iśvara* appears to be shining on *māyā*, *Brahman* is the 'Existent'⁵² which transcends *māyā*.

Upshot of Bhattacharyya's study of Vedāntic Metaphysics

1. The Vedānta Metaphysics of a priori

At the apex of the grade of emanatory existences, Bhattacharyya would place the 'absolutely formless indeterminate matter'.⁵³ And he says that the formless matter or self 'persists'⁵⁴ in all the grades. Thus :

Ideas are not only concrete universals but *substantial matters*⁵⁵ of different grades....

These sense - aspects in Vedānta are the primal matters, the absolutes of the senses⁵⁶

It is also maintained by Bhattacharyya that the sense - aspects or ‘basal *devatās*’⁵⁷ themselves may give way to higher grades or stages and each of the stages is capable of being actualised into *devatās* by ‘ecstatic contemplation’.⁵⁸ All this is of a piece with Bhattacharyya’s basic point, viz...., the formless matter or self or *Brahman* ‘persists’ in different grades of existence.

So, Vedānta, as interpreted by Bhattacharyya, *sees Brahman* in the whole panorama of existence. If we want to borrow the Platonic diction *without* accepting Plato on the issue, we may say that *Ideas are not universalia ante rem* but are ‘concrete universals’.⁵⁹ Or, if we like to talk in the Kantian style *without* accepting Kant on the issue, we have to say that *a priorities are given*. But where Kant holds that they are *presuppositions* of knowledge, Vedānta would point out they are ‘actualised’ in ecstatic intuition. For Kant, they are forms of objects in so far as objects are known; for Vedānta, they are *metaphysical* structures of objects of knowledge. For Kant, form of the object of knowledge is but the form of the *knowledge* of object; for Vedānta the form of the *knowledge* of object *resolves* itself into form of the *object* of knowledge. Bhattacharyya indeed helps us understand the *difference between Kantian presuppositions and Vedāntic tattvas*.

So the *Vedāntic metaphysics of a priorities*, which latter are neither Platonic nor Kantian, is the first important conceptual yield in Bhattacharyya’s study (of Vedāntic metaphysics).

2. *Māyā as ‘absolute negation’ : the difference between Vedānta absolutism and Hegelian absolutism*

Bhattacharyya describes māyā as ‘absolute negation’⁶⁰. It is ‘the matrix of names and forms. These too must be eternal, coeternal with the pure subject’⁶¹. This view of Bhattacharyya’s affords us an opportunity to contrast Hegelian absolutism with Vedāntic absolutism. We are supported in our endeavour to make the contrast by relevant observations of Bhattacharyya’s

in the same context in which he describes *māyā*. He observes that the forms that constitute individuality cannot be rationally explained.⁶² It is evident that Bhattacharyya has the Hegelian dialectic in mind. Hegel's dialectic would try to reduce *māyā* which is negation to the original affirmation. To Vedānta, however, negation of negation would be negation. *Isvara* negates *māyā* (as transcending it) and thereby affirms itself, but *Brahman* is not even self-affirming consciousness,⁶³ and *negates even the negation of negation*, which (latter negation) is *māyā*, in *Isvara*'s self-affirming consciousness. This explains why Bhattacharyya calls *māyā* as 'absolute negation'.

To sum up, let us quote Bhattacharyya :


The primary duality of self and negation, which is no duality of positives, has been found to transfigure every stage of existence.⁶⁴

As against Hegel's absolute idealism, Vedānta of Bhattacharyya's interpretation holds that *negation of negation is negation*; and *as against Kant's idealism*, it holds that self is *not presupposed* but *actualised* in ecstatic intuition. And, again, for Hegel, negation is (gradually) negated and turns into affirmation and incorporated into the Absolute. But for Vedānta, negation of negation is negation, not incorporated into the Absolute, it being felt as 'blank negation' through which the subject, as not having been presented with something, realizes itself as *un-objective*.

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(iii)

LOGIC

Place of Logic in Vedānta

Bhattacharyya here asks the question ‘If the central truth of Vedānta is that the undifferenced being of pure self can only be revealed, what is the place of argumentation in Vedānta? If ecstatic intuition in which *Brahman* is realised is not immediately available to the seeker of knowledge of *Brahman*, how can he start the enquiry at all?

Bhattacharyya’s answer is two-fold : (i) arguments in Vedānta are only ‘suggestions of the beyond’ ;¹ (2) the phenomenal world. ‘suggests the noumenon’, though only as a ‘thought’.²

But how does such suggestion arise ? Some ‘provisional belief’ or ‘śraddhā’³ is needed to start the enquiry. Such provisional belief is induced by śabda or āgama, by ‘authoritative statements’⁴. It may lead to realisation. ‘This is the only justification which we may expect to have of the truth of what is claimed to be revelation, from below.....⁵

Particular reference is made in this context to Śabdapramāṇa which is of course elaborated subsequently. Śraddhā in the śabda or āgama is rooted in a definite view of the relationship between śabda or word and artha or object. For Bhattacharyya, Śabda necessarily refers to object or *Brahman* : it being self’s objectification, it has a built-in reference to object. As Bhattacharyya has remarked in his elaborate discussion on Śabdapramāṇa, in the noumenal context the word becomes ‘reified’.⁶

Now, in the noumenal context Śabda or āgama may indeed be the pramāṇa. But how can Śabda, taken in the sense of authoritative statements regarding revelation of the truth (i. e. *Brahman*) intended for the seeker, help the seeker know *Brahman*? Śabda may have a direct referential role for the teacher. But for the learner it does not have the role *immediately*. That is to say, for the learner the fact of the word (in the capital) being given is no immediate guarantee of the realisation of truth.

But then the learner may have manana of the authoritative or revealed texts. Manana is the ‘mental act which generates knowledge by

means of arguments defending the truth embodied in the texts against objections preferred by other evidences⁷. So *defensive* arguments may obviate the force of counter-arguments against the truth.

But then can defensive arguments help the seeker *know* truth ?

Two considerations must be borne in mind before the issue can be settled. *First*, *no argument as such* is of any avail to anyone in so far as *knowing* the truth is concerned. *Second*, an argument may yet *generate a vision* or a *suggestion* for the learner.

But *after* the learner acquires a vision or gets a suggestion, he reassesses the arguments. It is then that he can distinguish between defensive arguments and 'heretical objections'⁸ to them, - can, in fact, *see through* the heretical objections.

It cannot be said that the passage in the mind of the learner -- from arguments to the generation of vision and then again from the generation of vision to a reassessment of arguments -- involves a circle. Really, as the learner proceeds from arguments and derives a vision, there is a progressive deepening of his consciousness ; and when the truth becomes explicit in his consciousness, the learner understands the suggestive or the symbolic value of the arguments : they suggest and symbolise for him the truth he has attained.

It may, however, be objected : are not the arguments first *given* to the learner ? *Psychologically*, they come first. The deepening of his consciousness, in which the learner is alleged to take a re-look at the arguments, is a spiritual matter, but it is not historically first. As and when the arguments were *given* to him to meditate upon, they did *not* generate any vision.

Here the learner is confronted with two possible situations. *Either*, he may *begin with skepticism* regarding the arguments, i.e., regarding their value. Or, he may begin with *śraddhā*. *Śraddhā* is translated by Bhattacharyya as 'provisional belief' in the authority of teachers who claim to have *seen* the truth. But what induces 'provisional belief'? In reply, we are told by Bhattacharyya that it can only be induced by authoritative statements.

Is there no circle here in what Bhattacharyya says about the relationship between ‘provisional belief’ and ‘authoritative statements’?

An observation of Bhattacharyya’s may help us entangle the issue. He speaks of an ‘eternal succession of omniscient teachers’⁹. From this point of view, the learner can have ‘provisional belief’ in the authority of the teacher uttering the truth because he is a part of a spiritual community which is the repository of the Vedāntic truth. As a member of the spiritual community, he cannot be sceptic.

Is Bhattacharyya settling the issue by stipulation? Does he stipulatively include the seeker into the Vedāntic community and as stipulatively rule out the sceptic ?

What exactly is the point of view of the sceptic in regard to truth? The sceptic is one who holds that truth is ‘created by mental activity’. This is just where Bhattacharyya would part ways with the sceptic. As an interpreter of Vedānta, he holds that ‘truth can only be recognised and not created by mental activity¹⁰

Hence the basic difference between Bhattacharyya and the sceptic rests on the acceptance or rejection of the absolutist point of view regarding truth. Bhattacharyya, in other words, implies that either truth is to be understood as based on Cognitive Community or it is not understood at all.

Once this absolutist standpoint regarding truth - apprehension is admitted, all that Bhattacharyya says about the role of logic in Vedānta, i.e., in the context of realisation of *Brahman* falls in place. Then it is understood that the Vedāntic truth that *Brahman* is real is conveyed, spelt out, elaborated in argumentation or logic.

Thus Bhattacharyya says, ‘Inference, and the other natural sources of knowledge, cannot yield the sacred truths but only point to them’.¹¹ Again, ‘inference etc. ... show the direction along which one may proceed to the truths.’¹²

So from the point of view of *attained* truth, i.e., from the point of view of the *teacher*, inference etc., - in short, logical arguments - can be, as it were, retrospectively viewed as elaborating the truth already known. And

from the point view of one to whom the truth is *yet* to be attained, i.e., from the point of view of the *learner*, logic can serve as take-off point in his spiritual journey in so far as, being a member of a spiritual community, he has ‘provisional belief’ in the authority of his teacher.

Lest one does not -- in this mire of arguments and counter-arguments -- lose sight of Bhattacharyya’s definite position on the place of logic or argumentation in the context of the revealed truth of Vedānta, the strikingly novel point of his in the context of the present discussion should be explicitly stated : *pramāṇa* or logic is but the ‘self-evident elaboration of the self evident’, to use Bhattacharyya’s telling expression in his article on “The Concept of Philosophy”.¹³ The word is ‘reified’, as Bhattacharyya insightfully puts it. Āgamaśāstra is *Brahman*’s expressing itself, elaborating itself in the mind of the seeker. *Brahman*, the supreme teacher, comes to teach the learner. The learner receives communion from his Teacher ‘ spirit can only teach spirit’ echoes Bhattacharyya.

Two points ought to be noted now. *First* logic, considered in the present context, is not a discipline, but *ratiocinative process*, i.e., argumentation. It is *tarka* in Vedānta; *second*, logic, says Bhattacharyya, ‘considers all the *pramāṇas* or sources of knowledge’¹⁴.

The second point needs some elaboration. With regard to this, again, two questions arise. *First*, logic is said to consider the *pramāṇas* but then *pramāṇas* themselves are logical elaborations of the truth (about *Brahman*). But is this not putting the cart before the horse ? But the point that seems to be in Bhattacharyya’s mind is this that logic or *tarka* is stratification of the realised truth. *Second*, if logic considers the ‘sources’ of knowledge, then is it not psychological ? *How* one obtains knowledge is a question relative to one’s psychology and this question should not have anything to do with logic which is an objective study. The reply would be that in the Vedāntic context consideration of the source of knowledge is *the* thing of importance - all knowledge, all argument, all ratiocination being ultimately *Brahman* - based. *Bhattacharyya’s logic is cognition-rooted as Kant’s Transcendental logic was intended to be or as Husserl’s logic was rooted in the intentionality of consciousness.*

Hence it is perfectly consistent on Bhattacharyya's part to say that logic, in the Vedāntic context, 'comprises a good deal of epistemological matter'.¹⁵ If it is asked 'To what extent a logic containing epistemological matter is really logic which is *formal* and has nothing to do with the *content* of knowledge, i.e., *Brahman* to which all knowledge for Vedānta is oriented?', Bhattacharyya would reply that for him logic has philosophical roots (in the consciousness of *Brahman*). Logic is elaboration, stratification etc. of the immediately felt matter, i.e., reality of *Brahman*.

Bhattacharyya refers to the distinction made in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* between *pramātrū - caitanya*, *vṛtti - caitanya* and *viṣaya - caitanya*.

PRATYAKṢA

The key to the analysis of *pratyakṣa* in Vedānta is Bhattacharyya's observation that 'the attitude of *nirvikalpa - pratyakṣa* is retained in the perception of phenomenal objects'¹⁶. In two ways, Bhattacharyya highlights the role of the pure self or *Brahman* in empirical knowledge.

First, all empirical knowledge is 'self-abnegation'¹⁷ of pure consciousness or self. The self is immanent in knowledge; and empirical knowledge derives whatever authority (*pramāṇya*) it has from this immanence.

Secondly, Bhattacharyya accords importance to the Vedāntic view of the mechanism of knowledge for a particular reason, viz., to explain how perception of object *as* object, is possible. Vedānta maintains that in perception mind goes out of the sense - orifices of the body to assume the form of the object *and* this mental modification as lighted by pure consciousness amounts to *pratyakṣa*. Bhattacharyya points out that if only the former process takes place but the latter does not, then 'perception of object *as* object' would not take place¹⁸. In other words, pure self would not only know the object but also know it as *object*. To be an object is to be an object *for* subject or self. Thus, once again, Bhattacharyya highlights the role of pure self in empirical knowledge.

Here is an important difference between Kant and Vedānta. For Kant, self is only the 'logical presupposition'¹⁹ of knowledge; for Vedānta, it is immanent in knowledge. To render knowledge of perceived object *as*

object, the self should, as Bhattacharyya says, ‘come out as determinate self-consciousness as distinct from object consciousness’,²⁰ as *pramātṛcaitanya* as distinct from *viśayačaitanya*.

Once more, Bhattacharyya accords prominence to the role of self in perception. Contrasting the physiological account of perception according to which- in perception- influences from object come to meet the mind as located in the body with the Vedāntic view according to which mind going out of the body comes to be illumined by self, Bhattacharyya expresses his preference for the latter. The former cannot explain how knowledge or *perception* as such takes place. The Vedāntic view explains perception better than the physiological theory as it accords *importance to the reference-point in the cognitive or perceptual situation*. The reference - point may be body in ordinary perception, as distinguished from pure self in *nirvikalpa - pratyakṣa*. But still the body becomes the reference - point in ordinary (i.e., determinate) perception in so far as the self is understood as located in the body. Now the point that emerges out of the contrast between the physiological theory and the Vedāntic theory is, once again, this that empirical knowledge is to be explained from the point of view of self.

Then Bhattacharyya turns attention to understand the status of the content of illusory perception. We shall see how he disposes of three theories in this connection.

But first, what is Bhattacharyya’s explanation of the content of illusory perception? Here too, according to Bhattacharyya, ‘there is a real materialisation of self’²¹.

‘When the nacre is mistaken for silver, the nacre, a mode of *māyā* ... modifies the mental mode coincident with it by the idea of silver which it revives by similarity. The self looking through it sees the objective illusory mode, silver’²².

Bhattacharyya now disposes of three theories of illusion, viz., *anyathākhyātivāda*, *ātmakhyātivāda* and *asatkhyātivāda*. Of course, he does not explicitly refer to the last by name, but it is clear from his arguments that he has this theory in mind.

First, *anyathākhyātivāda* holds that the illusory object is not created: we ‘intellectually pass’²³ on to the silver, i.e., the illusory object which exists elsewhere.

Bhattacharyya replies that the intellectual element in illusory perception is really ‘concept based on an associated image.’²⁴

Is the illusory content, then, an image, i.e., something subjective as the *ātmakhyātivādin* holds? Bhattacharyya replies that ‘a subjectivity, unconscious of its subjectivity, is nothing but the ... inexplicable or illusory objectivity.’²⁵

To the possible objection that the illusory silver is sometimes silver and sometimes nacre, Bhattacharyya replies that in correction ‘one is not conscious of the real silver being absent but only of the illusory silver having vanished’.²⁶

One thing must be noted here : Bhattacharyya speaks of our ‘disbelief’²⁷ in the persistence of the illusory silver. This is important. In his later writing viz., his essay on ‘Śaṅkara’s doctrine of *Māyā*’²⁸, Bhattacharyya sharply contrasts the Vedāntic view of the content of illusory perception from the *asatkhyātivādin*’s view of the same. He points out that the illusory content, what to speak of its being real when it is detected to be illusory, was not real even when it appeared : ‘existence is denied of it absolutely’²⁹. It is *disbelieved*. And *what is disbelieved cannot be the content of a negation*. *The asatkhyātivādin maintains that the illusory content can be the subject of a negative judgment, i.g., ‘that silver is not here’*. But Bhattacharya points out that a negation implies a previous belief, but disbelief is not negation of a previous belief, there being none such. We shall later on see that ‘disbelief’ is a very important concept for Bhattacharyya. In his paper ‘The False and the Subjective’, Bhattacharyya pinpoints ‘disbelief’ as a mode of awareness that is *non-cognitive* and understands disbelief as *having no object as cognitive awareness has*; disbelief has as its content belief that is rejected, that is past. Bhattacharyya goes on to observe that the false or illusory content is content of a rejected belief that is, again, content of the present disbelief.

ANUMĀNA

Bhattacharyya develops his Vedāntic interpretation of the process of *anumāna*, of what is involved in it, of its implication etc. mainly through his criticism of the Nyāya view of *anumāna*.

There are, according to Nyāya, three steps in the inferential process : first, the statement of universal relation between the middle term and the major term or *vyāpti*, second, the perception of middle term in the minor term or *pakṣa - dharmatā*; and third, the unity of this relation with the memory of *vyāpti* or *tritya - linga - parāmarśa*.

According to Nyāya, the major premise or axiom of syllogism is itself an induction based on (i) observation of concomitance between the major term and the middle term and (ii) non-observation of the concomitance of absences of the terms.

Bhattacharyya criticises Nyāya on the following grounds:-

1. As regards the major premise, the question of what number of instances is needed for one to arrive at it is a purely psychological question which has no relevance in logic. Logic is concerned with truth and not with the degree of the intensity of one's belief.³⁰
2. Positive evidences alone can generate belief (in the major premise). Negative instances constitute only a 'collateral justification'³¹.
3. The number of instances on the basis of which one infers the major premise, according to Nyāya, operates only as a 'function'³²; the instances are 'not separately registered in the mind'.³³
4. The unity in an inferential process operates as a *samskāra*. The major premise, says Bhattacharyya, is a consciously operative universal and not 'an abstract reason only'.³⁴ The relation of relations, i.e., *tritiyalingaparāmarśa* is unintelligible. Immediately as one sees the smoke, *vyāpti* or the major premise is evoked in one's mind as a *samskāra*. As Bhattacharyya says, the perception of smoke (on the occasion of the inference 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke') 'rouses into conscious activity the *samskāra* of the relation between smoke and fire'.³⁵

Bhattacharyya's views on inference should not however be understood within the *restricted bounds* of his controversy with Nyāya. It should be connected with the view of the universal of *devatās*, of *Brahman* in short, that he has formulated in the first chapter, viz., the view that universal or *devatā* of *Brahman* is *given* (whichever grade of emanatory existence one has in mind). We have seen that Bhattacharyya dares Platonism even in the realm of sense : for him there are *a priori* universals of sense. Of course, it is Platonism of concrete universals : these are concretely given in sense.

Connect now, all these (apparently) phenomenological speculations with the conception that Bhattacharyya has arrived at through his criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of universals. viz., the conception that the major premise of inference, stating the relationship between the middle term, e.g., smoke and the major term, e.g., fire is 'immanent'³⁶ in the perception of smoke. Then we come to the conclusion that the axiom of syllogism is operative as a conscious *samskāra* in the perception of smoke.

At bottom, the involvement of the axiom of syllogism in the inferential operation is part of the immanence of universal or *Brahman* in different grades of existence. Therefore, this *distinctive* understanding of the role of the axiom of syllogism as a consciously operative universal helps Bhattacharyya make a *breakthrough towards the larger thesis* about the Vedāntic absolute syllogism.³⁷ We turn to it now.

The absolute syllogism is stated thus: 'The universe is unreal because it is other than *Brahman* and whatever is other than *Brahman* is unreal like silver in nacre'.

Now, this inference does not certainly derive its force from 'like silver in nacre'. In every inference, an example or *drṣṭānta* is needed to support its major premise. But 'like silver in nacre' does not support the major premise 'Whatever is other than *Brahman* is unreal'. On the contrary, 'silver in the nacre' is understood to be illusory because one knows the distinction, *within phenomena*, *between* real and unreal; and again, one knows the real-unreal distinction within phenomena because one already knows *Brahman*.

So what kind of inference, after all, is the absolute syllogism of Vedānta ? It is only symbolising the consciousness of *Brahman* without which the phenomenality of the world would have been inconceivable. Otherwise, considered as an *argument*, the inference would be circular. It would be of some such form ‘How do you know that the world is unreal ? Because it is other than *Brahman*. But how do you know that what is other than *Brahman* is unreal ? Because *Brahman* is the only real, anything other than *Brahman* is unreal’. But the circularity disappears on the realisation that the inference is *self - elaboration* of the immediate intuition of *Brahman*.

Thus the absolute syllogism of Vedānta is such that it points to the necessary self - transcendence of all inference, all *pramāṇa* on the part of the seer who has the immediate intuition of *Brahman*. It is through thought - forms that one can, as Hegel maintained, go beyond thought - forms, ‘to the absolute realities of which they are shadows’.³⁸ The absolute syllogism, therefore, implies the immanence of *Brahman*-consciousness on every grade of existence and also its involvement in the major premise of syllogism. The entire speculation of Bhattacharyya’s regarding inference is rooted in the thought that *Brahman* is immanent in all knowledge.

UPAMĀNA

As knowledge of similarity, it is an independent *pramāṇa*.

It is not perception. It is knowledge of similarity between two things. Similarity is a relation. In perception, two things are not present and therefore their similarity is not present. Can similarity be reduced to identity (as *Brahman*-consciousness is) ? Bhattacharyya admits that identity is the ‘truth of similarity’.³⁹ Yet he points to the difference between the empirical consciousness of similarity and the identity consciousness of *Brahman*. Here comes Bhattacharyya’s wonderful imaginative construction on the point : ‘In this consciousness, there is a process, a swinging of the self backward and forward, bespeaking a limitation of its freedom. Hence it is a new kind of *pramāṇa*’⁴⁰.

ĀGAMA

Vākya is an independent *pramāṇa*. Every sentence ‘at once’⁴¹ refers to an objective situation.

What does "at once" mean? It seems that, according to Bhattacharyya, a sentence, so far as it is a sentence, i.e., *constitutionally* is object-ward. Writes Bhattacharyya, "The copula of a judgment is the self pointing necessarily to an object and unity of the sentence is but this self clothed in language".⁴²

It may be objected that there is here a confusion between the 'is' (copula) of predication and 'is' of objectivity. The former, it would be said, 'is a logical concept, the latter epistemological. But then, according to Bhattacharyya, predication is nothing but the fact of self functioning towards object. As Bhattacharyya says, '*Buddhi* is the faculty of knowledge the quiescent self - affirmation in the copula of a judgment'⁴³ Gopinath Bhattacharyya is indeed right when he writes, "The author, perhaps, means to say that the copula represents the assertive function of the self."⁴⁴ But then 'the assertive function of the self' is self's tendency to objectify. It is because the self (i.e. *Brahman*) is immanent in every judgment and the copula is the objectifying of the self that every judgment refers to object.

In every judgment, in so far as the self or understanding makes for its objectivity, there is reference to noumenon. This is, however, a *demanded* reference, because there is, on the level of judgment as such, no identity between it and the noumenon. The noumenon wants its true expression. Noumena, according to Vedānta, are revealed. Every word, as used in judgment, is demanded to be the true form of noumena. It is the demand of noumenon on the word to be its true expression through which the *intentionality of the word* is to be understood. This is *ontology of meaning and it is different from the ordinary referential theory of meaning*.

This theory of word as the form of the noumenal is fortified by the following consideration:

Every word, uttered or written, is manifested through its *dhvani*, i.e., its sensuous form. Bhattacharyya points out that whenever a sound is produced, it is recognised as 'that sound'.⁴⁵ So we have to recognise the sound form to be persistent. The sound - form is the sensuous objective form of the word. Therefore, the word is to be regarded as *the* word, the impersonal reality of the word written or uttered. The word is *the* object, the real. Further, the word is, through its manifestation, eternal and '..... is

manifested to us as the word existent in all previous cycles⁴⁶ From this point of view, it may be said that 'a sentence by itself has objective reference'⁴⁷, though in the secular context, the meaning of a sentence is determined through 'the knowledge of the topic through other evidences'.⁴⁸

In this connection, Bhattacharyya's emphasis on the *tātparya*⁴⁹ of a sentence is worth mentioning. *Tātparya* is the 'objective intention'⁵⁰ of a sentence. Every sentence, according to Bhattacharyya, has 'intrinsic *tatparyā*'.⁵¹ Bhattacharyya here distinguishes between *tātparya* or the objective intention of the sentence and *yogyata*⁵² or 'comportibility of meaning between parts of a sentence'.⁵³ The latter is 'consistency'⁵⁴ or formal comportibility of meaning while the former is 'comportibility in a material reference'.⁵⁵ *Tātparya* is the unity of a sentence with its corresponding objective relation. Such unity is *ultimately* explained by the fact that every word is noumenally oriented.

Bhattacharyya's speculative view that the word is the form of the noumenal and that there is an ontology of meaning has a modern ring about it. Indeed, Bhattacharyya *situates* Vedānta doctrine of *Āgama* in the philosophical context, adding a new corpus to Vedānta and making contribution to the problems of the relationship between word and object, meaning, reference, internationality etc.

There is, for Bhattacharyya, more to language than mere reference. There is for him a unity between word and object. Bhattacharyya accounts for it in terms of *Brūhadāraṇīyakopanisad* I, V, 3, and the Vedāntic doctrine. As he puts the former, 'The word directly refers to the thing, expresses the thing, touches it.'⁵⁶ The word seeks to be related to object, and this demand is explained through the Vedāntic doctrine that 'the same determination'⁵⁷ of the self is immanent in the word and the object. The 'unity'⁵⁸ between them, under the same determination, explains why the word wants to be related to object. 'With the same naiveté with which we objectify our ideas in perception', writes Bhattacharyya, 'we *objectify the word*'.⁵⁹ Thus the word seeks to be related to object not *merely* because it refers to the object but because of the more fundamental reason that it wants to be *identified* with the object. The simplistic idea of reference does very little justice to the word-object identity. The word wants to be identified with the object for the very

fundamental reason that it is the self objectifying itself (through the word). *Word - reference, then, is explained through word - objectification which again, is accountable to self - objectification.* Asks Bhattacharyya, ‘Psychologists speak of the primitive tendency to *reify* names, but have we got beyond this reification even now?’⁶⁰ Reference, for Bhattacharyya, is ontologically based. Whether this theory is accepted or not, it is certainly worth examining; and it is to the credit of Bhattacharyya to have insightfully *spotted* it in the Vedāntic context. Bhattacharyya’s interpretative-constructive work certainly helps a modern student of Vedānta *situate* it in the contemporary philosophical perspective.

Once Bhattacharyya’s attempt at tracking down our tendency to objectify the word to the primordial objectification of the self is appreciated, the many statements that he makes in the present context fall in place.

Thus:

‘The sentence at once refers to an objective situation’,⁶¹ ‘The copula of a judgment is the self pointing necessarily to an object and the unity of the sentence is but this self clothed in language’,⁶² ‘The primordial objective reference of a judgment is a provisional belief, a belief, it may be, with a certain general cautiousness induced by experience it is at any rate continuous with knowledge’,⁶³ ‘..... a sentence by itself has objective reference.’⁶⁴ ‘The sentence shines by its own light.’⁶⁵

Well, the ‘light’ of the sentence is the self’s light, the sentence is the self modulated into it.

To make the unity of word or sentence and object secure against all ambiguity, Bhattacharyya makes a distinction between situations in which *vākya*, i.e., sentence or word has a subjective element and those in which it is divested of such element. It is only *Vedavākyas* about the supersensuous which are divested of all personal element and therefore *they* are the true forms of revelation. But Bhattacharyya does accord at least temporary recognition to cases ‘of sentences having secular reference’⁶⁶ where the ‘ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence may be aided by the knowledge of the topic through *other* evidence’⁶⁷ In admitting such cases, Bhattacharyya points out that ‘every *vākya* as having direct objective

intention may be false'.⁶⁸ This has strange similarity with Husserl's doctrine that intention fulfilment may not correspond to intention. However, while this Husserlian doctrine would not be disputed by Bhattacharyya, it would be subordinated by him to the general idea that every *vākya*, in so far as it is *vākya*, has objective intention that is accountable to self's objectification. *Thus the Husserlian doctrine would be taken up into the more pervasive theory of word-object unity.* According to Bhattacharyya, then, (i) every *vākya* or sentence, in so far as it is *vākya* or sentence, has a *built-in intention* that is accountable to self's objectification; (ii) there is a distinction, in the secular context, between intention and intention-fulfilment; (iii) there is no such distinction in the context of true revelation as 'true revelation must have also the true form'⁶⁹ or as 'Each noumenon demands its true expression',⁷⁰ In this context, *vākya*, i.e., sentence or word is the object. Bhattacharyya speaks in this connection of the potency of the *mantras* or mystic syllables as the *om*⁷¹ which can only be 'realised'⁷² through 'devout intonation'.⁷³ In the noumenal context, then, the word is 'reified'.

ARTHĀPATTI

Bhattacharyya's analysis of *arthāpatti* should be understood in the context of his criticism of Nyāya view of the role of *vyātireka* in inference and also the Nyāya view that *arthāpatti* can be reduced to *vyātireki anumāna*. First, Nyāya holds that the major premise of a syllogism is itself an inference based on the observation of the concomitance (anvaya) between the major term and the middle term and the observation of the concomitance of their absences (*vyātireka*). Nyāya further holds that *arthāpatti* may be reduced to *vyātireki anumāna*.

Bhattacharyya points out that only *anvaya* is sufficient to establish the major premise. Negative instances are not necessary to the end⁷⁴. Secondly, *vyātireka* cannot be reduced to inference. In all inference, there is a conscious supposition that in the absence of something something else would not occur. That something therefore is the explanation of what has occurred. Devadatta must be taking food at night. This hypothesis is *arthāpatti*. If this hypothesis is not granted, the fact of Devadatta's getting fat cannot be explained. In all induction, there is the precedent thought that unless the hypothesis is admitted, something cannot be explained. Before any

inductive operation takes place, there is the precedent consideration that unless p, not q. Therefore, far from negative instance (*vyātireka*) forming part of inference, the precedent consideration of negative instance in the form ‘unless p, not q’ is presupposed by inference.

ANUPALABDHI

It is knowledge of absence.

Such knowledge is analysed by Bhattacharyya in the context of (i) the perception of the locus, (ii) knowledge of absence as ‘implicated in the perception of the locus’⁷⁵, (iii) non-existence of a thing as an ‘accidental percept’⁷⁶, (iv) distinction and relation between ‘absent thing’ and ‘absent’⁷⁷ and (v) determinate and indeterminate negation. With regard to (iv) and (v), we shall seek light on the matter from (i) Bhattacharyya’s account of ‘knowledge of absence as a present fact’ in his book *The Subject as Freedom*⁷⁸ and (ii) his essay on ‘Some Aspects of Negation’.⁷⁹

- (i) Can *abhāva* or non-existence be said to be known by perception? It cannot surely be known without the perception of the locus. Granted this. There are yet two considerations which count against the reduction of knowledge of absence or *anupalabdhi* to perception. First, ‘the perceptive process is directed to the locus’⁸⁰ and not to the non-existence of the thing on the locus. Second, there is a sudden knowledge of the non-existence of a thing in the perception of the locus. The perceptive process is directed wholly to the locus. The non-existence on it is not the ‘intended objective’⁸¹ of the perceptive process.
- (ii) Can it then be said that absence is known by, what may be called, ‘implicit perception’?⁸²

No. For a *pramāṇa* or method of knowledge must be a conscious process.

- (iii) The non-existence of a thing is an ‘accidental’⁸³ percept. This means that in the perception of the locus, there is a sudden knowledge of non-existence. Its suddenness consists in its being discontinuous with the perception of

the locus. The discontinuity is another name for the *epistemological gap* between the perception of the locus and the knowledge of non-existence. Borrowing a current diction, we can say that *phenomenologically*, knowledge of absence is distinct from the perception of the locus of absence.

- (iv) From the foregoing, we can say that ‘absence’ is *phenomenologically different* from ‘absent thing’⁸⁴.

This is the same thing as to say that knowledge of absence is an independent *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge.

- (a) But there is a relation of absence to the thing that is absent. Absence is absence of a thing and it can be known as such because knowledge of absence is ‘implicated in the percept of the locus’.⁸⁵
- (v) The absence that is known is of a thing which is intuitable⁸⁶, i.e., capable of being perceived. When the thing is perceivable and when yet it is *not* perceived, then its non-perception is knowledge of absence. So *anupalabdhi* is non-perception.

Because knowledge of absence is of a thing that is perceivable, therefore it may be called ‘determinate negation’. But Bhattacharyya goes on to distinguish ‘indeterminate negation’⁸⁷ from determinate negation, i.e., negation of something intuitable.

With regard to (iv) above, Bhattacharyya in his later work *THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM* points to different types of experience which are characteristically experiences of absence.⁸⁸ Thus absence may be felt to be ‘missing’ of something, may be again the feeling of the locus as ‘empty’ of something etc.

With regard to (v) above, i.e., Bhattacharyya’s distinction between determinate negation and indeterminate negation, we may refer to Bhattacharyya’s insightful concept of negation as ‘contradiction of all that is given’, i.e., negation of ‘determinate existence as such through which one

reaches the concept of the spirit. This is elaborated in his essay "Some Aspects of Negation".⁸⁹

It appears to us that the distinctiveness of Bhattacharyya's analysis of *anupalabdhī* is two-fold. (i) He does justice to the characteristic 'percept of the minus-ness'.⁹⁰ In his book *The Subject as Freedom*, Bhattacharyya speaks of absence as 'only a floating adjective that unlike colour is felt to be dissociated from the locus'.⁹¹ The experience of such 'floating adjective' is *more than* the perception of the locus. It is the experience of something which is *not constrained to the things given in perception*. (ii) *Secondly*, for Bhattacharyya such experience is *pointer to* the concept of indeterminate negation. That is 'negation of all being' (to use Bhattacharyya's idiom), of all that is object, i.e. *padārtha* in *Vaiśeṣika* terminology, negation of a grade in which consciousness feels the demand to switch its attention from objectivity to its basic subjectivity. It is within this wide spectrum that Bhattacharyya's analysis of *anupalabdhī* has to be understood. His analysis of *anupalabdhī* in the Vedānta context is embedded in his philosophy of negation in 'Some Aspects of Negation'.

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THE ADVAITA AND ITS SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE¹

1. The illusoriness of the individual self is ‘apparently the central notion of Advaita Vedānta’².

The doctrine that *Brahman* is the only reality, that the world of objects is false, that *māyā* is neither real nor unreal, that *Iśvara* is *Brahman* in reference to *māyā* - are ‘elaborations’³ of this single notion.

2. There are three important considerations with regard to the illusoriness of the individual self:
 - i) Illusion is different from contradiction. Contradiction cannot be *given*. Illusion, however, is given, though it is unthinkable. The identity of self with body, ‘I’ with ‘me’ is *given*, although self is known to be *not* body.
 - ii) To spiritual realisation, it is a ‘wonder’⁴ how the self which is subject or ‘I’ can yet be object or ‘me’. When one rises to spiritual experience in which one feels the contradiction between one’s *being* self and one’s *appearing* at once as object, one understands the latter, i.e., one’s individuality to be illusory. Spiritual experience of one’s *having been* individual is at the same time one’s understanding of one’s individuality as illusory.
 - iii) And it is when individuality or one’s object self is understood as illusory that objectivity as such is understood to be illusory. The world of objects, then, is suggested to be illusory only in the light of one’s own individuality being felt to be illusory. Thus according to Bhattacharyya : ‘.... we could never conceive the illusoriness of the world itself unless we started with the illusoriness of the me’⁵. Again, ‘It is the illusion of the individuality that suggests the theory of objective illusion called *anirvācya - khyātivāda*’⁶.
3. *Māyā* is the principle of individuality. Even when the individual sees that the self cannot be individual, it yet believes that it is individual. As

Śaṅkara says, the self understands that it cannot be object (*yusmad*) and yet it remains a fact that it is individual. Its individuality should be called mithyā or false (*mithyā iti bhavitum yuktam*) and yet it believes itself to be individual. Therefore, the belief in the principle of individuality is *prior to* individual consciousness: I am *cognitively* aware of myself as subject and not as individual or me and yet I *believe* I am individual. I, as *not* object, am yet under the spell of the belief in individuality which creates the false sense of objectivity and which therefore is prior to my individual consciousness.

4. Since *māyā* is prior to the individual's sense of individuality and since individuality is *not real*, it is to be taken as an *over-* individual, i.e., cosmic principle of illusion.
5. Since there are many individuals, *māyā* 'may be taken as the corpus of the many beginningless individualities'.⁷ But again, since the world is regarded as a *system* of many individual experiences, 'māyā may be regarded as the manifold of names and forms'.⁸
6. *Māyā* as the cosmic principle is to be understood in reference to *Brahman* or unindividual self.

But *Brahman* has not to be understood in reference to *māyā*. *Brahman* is not identified with *māyā* but uses *māyā* as a lord uses his servant.⁹ From such a point of view, *Brahman* is the Lord of individual selves, Creator of the world i.e. *Īśvara*.

7. *Īśvara, world and Jīva*: while *Īśvara* is creator of the world, He is not creator of individual selves. The individual selves are individual so far as they 'will'¹⁰, i.e., are individual according to their *karma*. *Īśvara* only adjusts their *karma* to their *bhoga*.
8. *World and Brahman*: The world is an 'absolute appearance'.¹¹ The notion of 'absolute appearance' is pressed into service by Bhattacharyya in contrasting the relation of *Brahman* to world with the relation of *Brahman* to *jīva*. The world is grounded in the reality of *Brahman*, 'at once real and unreal, real as *Brahman* ... and unreal as alienated from him'.¹² But *jīva* is not grounded in the reality of *Brahman*. Its *jīvatva* is but the *wrong feeling* of its being *other than Brahman*. So the *jīvatva* of

jīva is only subjective, while world - appearance is objective. That is why, Bhattacharyya says that *jīva* is ‘no absolute appearance’.¹³

9. *Īśvara and Brahman* : *Īśvara* is regarded by Bhattacharyya as ‘absolute emanation’¹⁴ of *Brahmaṇ*. *Brahmaṇ* does not get modified into *Īśvara* in time. *Brahmaṇ* only appears to be *Īśvara* against the background of *māyā* in accordance with which he creates the world for the *bhoga* of *jīva*. The ‘*ikṣā*’ or ‘creative thought’¹⁵ urges him to manifest himself in the world but the manifestation or emanation does not affect or change *Brahmaṇ*. The manifestation is as much put forward as withdrawn, ‘as much retracted as created’.¹⁶
10. *Māyā in relation to Īśvara and Brahman*: *Īśvara* wields *māyāsakti* and is therefore transcendent of *māyā*. *Brahmaṇ* too is transcendent of *māyā*. Both are ‘characterised by the same epithets, viz., *nitya*, *buddha*, *śuddha*, *mukta* (eternal, omniscient, pure, free)’¹⁷. But *Brahmaṇ* not only transcends *māyā* but also transcends the transcendence from *māyā*.
11. *Implications of (10) for absolutism*: The implications are two - fold, - one for philosophy, another for religion.
 - i) The foregoing account of the difference between *Īśvara* and *Brahman* has got wide implications for absolutism. *Vedānta absolutism should be contrasted with Hegel’s*. In *Vedānta*, we have the concept of *māyā*, in Hegel, the concept of negativity. The Hegelian absolute creates its distinction and thereby negates itself and through negation realises itself. But the *Vedānta* absolute, i.e., *Brahman not only transcends the negation but also negates the transcendence*¹⁸. Absolutism cannot make any room for self - relation¹⁹, for self - relation itself is constituted by negation which is limitation²⁰. For absolutism, ‘free relation’²⁰ is the only relation. It is only in terms of ‘free relation’ that we can understand the *Vedāntic* view of the relation of *Brahman* to the world. *Brahman* or *Īśvara* freely puts forth the world appearance and as freely retracts the appearance. But *Brahman* itself, i.e., as transcendent of *Īśvara* is *freedom*, not just *free*. It is freedom in that it not only transcends or negates its relation to the world but also negates the negation.

Negation is not incorporated, according to Bhattacharyya's interpretation of the Vedānta, into the *Brahman* as it incorporated into the Absolute of Hegel's Philosophy. It is *freedom* that is categorically distinct from freedom understood in ordinary parlance as contrasted to what consciousness, in context of life, is free *from*. *Brahman* or the Absolute of the Vedānta does not have even any relation of contrast or negative relation to the world.

- ii) Again, from the point of view of absolutism proper, i.e., Vedānta absolutism -- for which free relation is the only admissible relation -- no *distinction should be made between higher God and lower God. Brahman and Iṣvara are not distinguished as higher God and lower God.* The distinction between higher God and lower God is the distinction between two aspects of *Iṣvara*, viz., *Iṣvara* 'as wielding māyāsakti and thus immanent in the world (*vikāravartin*) and as dissociated from it, transcendent (*trigunātita*) and merging back into *Brahman*'.²¹ But *Brahman* is understood without any reference to the world and to māyā.

Now, the concepts of 'free relation' and 'freedom' help us (i) to appreciate philosophically the distinction between God and *Brahman* and (ii) to situate Vedānta absolutism in the context of absolutism in general. The concept of freedom, in fact, makes explicit the distinctiveness of Vedānta absolutism.

- 12. If *Brahman* cannot at all be understood in reference to the world, what of its determinations, viz., *sat* (existence), *cit* (knowledge) and *ānanda* (bliss)?

These are not determinations of *Brahman*. Each of them is the absolute which is indeterminate and 'unspeakable'.²² The unspeakable absolute is symbolised through these determinations.

- 13. *The individual self must not only correct the illusion of individuality but must also conceive all correction itself to be illusory.²³ For freedom is its svarupa.*

Is 'freedom' as *svarupa* of the individual its 'essence'?

Bhattacharyya's thought here is different from essentialism or Platonism. Freedom is not the *essence* of the individual in terms of which he can be defined. Freedom is not, e.g., a genus in terms of which the species falling under it is *defined*. Freedom has no *relation* to anything else. *When freedom is understood as the 'svarupa' of the individual, all that is meant is that the individual achieves itself as real, it rests in itself (sva) and is not definitionally (or otherwise) related to anything else. Definitionism, classificatory thought (Aristotle), relational thought etc. - all these are foreign to the idea of freedom. 'Svarupa' is neither essence, nor even nature, as 'essence' is sometimes taken to be. 'Nature' is 'prakrti' but the individual is 'svarupena Brahman' and not 'prakrtyā Brahman'.*

Freedom is 'not even an eternal predicament of the self'²⁴. *Contrast here Bhattacharyya from Sartre.* The individual, in its *svarupa* or freedom, is not 'condemned to freedom' *a la* Sartre. The individual has not to fear that freedom may be absolutised. Again, the Christian idea that the soul may be condemned to hell by the lord on the Day of Judgment has no place in the Vedānta view of the free spirit.

14. Advaita is 'primarily a religion'²⁵ and it is 'philosophy only as the formulation of this religion'.²⁶ Every religion 'makes for the realisation of the self as sacred. But Advaita is the 'cult of such realisation'.²⁷ For it, self - knowledge has to be cultured.

So Advaitism is primarily a religion of *jñānam*. Religion, for the Advaita, is 'inwardising'²⁸ of self, turning self into a 'vision'.²⁹

15. The inwardising of oneself is also the 'inner function'³⁰ of a religion prescribing salvation for others.
16. The inwardising of one's *individual* self is consistent for Advaita with the inwardising of everyone's self. Inwardising consists in realising one's *svadharma*; and everyone else in his *svadharma* is an 'aristocrat'³¹. His distinctive approach is 'too sacred a thing to be pooled'.³¹.
17. Spiritual realisation has to be sought according to one's individual spiritual status. This is the doctrine of *adhikāriveda*. So, in Advaita

there is no prescription that, in cultivating one's inwardness, one *has to* adopt the life of a hermit.

18. Everyone's individual spiritual status has to be regarded as sacred. *Toleration* of others in spiritual journey, of other religions is a sacred duty. The Advaita believes in a spiritual commonwealth.

In view of this toleration, Advaita does not reject any other *sādhana*, though it regards the religion of *jñāna* as sufficient and not needing to be supplemented by any other realisation.

Basic to Bhattacharyya's idea of toleration and of freedom of one individual to cultivate his *svadharma* is the metaphysical idea that 'The form in which the truth is intuited by an individual is cosmically determined and not constructed by him'.³³ Since one given individual's perception of truth is sacred, since in fact it is perception *grounded in* truth, it is cosmically determined; and therefore, every individual's perception of the truth is sacred. It is the idea of the *cosmic groundedness of truth* that confers dignity and sacredness to any and every seeker's perception and thereby unites the individual seekers. So it is that Advaita comes to conceive all individual selves as being 'one self'.³⁴

Now, individual selves are conceived to be one in altruism too, which maintains that the happiness of one given individual *added* to the happiness of other individuals leads to the happiness of all. *But the hedonistic calculus is impossible.* For advaita, the oneness of individuals is accountable to their being grounded in the cosmic spiritual order. The *unity of individuals in advaita is not additive, hedonistic, altruistic and empirical but the unity of a cosmic spiritual order.* Cosmic freedom is efflux of free subjectivity. It is this free order that binds individuals.

19. Advaita as religion of *jñāna* is 'primarily'³⁵ against the religion of *karma*. But *karma* performed in the attitude of detachment would be approved by Advaita.
20. What would be the Advaita attitude that prescribes inwardisation to a religion based upon good will, to a moral religion such as one conceived by Kant? Good will, as Kant said, wills itself and is desireless and thus seems to accord perfectly well with the attitude of *jñāna* or detachment. To Advaita, no religion of good will be self-

20. What would be the Advaita attitude that prescribes inwardisation to a religion based upon good will, to a moral religion such as one conceived by Kant? Good will, as Kant said, wills itself and is desireless and thus seems to accord perfectly well with the attitude of *jñāna* or detachment. To Advaita, no religion of good will be self-sufficient; because *first*, good will involves *ahankāra*³⁶, though it ‘means self-purification’³⁷, and *secondly*, though good will itself aims at transcending *ahankāra*, such transcendence is itself rooted in the attitude of detachment. Hence a religion of good will yields ground to the religion of detachment.

Thus the present deliberations of Bhattacharyya have two parts. The first part bases itself on the (spiritual) experience of oneself as spirit, as *detached* from object: this suggests that the world of objects is illusory. The second part devotes itself to an elaboration of Advaita conceived as a religion or cult of self-knowledge.

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II

SĀNKHYA

Bhattacharyya starts his Sāṅkhya - interpretation with an analysis of reflection as the organ² of metaphysical knowledge. For him, the Sāṅkhya tattvas are known in reflection. As he says, 'Reflection is ... the knowing of metaphysical entities'.³ Sāṅkhya holds that, through *aviveka* or non-discrimination, the self wrongly identifies itself with object or *prakṛti* and such identification is the cause of pain. It is through *viveka* or discrimination that the illusory identification of *prakṛti* with the self is corrected. *Viveka* takes place consequent on the detachment of object from self. Such detachment is reflection. Indeed, Bhattacharyya understands reflection as '..... a freeing of the self from the body'⁴ In the process of reflective detachment, the object, i.e., *prakṛti* and its different evolutes -- which are, as it were, seen through as causing pain to the self -- are unearthed.

What exactly is the process of reflection? Aside from the *Sāṅkhya* context, the reflective method consists in discovering or intuiting the structural principles of experience in such a way that those principles are understood *as part of the intuiting process itself*. Here experience is understood as 'bodied forth'⁵ from the very process of intuiting those structures. In the *Sāṅkhya* context, it is a detaching process. When the self reflectively, i.e., by turning attention inward comes to understand that it *was*, retrospectively speaking; glued down to the object, to the *bhoga* of the object, it thereby detaches itself from object and makes a search into what it is or *was* in the object that caused pain to it. If it is said that the reflective method is one of detachment for even the philosopher of *non-Sāṅkhya* persuasion, the reply would be that for *Sāṅkhya* reflection does not merely discover the structures of experience *from a distance*, does not merely know the structures, does not merely *theoretically appreciate* them but positively amounts to *executing the process of detachment* from the object. Reflection has accordingly been described by Professor Bhattacharyya as a 'spiritual function'.⁶ It is the spiritual task of dissipating the very 'wrong will',⁷ which leads (or led) to the illusory identification of the self with the object. The Sāṅkhya *tattvas* or metaphysical realities are known *in* the process of the detaching of the object from the self. Detachment here is conative, not

merely cognitive.⁸ It is not, again, the kind of distancing that is involved in a second-order understanding of the axioms, postulates, presuppositions etc. involved in a first - order enquiry. Considered as second order enquiry, all philosophical enquiry is indeed reflective. Philosophers, e.g., enquire into the conceptual presuppositions of first-order enquiries and, to that extent, may be said to be engaged in reflective activity. But what distinguishes an enquiry into the presuppositions of experience, admittedly reflective, from the kind of reflective enquiry that Sāṅkhya makes into metaphysical *tattvas* is that the former does not *affect* the field or discipline it enquires into, whereas the latter does affect what it reflects upon. A second-order enquiry, understood in the *non* - Sāṅkhya context, views what it reflects upon *from a distance as it were*; in other words, it does not *do* anything to its subject-matter. Such second-order enquiry, in other words, is rooted in the attitude of an *onlooker*. But the reflective method of detachment that is prescribed in the Sāṅkhya does not just retrospectively look upon experience to *review* the structures involved in it but *re-values* or *re-assesses* experience as having created some distemper in the self on account of which it *had* to undergo pain-experience. The distemper is not a fact *to be just recorded*, not something which might as well *not* have been attended to: on the contrary, the realisation of it involves a *demand* that experience be *re-searched*, *re-valued* in the light of the *present* reflection upon it. Reflection in Sāṅkhya, then, *does* something to experience: it makes a *scrutiny* of experience, passes a *judgment* upon it, indicting it as having been at the root of the wrong will or the will to *bhoga* that caused pain.

It is within the conspectus of reflection, then, that pain experience of Sāṅkhya-conception is placed by Bhattacharyya.

Some prefatory observations of Bhattacharyya's and some interpretative observations of ours are important in this context:

1. 'Reflection is primarily reflection on pain'. Reflection is taken here in the sense of 'spiritual function'¹⁰. It is the function of reckoning with something which appears to the self to be opposing itself'.¹¹ This is pain; so reflection is a matter of reckoning with pain, i.e., reflection on pain, on something from which the self *has* to be free.

2. ‘To reflect on the feeling of pain is necessarily to wish to be free from it’¹².

This can be understood in the light of the form which reflection takes. Reflection is of the form of the self opposing itself, i.e., the self inflicting pain on itself. Reflection thus is shot through and through with pain. Pain is an opposition which one ‘resents’¹³ and is contrasted with the object given in sensation. To quote Bhattacharyya:

Sensation I do not resent but I resent the feeling of pain though the sensation is apparently more foreign than the feeling. Sensation is in the first instance at least foreign, not opposed to the self while pain is opposed because it is of the self. Pain (is) thus the self opposing itself.¹⁴

3. To understand or realise pain, then, is to understand a resentful experience, an experience that one wants to get away from. There is *freedom in resentment*. It is the *freedom of recoil* and *it ought not to be confused with the Hegelain idea of ‘Dying to live’*. On the Hegelian theory, the absolute spirit sets up an opposition within itself, ‘incarnates’ itself -- in the Christian diction -- in matter or body or flesh, ‘crucifies’ itself, undergoes pain. Bhattacharyya proceeds one step farther than Hegel and gives a new dimension to the spirit’s freedom. And he has the concept of pain as a resentful experience. Once this interpretation of pain-experience is granted to Bhattacharyya, the next step follows for him, i.e., the idea of the self’s freedom from pain-experience, from its will to objectify itself. In other words, as against Hegel, Bhattacharyya’s view would be that the self freely binds itself in pain *and*, as freely, transcends pain. This transcendental freedom in pain-experience is conspicuous by its absence in Hegel’s philosophy.
4. Bhattacharyya’s construction on the Sāṅkhyā idea of pain deserves special notice. Pain is ‘self opposing itself’. That the self opposes itself and objectifies itself is also the idea contained in Hegel’s dialectic. But the Sāṅkhyā idea here, at least as interpreted by Bhattacharyya, is fundamentally different from the Hegelain idea. According to Bhattacharyya, the self’s

opposing itself - which is pain - involves resentment on its part that if it *would*, it *could* free itself from pain, from opposition. In reflection, the self realises that it could as well exercise its freedom *not* to exercise its will wrongly as it *did* in fact exercise its freedom wrongly, that it could be free not only to exercise its freedom but could also *retract* its freedom, that it has as much the freedom to *retract* its freedom as it has the freedom to *exercise* freedom, that it has as much the will *not* to will as it has the will to *exert* will. In the Hegelian dialectic, however, these two grades of freedom are not distinguished. Self's opposition, self - created though, is not for Hegel painful, because there is no resentment in such opposition for Hegel because Hegel does not distinguish, as Bhattacharyya as a constructive interpreter of Sāṅkhya does, the freedom to *withdraw* from the execution of will *from* the freedom to execute the will.

5. The wish to be free from pain ‘constitutes’¹⁵ pain.

Pain, i.e., pain-feeling is what is wanted to be got rid of. What is wished to be got rid of must be painful. Hence the wish to get rid of pain constitutes pain.

Next Bhattacharyya turns to make a distinction of grades between two kinds of reflection. The salient points of his observations in this context are as follows:

1. To reflect on the feeling of pain is necessarily to wish to be free from it. This point has already been explained.
2. The wish to be free from pain *constitutes* the facthood of pain, for what is not wished to be terminated is not felt as pain.
3. The wish for freedom from pain is the reflective self. It wants to be free from pain and at the same time constitutes pain. Thus it acts ‘suicidally’.¹⁶
4. Hence reflection on pain is itself evil.

5. The wish for freedom from the reflective wish to be free (which constitutes pain and is itself evil) is spiritual freedom. Contrasted to it, the reflective wish to be free from pain is ‘secular’.¹⁷
6. To the secular wish to be free from pain, pain is a ‘fact’¹⁸ and yet a ‘puzzle’¹⁹ in that it appears to be ‘both distinct and non-distinct’²⁰ from the self.
7. But that the spiritual wish itself constitutes pain *in* wanting to be free from it - this suicidal aspect of the reflective self is not known in secular reflection. Pain is, to secular reflection, just a ‘fact’ though it is a ‘contradiction’²¹ in that it is wanted to be got rid of and is yet ‘appropriated’²² by self which knows it to be ‘opposed to itself’²³.
8. While pain is a ‘fact’ to the secular wish to be free from it, to the spiritual wish for freedom it is ‘no absolute fact’²⁴ though it is ‘not eliminated from consciousness’²⁵. To the spiritual wish, pain - in the secular wish to be free from it - is a contradiction, as both ‘given’²⁶ and ‘myself’.²⁷
9. Sāṅkhya admits that pain appears as a contradiction but holds that it is ‘terminable’²⁸. It maintains that the feeling of pain is non - distinct from the self and that this non - distinction goes when the object, *prakṛti*, distinguishes itself from the self.
10. To spiritual reflection, pain appears as ‘real’²⁹ though terminable.
11. How pain, being foreign, yet appears an ‘non-distinct’ from self evokes ‘wonder’³⁰. Such wonder leads to the reflection that ‘I let myself be affected’.³¹ Pain, which is felt to be foreign, yet appears as non-distinct from the self. The wonder that this twin fact evokes is resolved when it is understood that I had let myself be affected, that I had made myself object to myself, that I was under the spell of illusion of taking the subject to be object. I felt pain because I had objectified myself. Thus pain - feeling involves illusion and is not just a matter of *knowing*

something, as it *is* such a matter in secular reflection, a matter that is foreign and non - distinct. To spiritual reflection, pain thus appears to be ‘self opposing itself’³².

12. ‘I let myself be affected’ - this thought appears when I resent pain which I do not do in the case of sensation. That I *could*, ‘if I *would*’,³³ ‘refuse to be affected’,³⁴ - this is not what I think when I have a sensation. I resent pain, but I do not resent my sensation which too, like pain, is an affection. It is such *resentment in my affection* which brings out that it is I who let myself be affected.
13. There is a marked difference between pain as appearing to secular reflection and the same as appearing to spiritual reflection. In secular reflection, pain appears to be *opposed* to self, whereas in spiritual reflection, pain appears to be self *opposing itself*.
14. Also, reflective feeling, as distinguished from the secular wish to be free, understands freedom not as *given* fact, not as a given ‘blind’ feeling³⁵ but as ‘no *given* experience at all’.³⁶ In this sense, the reflective self is ‘reason itself’.³⁷
15. The illusion that is involved in pain-feeling is at one ‘intellectual and conative’,³⁸ The self, in opposing itself, *knows* itself as object and ‘it opposes itself as it objectifies itself’³⁹. It is the self’s ‘wrong will’⁴⁰ that *misleads* it into knowing itself as object which is really ‘wrong knowledge’.⁴² The reflective self, i.e., the self opposing itself and thereby undergoing pain is itself evil.
16. Thus (i) pain is evil; (ii) reflection on pain is evil; (iii) the reflective self, the self that may be said to be *evil-ly moved* (to *bhoga*), is evil. But (iv) in the reflective self itself, the distinguishing of pain from self, of the object from the subject, ‘has begun’⁴³.

Reflection, as understood by Bhattacharyya, may be said to be *Janus-faced*. The reflective self is both *affected* by pain and at the same time seeks *detachment* from pain. As Bhattacharyya points out:

Illusion (that pain involves) is known as such when correction has begun⁴⁴.

In other words, it is when the reflective self starts the process of detaching itself from pain, of freeing itself from its objectifying tendency, of its ‘wrong knowledge and wrong will’⁴⁵ that *retrospectively* the process of objectification is known to *have been* a fact. To quote Bhattacharyya:

It is in the regressive movement of reflection towards *mukti* that the progressive movement of the self towards *bhoga* is known to *have been* a fact.⁴⁶

Progressive detachment from object, from pain is retrospectively testifying to the fact of pain. A more acute way of describing the detachment would be to observe that in detachment, not only is pain *per se* understood, not only is objectification understood but also is *the very fact of embodiment*, in which pain is rooted, realised. The reflective self realises (in detachment) the body as *its* embodiment. Pain is felt in the body and, in reflective detachment, body is understood as the objectification of the self *and* object as such is understood as ‘body of the self’ (in Bhattacharyya’s diction). The string of statements that Bhattacharyya makes in relating the concept of body to the self *and*, what is more, in developing *the metaphysical conception of object* bears quotation:

There is no freeing except in knowing of the object as metaphysical, as absolutely distinct from the self ... as what was illusorily confused with the self as its body; and there is no knowledge of the metaphysical object except as what was its body and now disowned⁴⁸.

The self is identified with the object in the consciousness of being embodied.⁴⁹

The body represents in itself the entire process of nature for the self.⁵⁰

There is to *Sāṅkhyā* no metaphysical object or objective *tattva* except in a body⁵¹

To reflection, it (i.e., body) appears as what the self has become and also as what the self is getting freed from.⁵²

Truly, Bhattacharyya's way of deriving the metaphysical *tattvas* from the *Sāṅkhyā* reflective method, of explicating metaphysical *tattvas* is striking. Its *philosophical novelty* lies in its idea of detachment of the self; and its *exegetical novelty* lies in this that it introduces the reflective method to explicate or unravel the *Sāṅkhyā* *tattvas* which would otherwise, i.e., without being explicated in reflection appear to be mythological. It is the reflective self that, retrospectively, testifies to the object by detaching from it, by dissolving it into unmanifest *pradhāna*; and it is in detachment that the self, *puruṣa* is known as 'consequently'⁵³ i.e., because of the detachment, 'standing in its eternally manifest solitariness'⁵⁴. Thus it is that the reflective method of detachment reveals, on the one hand, the self or *puruṣa* and, on the other, the umanifest objective realities as 'the metaphysical *tattvas* or noumena of *Sāṅkhyā* philosophy'.⁵⁵ So then, in the reflective methodology that Bhattacharyya adopts to understand *Sāṅkhyā* philosophy the metaphysical *tattvas* are *not speculative entities* but have their warrant in reflection. Bhattacharyya *reads a metaphysic of experience in Sāṅkhyā*.

If, now, reflection is understood to be both realisation of the affection of the self and detachment from object or body, it is easy to see why Bhattacharyya comes to interpret the process as at once spiritual and natural. As Bhattacharyya says :

The freeing process of reflection is at once a part of life and a detachment from life.⁵⁶

Sāṅkhyā, in Bhattacharyya's interpretation, holds to the idea of the natural urge towards freedom. The reflective self indeed understands its objectification in detaching itself from such objectification. But in so far as objectification is retrospectively understood by the reflective self as *its* objectification, it may be said that there is a 'continuity'⁵⁷ between objectification and detachment. The *natural* process of objectification, then, is connected with the *spiritual* process of objectification. So it is that

Bhattacharyya interprets Sāṅkhya as a religion of ‘reflective spontaneity or spiritual naturalism’.⁵⁸ So too, Bhattacharyya holds that ‘the body represents in itself the entire process of nature for the self’⁵⁹. Bhattacharyya brings out the distinctiveness of Sāṅkhya by contrasting it with Yoga. First, for Yoga, there can be no *natural* urge towards *spiritual* freedom: the natural will towards freedom is to be dissipated in the interest of ‘negative willing’⁶⁰, a distinctively spiritual activity which has nothing to do with the natural process. *Yoga would not accord natural will any place in free will or freedom. But Sāṅkhya understands freedom in nature.* For it, *pari passu* with detachment there is the relegation of object to *pradhāna* which is a natural process. *Secondly*, Yoga maintains that distinctively spiritual activity must have no taint of egoism of mind: the egoistic mind must be *made to give way* to negative willing (so that the object lapses altogether into the unmanifest *pradhāna*). But for Sāṅkhya the egoistic mind drops *naturally*; and this natural process is connected with the spiritual process of detachment. *Thirdly*, Yoga maintains that objectification and detachment cannot constitute the same process, that detachment is a *conscious exercise to transcend* objectification and that it is because of such exercise that object lapses into unmanifest *pradhāna*. But Sāṅkhya clings to the view that the process of object’s becoming (so to say) object is part of the process of self’s understanding it as what *was* its body. *Fourthly and, fundamentally*, Sāṅkhya wrestles with the genuine problem of constructing a metaphysic of experience: for it the *tattvas* are *given* as self’s objectification. Yoga, however, is concerned more with the culture of subjective freedom than with founding a metaphysic of object. For it, freedom is nothing *given*, everything natural - including natural will - has to be extirpated from it. For Sāṅkhya, however, freedom is to be cultivated *in nature*.

We shall now highlight the importance of the reflective - retrospective process of understanding objectivity in the Sāṅkhya context in two ways. *First*, we shall show, following Bhattacharyya, that *only the reflective retrospective method can testify to the object as continuing out of consciousness*. We shall see, following Bhattacharyya, how the Sāṅkhya method of founding a metaphysic of experience is more consistent than Kant’s to bring object within the reflective context as there is, for Sāṅkhya, something more *in reflection* than Kant could imagine.

With regard to the first point, Bhattacharyya seeks to establish the realistic thesis on the basis of the distinctive reflective consciousness of pain. Can consciousness certify a content to be *outside* it? With all Perry's criticism, one *cannot* extricate oneself from the ego - centric predicament *as and when* one knows a content. But one *can* extricate oneself from such predicament by taking a *retrospective look* at the content. *If there is a mode of consciousness which testifies to a content as now existing outside of it, then that consciousness may be said to have extricated object from the ego-centric predicament and established the present independence of the content, i.e., object. Such is the reflective consciousness of pain which testifies to pain as what was of the self and what is now -- in reflective retrospective consciousness -- outside the self.* Such retrospective consciousness is not memory; for memory is the consciousness of a content as *past*, whereas pain – and object for that matter – is understood as what *was of* self and *is now outside* self. Retrospection gives *a new dimension to the understanding of the content as what was of the self and now stands contrasted as not-self*. There is no such *reassessment of content* in retrospective memory.

Bhattacharyya's remarks on the reflective *consciousness of pain vis-a-vis* apprehension of object and its independence should be quoted:

The realistic view of the object as what can exist unknown or unrelated to the self would be unintelligible unless knowledge itself testified to the necessary existence of the object as unknown We can conceive a content to exist out of consciousness if our present consciousness necessarily refers to such continuation. This can be said only about the consciousness of pain, for to be reflectively aware of pain is to wish to be free from it There is the consciousness of pain as given and, therefore, the idea of its ceasing to consciousness is not the idea of its ceasing to be real. It is then only here that we have the idea of a content of consciousness possibly existing out of consciousness. The exemplar of objective reality then is pain
...⁶¹

Pain is what is immediately manifest as the not-self or object. An object is known as object only as we are conscious of it as what may exist out of consciousness and such consciousness is primarily of pain object,

whether phenomenal or noumenal, is manifest as pain (hostile to the self)

⁶²
... .

What is important is that Bhattacharyya's exegetical interpretation of Sāṅkhyā brings out two points of general philosophical importance. The first relates to the realistic thesis of the independence of object of consciousness; the second relates to the novel idea of the independent object as apprehended not in knowing but in extra-cognitive mode of awareness - pain being *felt*, not *known*.

Both these points may be taken up together as they are related. It may be observed that whether one is within the doctrinal context of Sāṅkhyā or steps out of it with a philosophical concern distinct from a scholastic interest, the analysis of the reflective consciousness of pain yields the general philosophical thesis that the independence of object in relation to consciousness can be established only in reflective consciousness, i.e., second - level consciousness as distinct from first - level consciousness. This point is of crucial importance in placing the realistic thesis of independence in the proper perspective. *Realism makes the mistake of thinking that the act of consciousness which knows an object is the same as the act of consciousness which knows its independence. But the act of consciousness which knows an object can not at the same time know its independence.* As Bhattacharyya says in his essay on 'Knowledge and Truth' written earlier than his work on Sāṅkhyā:

We are not aware of the distinction (of the object) from knowing as an objective fact.⁶³

.... so - called distinction of object from knowing is only unrelatedness of which we are aware but non-cognitively.⁶⁴

There is no knowledge of the circumstance of unrelatedness but only an extra-cognitive awareness of it⁶⁵.

Now, whether he calls it 'extra-cognitive awareness' or whether he calls it 'reflective consciousness of pain', Bhattacharyya sustains his point, viz., object known is *not* known as independent: and his Sāṅkhyā exegesis adds one point to this negative thesis which is that the independence of content of consciousness is understood not when consciousness is, as it is on

the first level of it, *hyphenated* with the object but when it reflectively distinguishes itself *from* object that is not itself, distinguishes itself as *self* from object as *not - self*. Bhattacharyya's Sāṅkhya interpretation is *not merely of scholastic importance*; it is a *contribution to the realism - idealism debate*. *Realism fails to see that the independence thesis can be established only on the reflective level of consciousness; and idealism fails to see that reflective consciousness has a retrospective moment in virtue of which object comes to be understood as not-self in contrast to consciousness*. Object is not *known* in its *independence* when it is *known*. And this leads to reflection on how its independence comes to be revealed. Second - order reflection on object brings out that knowledge - object distinction is not a *known* distinction, i.e., not any distinction *between* knowledge and object, object being *not obtained apart from knowledge*. Object, in other words, is no part of a supposed cognitive complex (of knowledge and object). Reflection, then, testifies to object as what one *took to be one with cognition* but what one is *now* non-cognitively aware of as no part of cognition. To quote Bhattacharyya:

..... what we are not aware of cognitively we are aware of non-cognitively.⁶⁶

Bhattacharyya thus finds a place for the independent object of realism *within* the reflective context by interpreting it as what is reflectively known as *non-cognitive*.

What is important is that the Sāṅkhya concept of reflection is interpreted by Bhattacharyya as making room for the non-cognitively apprehended content, for object in short. *First*, as a philosopher he arrives at the idea of the non-cognitive apprehension of the object and, *then*, as an interpreter of Sāṅkhya, he understands spiritual reflection on pain to be reflection on something hostile to the self, i.e., object. Whichever concept one chooses -- either that of non - cognitive apprehension or that of reflection on pain --, one comes to the realistic idea of the independent object as apprehended *retrospectively* in reflection. This is more important than any scholastic work as it gives a new dimension to *the realism-idealism controversy from within the perspective of reflection-retrospection*.

Before we take up the contrast between Sāṅkhyā and Kant which we intended to do earlier, we shall labour the point about reflection a bit more in order to see how Bhattacharyya places the different aspects of Sāṅkhyā in the reflective context.

1. *The Sāṅkhyā conception of unconscious teleology.*

We have seen that when one reflects on pain, one incarnates or objectifies oneself in the body in which pain is felt and thereby one gets at the concept of object as such. Thus the object has a necessary reference to the self, being known as the body of the self. Now, what the Sāṅkhyā regards as ‘unconscious teleology’ is, in Bhattacharyya’s interpretation, but a metaphorical description of the objective process being real only as the identifying of the object with the self or its distinguishing from self.⁶⁷

In reflection the object is seen retrospectively. The objective or natural process is recognised by the Sāṅkhyā but only *within* reflection. Reflection retrospectively testifies to the objective process, i.e., the process of the reflective self’s relating to the object as its *bhoga*, its objectifying tendency accountable to its ‘wrong will’.⁶⁸

2. *Self, Body and Object in Sāṅkhyā.*

Even at the cost of repetition, their relation should be made explicit. The concept of object is reached through the reflective feeling of embodiment. The feeling of being embodied is the feeling of embodiment. The feeling of being embodied is the feeling of being objectified and it is the self’s feeling of being objectified that constitutes, reflectively speaking, the concept of object as such. Bhattacharyya’s remarks in this context are well worth quoting:

The self is identified with object in the consciousness of being embodied.⁶⁹

There is to Sāṅkhyā no metaphysical object or objective *tattva* that is manifest except in the body that is forming⁷⁰.

3. *Body and Object in Sāṅkhyā.*

Object, we have seen following Bhattacharyya, is what was to reflection the body of the self. To reflection, i.e., body is self as *having been*

embodied. So the body feels itself, in reflection, to be *not* in space. Contrasted to the body is the external object: the external object is external *in relation to the body felt as internal*,⁵ in Bhattacharyya's language.

Every external object is known as in space which is itself distinguished from or external to the body as self from within⁷¹.

But then the external world does not depend on the body. It is only *not manifest* apart from the body. The *bhutas* that constitute the body are *manifest*. But the constituents of the world are their 'primodial potentialities, the *guṇas* that make up *prakṛti*'.⁷² *Prakṛti* manifests itself in two ways - through causality, through its manifestation into '*tattvas* that constitute the body and in the non-causal way as the external world'.⁷³ And the material of the world and the material of the body are different: the world has, for its material, the unmanifest *pradhāna* and the body has, for its material, the manifest *bhutas*. So it is that Bhattacharyya writes:

The world is not a construction by the percipient out of noumenal *bhutas*, being a construction in respect of its material as well so far as it is manifest.⁷⁴

Clearly, according to Bhattacharyya's interpretation, Sāṅkhya is different from Kant's philosophy. According to Kant, world is a construction not in respect of its material but only in respect of its form. Kant's agnosticism with regard to the material of the world would not be accepted by Sāṅkhya although both Sāṅkhya and Kant adopt the reflective method of enquiry. On Bhattacharyya's interpretation, Sāṅkhya employs the reflective method to uphold realism, whereas Kant ends in agnosticism by following the same method. Also, Bhattacharyya distinguishes between Nyāya realism and Sāṅkhya realism.⁷⁵ For Nyāya, which is out and out realistic and does not have anything to do with the reflective method of enquiry, the manifest material of the world is as much given as the world itself. But for Sāṅkhya, manifestation is construction, being 'appearance projected by the feeling body',⁷⁶ and yet the unmanifest *prakṛti* is 'given'.⁷⁷ The unmanifest *pradhāna* continues into the manifest world, -- a view that runs counter to Kant's agnosticism for which there is a complete hiatus between the manifest world and the unknown thing-in-itself. Sāṅkhya agrees with Kant against Nyāya that the manifest world is a construction but again agrees with Nyāya against

Kant in maintaining that the world is given. It is the given which is constructed, but, against Kant, Sāṅkhyā maintains that the ‘constructed’ is *continuous with* the given.

Bhattacharyya makes the distinction *and* relation between body and the world clearer when he says that the body, constituted by the manifest *bhutas*, is distinct from the world.⁷⁸

Constituted by the manifest body, the world is for the *bhoga* of the self (as identified with the body). Yet, Bhattacharyya points out, though the world is for the *bhoga* of the self, it is still felt to be *given*. Here is the realism of Sāṅkhyā. To do justice to Bhattacharyya’s reflections on the Sāṅkhyā ideas of body and the world, we may refer to three statements of his which specify the relation and the distinction between body and the world in three ways:

1. The world as external to the body is distinct from the matters that directly constitute the body and from other manifest *tattvas* that indirectly condition its manifestation⁷⁹
2. we are aware of it (i.e., the world) in our experience (*bhoga*) as *given* and have accordingly to conceive it as a construction (in the interest of *bhoga*) out of *unmanifest* real matter .. out of which the body and its constituents have emerged by real causal combination and not by imaginative construction.⁸⁰
3. *prakṛti* gets manifested in two ways - in the causal way as the manifest *tattvas* that constitute the body and in the non-causal way as the external world.⁸¹

The relation of causal manifestation and non-causal manifestation, referred to earlier, has to be further elaborated.

The external world is ‘nothing manifest’ apart from bodily consciousness.⁸² But object ‘not constituting any body would be only unmanifest *prakṛti*’⁸³: In Sāṅkhyā realism, the world is a ‘construction out of *unmanifest* real matter ...’⁸⁴ Thus the world, through causality or manifestation, appears to self, and the same world is the external or unmanifest world in the non-causal way. The constructed and the given, the

manifest and the unmanifest are combined in Sāṅkhya realism. And this is possible on the part of the Sāṅkhya because Sāṅkhya *places realism itself in the reflective context*: reflection for Sāṅkhya (of course as interpreted by Bhattacharyya) is self reflecting on *itself as having been object*. Sāṅkhya, we have seen, is no ordinary realism which uncritically accepts the object of knowledge as independent. For it, the object is reflectively-retrospectively understood as what the self *had* embodied itself or objectified itself in.

We shall, following Bhattacharyya, refer now to two aspects of Sāṅkhya philosophy where reflection brings about the unity of the given and the constructed, of the unmanifest and the manifest.

We first refer to the Sāṅkhya concept of *buddhi*. The world is said to be manifest through *buddhi*. Now, *buddhi* emerges through real causality from *prakṛti* and yet *prakṛti* becomes manifest through *buddhi*. *Buddhi* manifests *prakṛti* and at the same time, understands such manifestation to be of an unmanifest given.

Again, as we have seen following Bhattacharyya, the external world is nothing manifest apart from bodily consciousness. What *Sāṅkhya understands as manifestation is what Bhattacharyya understands as self becoming body or object. In reflection self as becoming body or object is understood*. Now, to be aware of self as modified into object is also to be aware of that of which it is modification, i.e., of the unmanifest *prakṛti* becoming *buddhi* or mind. Hence, in reflection on *buddhi* or mind we become aware *pari passu* of unmanifest *prakṛti*.

And now we come to what we intended to do earlier, i.e., to contrast Sāṅkhya and Kant. Both Sāṅkhya and Kant are interested in founding a metaphysics of experience. Sāṅkhya explicates the *tattvas* involved in our experience, Kant tries to uncover the structural presuppositions of our experience. Both follow the reflective method. But then, the end - results of their application of the reflective method are different. (i) The Sāṅkhya philosopher is a realist, Kant an idealist. Sāṅkhya finds the independent or unknown object of the realist's conception within reflection : to repeat, it is known as what *was* of the self, what the self *had* objectified itself in and what *now* stands contrasted to self. To Kant, however, the unknown thing - in - itself is not *known* as unknown. Kant confesses to an agnosticism in respect

of it. But Sāṅkhyā repeatedly maintains that the unknown object -- in its distinctive language, unmanifest *pradhāna* - is known, *retrospectively*. Thus it is emphasised that the unmanifest *pradhāna* is *given*. (ii) Then, as Bhattacharyya points out, Sāṅkhyā entertains the possibility of the body getting dissolved into ‘unexperienceable realities’.⁸⁵ (iii) There is again the knowledge of the object ‘as what was its (i.e., the self’s) body and disowned’.⁸⁶ Thus *retrospectively*, in reflection, the unknown or unmanifest object is known, insists Sāṅkhyā. The idea of such retrospective moment in reflection is conspicuous by its absence in Kant. (iv) Another idea that Sāṅkhyā has is that of object being ‘detachedly known’,⁸⁷ as Bhattacharyya expresses it, in *viveka*. (v) Still another idea that Bhattacharyya spots in Sāṅkhyā is that the world is a given appearance or phenomenon of *prakṛti*, being as much *given* to a *bhāva* as constructed by it⁸⁸

So in different ways the realism of Sāṅkhyā comes to be emphasised, viz., through the ideas of retrospective moment in reflection, of self as *disowning* the object in reflection, of knowledge of the unmanifest *prakṛti* being *given*, of *knowledge* of object being dissolved into unmanifest-ness, so to say, and so on.

There is again another fundamental difference between Sāṅkhyā and Kant that we can derive from Bhattacharyya’s interpretation. Both follow the reflective method of enquiry, but for Kant, reflection is a matter of looking within, so to say, to isolate the structural principles that lie embedded in experience, whereas Sāṅkhyā aims at knowing the metaphysical *tattvas*. Bhattacharyya refers to the ‘knowledge of the metaphysical object’⁸⁹ in this connection. Kant is an epistemologist, the Sāṅkhyā philosopher is a metaphysician. Kant’s thing-in-itself is not the same as the unmanifest *pradhāna* of Sāṅkhyā because the thing in-itself acts as a foil to our knowledge, whereas the unmanifest *prakṛti* is known: Sāṅkhyā positively maintains that the process of object’s getting dissolved into unmanifest-ness is known (through *viveka* or the self’s freeing itself from detachment to object).

In other words, for Sāṅkhyā reflection does not just isolate the ‘metaphysical first principles of natural science’ of Kant’s conception but founds a *metaphysics of nature*. As we have seen following Bhattacharyya,

Sāṅkhyā is interested in the ‘metaphysical’ object. But Kant is interested in the epistemological object, that is, object as known. For Kant, the form of the object of knowledge is but the form of the knowledge of object. For Sāṅkhyā, the self’s reflective knowledge of itself is indeed dissociation from object but such dissociation is at the same time distinguishing which, as Bhattacharyya points out, ‘is a function not of the subject but of the object’⁹⁰

So while Kant would hold that the forms of the object of knowledge are but forms of the knowledge of object, Sāṅkhyā holds that the unfolding of the different stages of *prakṛti* is an objective natural process and not, as in Kant, a subjective process of uncovering the subjective functions constituting the objects of knowledge. *That the self embodies itself in object is an objective fact according to Sāṅkhyā* though in reflection the self *sees through* such embodiment (and therewith detaches itself from such embodiment). In fact, with regard to the question of embodiment, Sāṅkhyā thinking is completely distinct from that of Vedānta which would understand embodiment as illusory. Vedānta would regard embodiment, from the point of view of transcendence of it, as negated; but Sāṅkhyā would understand embodiment as what *had been* a fact and what is *now* i.e., in reflection disowned, relegated to unmanifest *pradhāna*. Time and again, Sāṅkhyā brings this unmanifest aspect of *pradhāna* *within* reflection instead of negating it. As Bhattacharyya says :

There is no freeing except in the knowing of the object as metaphysical, as absolutely distinct from the self, or as what was illusorily confused with the self as its embodiment; and there is no knowledge of the metaphysical object except as what was its body and now disowned.⁹¹

Reflection is both the self’s detachment from the body and seeing (through) its involvement in the body. *Viveka*, for Sāṅkhyā, is ‘detachedly’⁹² knowing the object on the part of the self.

So the long and the short of the matter is that Sāṅkhyā holds to a conception of the object which is neither Kant’s epistemological conception of it nor the Vedāntic spiritualistic conception of it; it holds to the metaphysical conception of the object. And it derives the warrant for such a conception from reflection which, as we have seen, has an objective side to it. The metaphysical object, again, is not the *res extensa* of the Cartesians but

the object reflectively understood as *having been* the embodied subject. Thus by understanding the object in reflection to be the embodiment of the self, by including the object in reflection, Sāṅkhyā comes to the metaphysical conception of the object. This is not possible for Kant the epistemologist, because reflection according to him knows only the constitutive forms of the object, i.e., *forms of the object so far as the object is known*. With Sāṅkhyā, however, unmanifest *prakṛti*'s 'evolutes' are not the Kantian 'forms': they are forms -- if at all they are to be so described -- in which *prakṛti* manifests itself. The Sāṅkhyā method of reflection indeed *appears* to be similar to Kant's transcendental method. Both consist in uncovering the structures of experience. But then, the comparison loses sight of the distinctive methodology of Sāṅkhyā. Uncovering here is not the subject's looking within, subject's reflectively understanding how the object is constituted by the subject's functions. As it has been already pointed out, uncovering in the Sāṅkhyā context is *object's* distinguishing, manifesting itself to the self (as having been its embodiment). To quote Bhattacharyya:

..... as the self becomes completely free, object ceases to be manifest to it.⁹³

Every manifestation is the self's *becoming* object, *embodying* itself. As Bhattacharyya points out, there is for Sāṅkhyā no metaphysical object 'except in the body that is forming or dissolving'.⁹⁴ And there is no *viveka* except in the object being 'detachedly known'.⁹⁵ Bhattacharyya understands buddhi or mind to be 'the pattern of all metaphysical or body-forming object'.⁹⁶ It is in the self's becoming embodied or object that there is, as though, what Bhattacharyya calls, the 'aesthetic perception of the material object'.⁹⁷ When the self's freeing process begins, it sees through its previous embodiment as an *objective* process, as the process of the *object's* lapse into unmanifest - ness, so to say. Both body - 'forming' and body - 'dissolving', to use Bhattacharyya's diction, are objective processes for Sāṅkhyā. There is no conception of such objective process, no conception of retrospection in reflection, in which the *past objectification or embodiment* is seen by the self in Kant's philosophy. If Sāṅkhyā has at all to be understood as having applied the transcendental method, then it must be observed that it applies the method to uphold metaphysical realism as distinguished from Kant's epistemological idealism.

Aside from the difference between Kant and Sāṅkhyā with regard to the deliverance of reflection -- in Kant it is the ‘form’ of the object, in Sāṅkhyā it is the metaphysical object --, there is also the difference in their motivations in applying the reflective method. For Sāṅkhyā, reflection starts with, what Bhattacharyya aptly calls it, ‘wonder’⁹⁸ on the part of the self as to how it could be affected by pain; *after* being affected by pain, the self frees itself from the body in which pain is felt and in which it embodied itself. Reflection thus is a spiritual enterprise for Sāṅkhyā. It is indeed knowledge of the self, but alongside such knowledge there is the feeling of the self opposing itself which (opposition) the self wants to reckon with by tracing it to its previous embodiment or objectification. Thus reflection, for Sāṅkhyā, is the ‘spiritual function’⁹⁹ of reckoning with what opposes the self and what the self wants to be free from. To Kant, however, the aim of reflection is a *theoretically* satisfactory account of the object of knowledge as a ‘unity’ constituted by the synthetic functions of the self. The motivations of the Sāṅkhyakāra and Kant are different and therefore the end-products of their methods are different. For Kant, it is the ‘formal’ unity of the object that is to be explained; for Sāṅkhyā, it is the ‘object’ that is to be explained. No amount of theoretical analysis can do away with the appearance of the object; and, indeed, Kant was hard put to it to remove the foreign *appearance* of the thing-in-itself. Sāṅkhyā, however, can explain the spiritual malaise - of the appearance of the object - through the self’s embodiment (*and* dissociation at the same time).

Upshot of Bhattacharyya’s reflections on Sāṅkhyā.

1. The entire Sāṅkhyā - interpretation of Bhattacharyya’s has its spring in one interest, viz., that of upholding Sāṅkhyā realism. It is with this aim in view that Bhattacharyya tries to find out a distinctive methodology through which the objective *tattvas* can be known.
2. For Bhattacharyya, this methodology is reflection. Now, the Sāṅkhyā realism of object, of unmanifest *prakrti* would become intelligible if the reflective methodology gives the warrant to it. Here Bhattacharyya’s novelty lies in his interpretation of pain-experience. It is only in reflection on pain-experience that one can testify to the self’s previous incarnation, so to speak, in pain-

experience. Bhattacharyya thus finds pain to be the ‘exemplar of objective reality’¹⁰⁰. As a piece of exegesis, this is indeed novel: objective reality is spotted in pain-experience because pain-experience alone can be certified by present experience to *have been previously a fact*. And this exegesis is true to the letter and spirit of Sāṅkhya : Sāṅkhya conceives of *prakṛti* as *sukha-dukkha-mohātmaka*.

3. But apart from his exegesis, what is more important is the *general philosophical point* that Bhattacharyya extracts out of Sāṅkhya, viz., that the realistic or independent object cannot be testified to by present knowledge that is *one with* the object but only by retrospective-reflective awareness as what *was not* the self, *was the object*, *was hostile* to the self, *was painful*. The point, then, that Bhattacharyya would press against realism is that the independence of the object supposedly in relation to knowledge – is only a matter of non-cognitive apprehension. The Sāṅkhya idea of *prakṛti*, then, for Bhattacharyya has a philosophical importance as *within it he reads unknown-ness or non-cognitivity*, if we so put it, of the object.
4. The Sāṅkhya ideas of manifest *prakṛti* and unmanifest *prakṛti* are understood by Bhattacharyya in the light of the self’s body-forming and body-dissolving respectively as evidenced in reflection.
5. It is daring on Bhattacharyya’s part to have introduced the concept of objective side in reflection. Thereby, Bhattacharyya not only distinguishes Sāṅkhya realism from ordinary realism, which does not feel the necessity of establishing the independence of the known object through reflection, but also gives a *new dimension to reflective methodology*.
6. A very important feature of Bhattacharyya’s interpretation of Sāṅkhya is the idea of the metaphysical object. The metaphysical object is not the object assumed in naïve, uncritical commonsense, but what is warranted in reflection as what *was* the body of the self and is *now*, i.e., in present reflection disowned.

7. Sāṅkhya has been described as a religion of ‘spiritual naturalness’.¹⁰¹ For it, there is a continuity between the self’s freeing from object and object’s lapse into unmanifestness or unknown-ness. The self’s freeing is understood through retrospection on its embodiment. ‘Life starts reflection’,¹⁰² says Bhattacharyya expressing the Sāṅkhya view of continuity between self’s freeing and object’s lapse into unknown-ness. It is important to see how Bhattacharyya *credits importance to nature in the spiritual context*. As Bhattacharyya says, ‘the body represents in itself the entire process of nature for the self’¹⁰³.
8. Bhattacharyya’s Sāṅkhya - interpretation has this merit, then, that it understands Sāṅkhya as a complete, consistent, well - rounded system that can be understood in its own terms without being rendered consistent in terms of monism.¹⁰⁴ Here, as we have been seeing throughout, Bhattacharyya brings his reflective methodology to show how the self and the object are related and how yet object is *distinguished* in its manifestness and unmanifest - ness.

To have introduced the reflective methodology in interpreting Sāṅkhya is the supreme merit of Bhattacharyya.

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III

YOGA

For convenience of our study of Bhattacharyya's reflections on Yoga philosophy, we have to bear in mind three considerations : (i) Sāṅkhyā view on the objectifying tendency of the self, (ii) Sāṅkhyā view of *viveka*, and (iii) Yoga view of freedom and knowledge.

We have seen that, while interpreting Sāṅkhyā, Bhattacharyya has pointed out that the illusion that is involved in pain-feeling is at once intellectual and conative: the self *knows* itself as object as it objectifies itself. Thus the self's objectification is as much wrong will as it is wrong knowledge.

Sāṅkhyā then goes on to maintain that the self's freedom is realised through knowledge alone. It understands such knowledge to be discriminative, to be *viveka* which is distinguishing of object from the self. And it maintains that when *viveka* arises, self's wrong will, its objectification spontaneously comes to be dissipated.

Here Yoga joins issue with Sāṅkhyā. For it, mere *vivekajñāna* is not enough to realise freedom, to dissipate the objectifying of the self. Wrong will cannot spontaneously, i.e., *naturally* be dissipated, *unless* there is a culture, i.e., practice of Yoga. Yoga calls such culture *asamprajñāta*. And, Bhattacharyya interprets *asamprajñāta* to be 'negative willing'² i.e., willing to abstain from egoistic willing³. For Yoga, *asamprajñāta* would strike at the very root of knowledge which Sāṅkhyā views as sufficient for the self to achieve freedom from *prakṛti*.

On four counts the difference of Yoga from Sāṅkhyā is pronounced and fundamental. First, even in the attitude of knowledge, prescribed by Sāṅkhyā for realising freedom, Yoga discerns an egoistic will *towards* freedom and it maintains that this egoistic will itself has to be dissipated. The second point of the difference is a *supplement* to the first one. There must, according to Yoga, be not only the dissipation of *negative will*, *not only the will to deny the will to achieve freedom, but also not willing to will*. Free willing, for Yoga, is *first* willing *not to will* and *secondly, is not - willing to will* (to achieve freedom). When *nirodha*, as Yoga calls it, i.e., willing not to

will is supplemented by, what again Yoga calls, *pranidhāna*, i.e., not willing to will, the self does not any longer move towards freedom but is absolute freedom. *Thirdly*, in so far as *viveka* of Sāṅkhya conception is knowledge seeking discrimination (of object from the self), it is not the negative willing of Yoga conception. Yoga, as we have seen, interprets *asamprajñāta* to be negative willing, i.e., willing to abstain from egoistic willing; and *asamprajñāta* of Yoga conception is not *viveka* of Sāṅkhya conception. *Fourthly*, Sāṅkhya holds that when *viveka* arises, the self's objectification naturally drops off. To Yoga, freeing movement of the self is not a *natural* movement (of the lapse of objectification into unmanifest *prakṛti*.) *Freedom is not nature* : there is a fundamental difference between them. *Egoistic will towards freedom is not absolute freedom, it being natural will. True freedom must be freedom from the natural will. It is one level deeper than the freedom from natural will.*

It is in the conception of absolute freedom that transcends the will to freedom in which Bhattacharyya finds the roots of Yoga as a system of philosophy. From Bhattacharyya's point of view, Sāṅkhya, with all its emphasis on *viveka*, remains chained to the idea of egoistic will; it has not cultivated the attitude of spiritual freedom.

After thus fixing the Yoga point of view in absolute freedom, Bhattacharyya gets into the details of Yoga, and that too, principally, with the aim of explicating the level of absolute freedom.

The first most important consideration for Bhattacharyya is the emphasis that Yoga places upon the specific *practice of Yoga* to *actualise* knowledge of the object's distinction from the self that (i.e., the knowledge) is already reached. On Bhattacharyya's interpretation, it appears, Yoga is on a deeper level than Sāṅkhya in so far as the attainment of self-knowledge is concerned. While Sāṅkhya stops with *viveka* or discriminative knowledge in the matter of the realisation of the self's freedom from *prakṛti*, Yoga thinks that the *practice* of Yoga through an effort of the mind is needed to *actualise* the knowledge of the self as free already obtained. This specific practice is *asamprajñāta*. As Bhattacharyya puts it:

To it (i.e., to Yoga) as to other systems, freedom is reached through the correction of *avidyā* or spiritual illusion. To Sāṅkhya, such illusion is

finally corrected or eliminated through knowledge, while to Yoga, the final elimination is possible only through the practice of Yoga, a form of willing that is conditioned by knowledge Yoga to actualise knowledge that is already reached – *jñānajanyayoga* as *Vijñānabhiṣu* calls it – is the subject matter of Yoga philosophy⁴.

Again:

In other systems spiritual activity is not necessarily Yoga in the sense of spiritual willing and Yoga may be a spiritual condition other than activity it is only in Yoga philosophy that Yoga is identified with spiritual willing ...⁵

Lest Bhattacharyya's intentions in emphasizing *practice* supplementing knowledge should not be misunderstood, it must be clearly be noted that practice in the Yoga context is not mundane practical activity. Activity here is taken in the sense of 'spiritual willing'. And the point of highlighting the importance of spiritual willing is to find the roots of Yoga in a specific view of freedom which is not the view of Sāṅkhya concerned as it is, to the end of the chapter, with egoistic will to freedom. Yoga would view the egoistic will to freedom as still chained to nature. Egoistic willing towards freedom, though wanting *freedom*, *still aims at* freedom as its end, its object. But spiritual willing is 'explicitly aware of being the activity of the end'⁶. It is 'self-deepening'⁷ of the freedom that is 'already attained'. The very 'mentality'⁹ that seeks freedom is dissipated in spiritual willing: it is 'freedom from this mentality itself'¹⁰.

The point of the foregoing emphasis upon spiritual activity - better 'spiritual willing' - is to accord *philosophical* importance to the concept of absolute freedom. The Yoga emphasis on activity supplementing knowledge is not to be understood (or misunderstood) in terms of the banality that philosophical theory should be translated into practice. The Yoga would rather point out that practice, as it understands it, is itself rooted in a theory, i.e., the theory of absolute freedom.

The second important consideration for Bhattacharyya is the Yoga idea of *asamprajñātasamādhi*. This may be realised through *nirodha* or *prapnidhāna*. These may be distinguished as *levels* in the attainment of

samādhi. According to Bhattacharyya, *pranidhāna* is ‘alternative’¹¹ to *nirodha*. *Nirodha* is willing *not* to will. *Pranidhana* is ‘willing to arrest negative willing,’¹² it is not - willing to will. It is arresting ‘all willing’.¹³ The important features of *pranidhāna* for Yoga, according to Bhattacharyya, are : (i) *negatively*, it is ‘to reverse ... the entire attitude of willing’¹⁴; (ii) *positively*, it is (a) ‘to secure the attitude of knowing’¹⁵ and (b) is the ‘will to be in the knowing attitude for freedom from knowledge’¹⁶.

Now, Bhattacharyya’s construction of *pranidhāna* may appear to be knotty and confusing: *first*, *pranidhāna* is said to be reversal of the attitude of knowing, but *secondly*, it is said to secure the attitude of knowing and yet again, *thirdly*, it is said to be ‘will’ for ‘freedom from knowledge’¹⁶.

We can, however, untangle the knot and clear the confusion if we bear in mind that in his Yoga - commentary, Bhattacharyya keeps the contrast with Sāṅkhya in mind, especially the Sāṅkhya understanding of ‘knowledge’ and ‘will’; when in the Yoga context, he speaks of ‘knowledge’ and ‘will’, he contrasts the Yoga understanding of these from the Sāṅkhya understanding of these.

To recapitulate Bhattacharyya’s Sāṅkhya - commentary : the illusion that is involved in the feeling of pain is ... at once intellectual and conative ... *avidyā* has to be conceived as a beginningless series of wrong knowledge and wrong will....¹⁷

Now, when *pranidhāna* is said to be, negatively, reversal of the entire attitude of willing, it is objective willing or egoistic willing, ‘wrong’ willing according to his Sāṅkhya commentary, that Bhattacharyya has in mind and that he contrasts with (ii) (b) above which is the specific Yoga idea of free willing. And when *pranidhāna* is *graded*, positively, as securing the attitude of knowing, it is contrasted with ‘wrong knowledge’ in the language of his Sāṅkhya-commentary, i.e., the objectifying tendency of the self. This securing of the attitude of knowledge, knowledge that is *dissipated* from objectifying tendency, from wrong will is will as understood in (ii) (b) above which is free will. And free willing ‘not only springs from knowledge but continues and actualises it’¹⁸. It is perfectly consistent, in the Yoga context, to understand such will to be ‘will to be in knowing attitude’, ‘knowing’ being taken to be what will actualises, i.e., knowing of the free self: will here

is autonomous, being the self - deepening of what it, i.e., will has got already *within* itself and not heteronomous i.e., not seeking something *outside* itself.

But how can such will be in the knowing attitude for ‘freedom from knowledge’? To understand this is no difficulty if one takes into consideration Bhattacharyya’s view that Yoga is ‘spiritual willing for the free being or active quiescence of spirit of which quiescent knowledge is only a contingent aspect’.¹⁹ Bhattacharyya’s meaning seems to be that Yoga as free willing is at bottom freedom, and will is intended to be the knowing of the ‘being’ of freedom, *but freedom has no ‘being’*, and so *knowing* of freedom can be ‘only’²⁰ a contingent aspect of the free being of the spirit. Freedom has no ‘being’ because it is not assertible either as existent or as non-existent. It is then negation of all being. That freedom and negation are convertible terms comes out clearly in Bhattacharyya’s essay on ‘the Concept of Value’ where he speaks of ‘negation or freedom’²¹ in the context of valuation of ‘inner willing’²².

Bhattacharyya’s entire interpretation of Yoga here is embedded in his Philosophy of Freedom which may be made explicit in the following argument :

1. Freedom does not have any ‘being’, i.e., is no *padārtha* (in the Vaiśeṣika terminology).
2. Knowledge is necessarily of what has ‘being’.
3. Therefore, ‘freedom’ cannot be said to be ‘known’.
4. To the quiescent spirit, then, knowledge is contingent.

Again, because freedom has no being, it does not negate any being. It is the constant refrain in Bhattacharyya that freedom is free even from negation of being. *It is in this negation or freedom that the spiritual willing of Yoga is embedded.*

‘The will to be in the knowing attitude for freedom from knowledge’ is thus freedom from objective knowledge. It is at the same time freedom from the objective tendency of the will. So it may *indifferently* be called ‘freedom from knowledge’ and ‘freedom from will’. It wants to ‘secure’²³ the attitude of knowing in the sense that it aims at *consolidating*

viveka or the distinction of the object from the self. *Viveka* is knowledge, but still on the level of *viveka* the will to be in the objective attitude on the part of the self is not yet dissipated, and *asamprajñātasamādhi* intends to *secure vivekajñāna against* the tendency of the self to be led astray, so to say. So *asamprajñātasamādhi* wants to *secure knowledge of viveka* against the possible objective attitude of knowledge. Hence it is will to be in the knowing attitude i.e., the attitude of *viveka* for freedom from knowledge, the objective attitude of the self.——

Thus we render Bhattacharyya's meaning in reference to *asamprajñātasamādhi* clear.

The will to be in the knowing attitude for freedom from knowledge is viewed by Bhattacharyya as 'the will to contemplate a mystery, the mystery of absolute freedom'²⁴. The will in question here, it is evident, is spiritual willing which is not freedom *to seek freedom*, not freedom *from bondage*, but *freedom that is absolute*. It has nothing outside itself to seek. Hence it is absolute. Absolute freedom is not motivated by anything else. Its emergence is 'spontaneous'²⁵. It exercises itself without any cause or reason. *It might not have exercised itself*. Indeed, this latter is not only envisaged as a possibility by Bhattacharyya but also taken to be incorporated into the very idea of absolute freedom. *Absolute freedom can as well retract itself as it can manifest itself*. As Bhattacharyya says in his paper on 'Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā':

Creative freedom is intelligible as the reversed process of the retractive freedom. The common conception of creative freedom without destroying freedom, of the lord being able to put forth will but not to retract it, is not the conception of absolute freedom²⁶.

Since *asamprajñātasamādhi* aims at consolidating that attitude of will in which will contemplates freedom and since absolute freedom spontaneously emerges i.e., emerges without any cause or reason, it may be said that on the level of *asamprajñātasamādhi* will contemplates 'a mystery', the mystery of its 'spontaneous emergence'²⁷ as Bhattacharyya puts it. The will *might not have exercised freedom*, and yet it exercises its freedom and this has no reason and so this is a mystery.

But ultimately the construction that Bhattacharyya puts on *asamprajñātasamādhi* brings it in a completely new light; and it may be said that here Bhattacharyya adds to the corpus of Yoga thinking on *asamprajñātasamādhi*. Yoga says that such samādhi may be reached by spiritual activity which may be either *nirodha* or *Iśvarapraṇidhāna*. Bhattacharyya interprets *Iśvarapraṇidhāna* as ‘surrender of willing’²⁸ and ‘positive contemplation of the mystery of absolute freedom or God’²⁹. Will can not understand the emergence of freedom. In other words, *freedom cannot be explained by theoretic reason. Freedom, then, is not only not ‘willing not to will’ (nirodha), not only again not ‘not willing to will (prāṇudhāna) but also not willing at all.* Yoga, on this construction of Bhattacharyya, *understands willing not as free act as Kant does but as freedom.*

The other important considerations for Bhattacharyya for a proper understanding of Yoga as a distinct philosophical system are as follows:-

1. Yoga as a system of philosophy is distinct from other systems which too recognise Yoga. But those systems recognise Yoga as a spiritual condition, not as spiritual willing.
2. Marking out the distinctness of Yoga philosophy from other systems in terms of spiritual willing, Bhattacharyya finds it important to bring out the important features of spiritual activity or willing. *First*, spiritual activity is for *actuaising* the knowledge of freedom. *Second*, spiritual activity is distinct from all other activities in which too freedom is sought to be attained. There are activities in which freedom *from* some evil is sought to be achieved. But spiritual activity is the activity *for* achieving freedom. In other words, spiritual activity consists in achieving, i.e., actualising freedom that is *already* known. It is, as Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘the self-deepening of a satisfaction already attained’³⁰. *Third, other* activites aim at the fulfilment of some desire. *But freedom is not desired.* When mind desires something, it retains its present mentality. But freedom is sought by one who is engaged in *spiritual activity to get rid of or to be free from the mentality itself.* *Fourth, activity in the moral sphere is obedience to some law, the categorical imperative as Kant would*

say, but spiritual activity is not subordinated to any law extraneous to itself. it is subordinated, if at all, to itself. Spiritual activity consists in the *culture* of freedom that is *already known*.

We have just referred to Kant's view that moral act is obedience to the moral law and have distinguished, following Bhattacharyya, spiritual activity from moral activity. In passing, we may note another difference between Yoga and Kant. As distinct from Kant, Yoga holds that spiritual willing is not free act but *freedom*. The basic difference, however, between Kant and Yoga is that Yoga conceives of *spiritual willing to be distinct from moral activity*. Of course, Kant does speak of free willing but for him such willing is to realise freedom as the Law of Holiness; to Yoga, however, free willing intends its *self-* culture. Morality for Kant has 'Commandments', but spirituality for Bhattacharyya has no Commandments extraneous to it.

3. Another important consideration for Bhattacharyya in the Yoga-context is the distinction between non-spiritual willing and spiritual willing. Non-spiritual willing does not aim at freedom as spiritual willing does. What is of special note is that Bhattacharyya, after noting that 'all willing is the function of *buddhi* called *asmitā*',³¹ adds to the corpus of Yoga philosophy by observing that spiritual willing is 'higher *asmitā*'³² controlling 'lower *asmitā*'³³ or objective willing,³⁴ *in order to* 'energise'³⁵ it (i.e. objective willing) in the interest of freedom.³⁶ Thus spiritual willing is not just withdrawl from objective will but, positively, willing in the interest of actualising freedom.
4. The great merit of Yoga philosophy is, as Bhattacharyya takes it to be, to incorporate the consciousness of free willing into a 'practical psychology of willing',³⁷ a discipline which lays bare the stages in the maturation of the consciousness of freedom into actual or *realised* freedom. Bhattacharyya would contrast Yoga psychology with empirical psychology. In this latter, mental states are only presented as facts and no in-depth understanding of the 'mental' in the light of the consciousness of freedom is sought to be achieved. It appears that from Bhattacharyya's point of view psychology can be distinguished from other sciences if its roots in the consciousness

of freedom are unearthed. But, as it is, it does not turn any attention to that, does not turn reflective to free mental states from their appendage to objects. There is, again, Kant's moral psychology which is indeed based on the concept of freedom, but freedom is 'here only a *concept*, a *presupposition* and not *known*. *The consciousness of achieved freedom does not regulate Kant's transcendental enquiry. Bhattacharyya's reflections on Yoga psychology of freedom may be connected with his speculations in his book, THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM in which he lays bare the consecutive stages in the attainment of subjectivity in the light of subjective freedom that is 'believed', of 'the felt detachment from object'*³⁸.

5. An important consideration for Bhattacharyya is the question of skepticism about Yoga. The question is whether Yoga could bring about anything in *nature*. The question appears basic to Bhattacharyya as he connects it with the general question of the *reality* of freedom, of free causality. *Bhattacharyya's argument is that if Yoga is a mystery, then free will must be said to be a mystery, and if free will is a mystery, free causality is a mystery, and if free causality is a mystery, then natural causality too must be said to be a mystery. But, argues Bhattacharyya, we are directly aware of only will - causality and it is thence that we derive the idea of natural causality.*³⁹

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III

JAINA ANEKANTAVĀDA¹

1. Ordinary realism, keeping away from thought-distinction or thought-constitution of reality -- which idealism takes to be the only way of knowing reality -- admits determinate definite truths. It is sharply contrasted from idealistic logic according to which the process of rendering a content definite or the process of distinguishing a content is the work of thought. Professor Bhattacharyya interprets distinction conceived in the realistic way as ‘bare togetherness’² of facts known.
2. Jaina realism, according to Bhattacharyya, takes ‘togetherness’ as ‘manifold’³ ‘being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which cannot be subsumed under a universal’⁴
3. If in ordinary realism ‘togetherness’ means distinction of truths, Jaina realism interprets it as ‘distinction from distinction’,⁵ i.e. a distinction which is *not fixed* but itself constituted by distinction from other entities which are themselves constituted by distinctions.
4. ‘Distinction from distinction’ has, however, been sought to be reduced to identity, in different ways though, by Hegel, the Naiyāika and Johnson.

In Hegel’s Dialectic, the distinction of a content from another (which is previously thought or distinguished) is negation of the former and the distinction of the previous distinction is ‘negation of negation’ which the Hegelian identifies with the identity of the former. If identity is the work of distinguishing thought, then, as Bhattacharyya points out, ‘Realism proper has no place for relation of identity in the objective’,⁶ the ‘objective’ being taken by realism to be what is apart from the distinguishing thought of it.

But in Hegel’s dialectic, although distinction is sought to be negated by identity, yet difference still ‘retains some kind of being’.⁷ That is to say, Hegelian logic, try as it might to do away with the Thing-in-itself of Kant, cannot explain the *particularity* of what is given. Bhattacharyya makes a detailed criticism of Hegelian logic on this score in his article ‘The Place of the Indefinite in Logic’.⁸

As regards Nyāya, although as a realistic system it does not admit -- as Hegel does -- the logical relation of identity (to which particularities, differences, distinctions etc. are sought to be reduced), yet it maintains that *samavāya* which is a relation of distinct terms exists separately from one of the distinct terms related by it. To Bhattacharyya, such inseparable relation may be regarded as a 'form of concrete identity'⁹. Now, *samavāya* is either distinct from the distinct terms related by it or not. If it is distinct, it has to be related to the terms by another relation in which case there would ultimately be a *regressus ad infinitum*. If it is not distinct, how is it related ? Nyāya insists that the relation *is* distinct but it is related by self-identity or *svasamavāya*. Here Bhattacharyya points out that 'self-related' can only mean 'unrelated in the objective',¹⁰ i.e., not related in the way in which objects are related. But it remains in that case unrelated. And so it cannot be distinguished, i.e., cannot be distinguished or fixed by any distinguishing thought.

Turning to Johnson's theory (as stated in his *Logic*, Vol I, chapter VII), Bhattacharyya points out that here 'identity and 'difference' are taken as co-ordinate. There is, on this theory, a mutual implication of identity and difference between terms, i.e., identity in one respect and difference in another. The two terms M and N are identical in respect of a and different in respect of b. To quote Bhattacharyya :

It amounts to saying that M and N are in the two relations the *same* two terms only in a factitious sense. They are two pairs of terms - Ma, Na and Mb, Nb ... and the identity of Ma, Na, means that they are only different symbols of p.¹¹.

But Bhattacharyya points out that even in such a situation the differences of symbols 'cannot be got rid of' by p.

The point is : on such a theory particularity is understood through particularizing *thought*.

Ordinary realism would demur to this suggestion. For it, particularity is *given*, i.e., is *independent of* particularizing thought.

Here Bhattacharyya points to something very important: with regard to the particular, realism insists that here is something, i.e., particular which

is *distinct* from the distinguishing act, and therefore cannot be rendered definite. It is *indefinite*.

5. Hobhouse, the realist logician, has admitted such indefinite. The content of ‘simple apprehension’ is for him indefinite. But for him, the content of knowledge is defined by abstraction, i.e., abstraction of thought. Moreover, the indefinite as a concept does not for Hobhouse play any part in our knowledge which is of the definite (determined by abstraction). Hobhouse does not *feel the necessity of reviewing the form* which knowledge is usually taken to have, viz., the form of the knowledge of the definite *in the light of the concept of the indefinite*.
6. But for the realist the apprehension of the indefinite is a situation which cannot be dismissed.
7. Since for realism, the definite is objective, i.e., independent of thinking, the indefinite too has to be admitted as independent of thinking, i.e., independent of definitising thought.
8. But the problem arises with regard to the ‘definite indefinite’. For thought, the two elements ‘definite’ and ‘indefinite’ are incompatible, though the total content, i.e., ‘definite indefinite’ has to be accepted as fact. A realist would of course *not* allow thought to have any say about the content ‘definite indefinite’: it is objective for him. But the two elements ‘definite’ and ‘indefinite’ cannot be related objectively even in the way of distinction, i.e., in terms of distinction as a specific category of realism (which would have nothing to do with *distinguishing thought*). Yet their togetherness has to be admitted realistically, i.e., as objective. Accordingly, realism has to interpret it as ‘distinction from distinction’. The definite being is distinct or the definite and the indefinite is ‘distinct from the distinct’, not *identity* as the idealist logician would have it.
9. *Bhattacharyya’s novelty* here lies in the suggestion that the relation between ‘indefinite’ and ‘definite’ in the ‘definite indefinite’ is ‘magical alternation’¹². What he implies thereby is that the ‘indefinite’ has to be recognised in a realistic spirit and kept apart from thought’s

distinguishing activity. Here there is ‘togetherness of undifferenced elements.’¹³

10. If the indefinite is ‘given’ (independent of thought) and is distinct or definite in its own right, it is ‘definite as indefinite’. Similarly, if the definite is ‘given’ and is distinct in its own right, it is ‘definite as definite’.
11. It is now that ‘definite definite’ becomes a manifold in contrast with ‘definite indefinite’. Writes Bhattacharyya:

If the adjective ‘definite’ in ‘definite indefinite’ be objective, it is also objective in ‘definite definite’.¹⁴

So in ‘definite definite’, ‘definite’ is both an adjective and a substantive. So ‘definite definite’ becomes a manifold. There is a relation between ‘definite’ and ‘definite’ in ‘definite definite’. Because there is a difference between the two definites, i.e., as adjective and as substantive, therefore their relation is one of ‘difference’ as in ‘definite indefinite’ where ‘definite’ is only adjective.

12. But realism cannot remain content with these two forms of togetherness. For it the basic category is distinction which is independent of subjective distinguishing. So it cannot but ask the question ‘what again is the distinction between undifferenced togetherness and differenced togetherness?’ And the answer would be: ‘Indetermination’¹⁵, i.e., what cannot be defined or rendered definite as a thought - content. Thus once again, keeping idealism away from his scheme of things, the Jaina philosopher as a realist develops ‘indetermination’ into seven modes or *bhangas* of truth. *First*, (i) there is particular definite being; *second*, (ii) its negation or distinction from the distinct being; *third*, (iii) the differenced togetherness of (i) and (ii), *fourth*, (iv) the undifferenced togetherness of (i) and (ii); *fifth*, (v) the indefinite as definite; *sixth* (vi), the indefinite as distinct from or negation of (v) ; and *seventh* (vii) the indetermination of all the truths from (i) to (vi).

Important features of this paper:

1. The first most important feature of this paper is the new dimension it strikes as a logical theory of realism. Ordinary realism, to repeat what Bhattacharyya has already told us, is based upon the conception of distinct beings which are independent of distinguishing act. To idealism, on the contrary, what cannot be thought, what cannot be rendered definite by thought has to be recognised as indefinite. But Bhattacharyya interprets the Jaina realist as insisting that the indefinite has to be recognised as objective and not to be left out because thought cannot render it definite. The conception of the ‘indefinite’ is an *extension* of the ordinary accepted scheme of realism.
2. It may be said that giving a name (that is the ‘indefinite’) does not help one distinguish Jaina realism from ordinary realism: all realists admit that the contents of knowledge are independent of thought (taken by Idealists to render contents definite), and so far, *all* realists, whether of the Jaina persuasion or not, admit the category of the ‘indefinite’. So, it may be said, Bhattacharyya’s interpretation of Jaina realism in terms of the notion of the ‘indefinite’ does not bring out the differentia of Jaina realism.

To this, the reply would be that the Jaina realist does not admit the ‘indefinite’ in the sense any other realist or a Kantian would admit it. Hobhouse, as Bhattacharyya recognises, admits, *as a realist logician*, the category of objective indefinite. The content of ‘simple apprehension’ for him is ‘a definite with an indefinite background’.¹⁶ Kant, again, retains the thing-in-itself in his philosophy; and here Kant evinces better philosophical insight than Hegel - who later on tried to do away with the recalcitrant thing-in-itself through his dialectic -- in that Kant *would* refuse to admit that the thing -in-itself is but the name of an Absolute divorced from human knowledge: Kant would refuse to smuggle metaphysics into epistemology. There is, of course, a fundamental difference between Hobhouse and Kant: Hobhouse *does* recognise the objective indefinite. To Kant, it is no object but only what acts as a foil to knowledge of objects. However, neither Hobhouse nor Kant would allow the indefinite any role to play in knowledge. The Jaina realist, on the contrary, insists on recognition being paid to the indefinite as

indefinite, as an objective content of knowledge without, however, resolving (consequent on such recognition) the indefinite into a definite content.

But, it would be asked ‘Does not Hobhouse and any realist logician of his ilk admit the indefinite as indefinite?’

The reply would be that Hobhouse does not admit that the indefinite can be a *content* of knowledge. Here now we turn to the distinctiveness of Jaina realism.

3. The speciality of the Jaina realist is his insistence that a *given* definite i.e., the definite recognised in other schools of realism, is *itself indefinite*. Thus the indefinite content of the Jaina realist is neither the indefinite of Hobhouse’s conception, nor the thing-in-itself of Kant : both remain *outside* the boundary of knowledge of definite contents. Idealistic thought indeed either tries to contain it or confesses its failure to contain it. Contrasted to idealism, Jaina realism points out that the indefinite content is objective. So where Hegelian dialectic seeks to reduce the ‘indefinite’ to the definite, Jaina realism understands the definite itself as indefinite. And contrasted to Hobhouse, the Jaina realist would understand the definite content of knowledge as itself indefinite.
4. Moreover, Jaina realism does not certainly mean, as critics of Hegelian dialectic mean, that the indefiniteness of the content is but the recognition of the fact that particularity cannot be explained by dialectic. Bhattacharyya has indeed conceded this point of the anti-Hegelian in his paper on ‘The Place of the Indefinite in Logic’. But in respect of his interpretation of Jaina realism in particular, Bhattacharyya’s point is that the indefiniteness is no particularity that remains a standing scandal to knowledge. The indefinite is a realistic object.
5. Where, now, Jaina realism goes farther than ordinary realism is in its *extension of the realistic category of ‘distinct’ objects*. The realistic theory of distinct objects understands the relation between distinct objects as one of distinction of definites. Jaina realism, however, points out that the definite and the indefinite, both objective, cannot be ‘related even in the way of distinction’.¹⁷ This tricky situation has been sought to be rendered clear by a concept that Professor Bhattacharyya introduces,

viz., that of ‘*togetherness of unrelated or undifferenced elements*’¹⁸. The definite and the indefinite cannot be distinguished as two definites can be (of course, realistically). But then their objectivity cannot be whittled away. There is no relation between them as there is between two definite contents. But there is togetherness between them. But while ordinary realism understands togetherness as one of distinct, definite contents, Jaina here would *add to the conceptual vocabulary of ordinary realism* and hold that as between the indefinite and the definite, the togetherness is one of unrelated elements. We can neither affirm a relation between them nor deny their togetherness. There is *non-relational*, i.e., non-distinctional *togetherness* between them - in Bhattacharyya’s language, ‘*togetherness of undifferenced elements*’. Such non-relational togetherness of distincts is a novel conception in Jaina realism. The elements are *both together and undifferenced*, i.e., there is *togetherness without relation between them and undifferenced-ness, so to say, without identity*. They are ‘*alternatively*’¹⁹ *together and undifferenced*. We cannot deny many elements in their togetherness nor can we affirm a relation between them. Their relation is understood by Bhattacharyya to be one of ‘*magical alternation*’²⁰ If one says that they are together, one has to be told that they are not related but undifferenced, and if one says that they are undifferenced one has to be told that they are not identical. Bhattacharyya seems to mean that *this alternation is different from disjunctive and conjunctive alternations* that logic has familiarised us with. For logic, the alternants are definite distinct contents. But Jaina logic, as Bhattacharyya interprets it, conceives alternation as indetermination’.²¹ In sum : the concept of undifferenced togetherness, introduced by Bhattacharyya into his hermeneutics of Jaina logic, refuses to be restricted to the Realistic concept of relation of *definite* districts and the Idealistic concept of distincts *constituted* by relation.

6. The thought that undifferenced elements are *not identical* distinguishes Jaina realism from Hegel’s identity - theory and the thought that unrelated elements are *together* distinguishes it from atomism.
7. While the category of ‘*definite indefinite*’ brings out that it is an indetermination and represents an extension of the thought of ordinary realism, the content ‘*definite definite*’ too brings out that the *definite is*

manifold. In ‘definite definite’, ‘definite’ is both adjective and substantival and so it is an indefinite content.

From the thought, then, that the so called definite content is itself indefinite, or so-called definite contents are subject to indetermination, it is but an easy step to the Jaina theory of anekānta. It represents the thought of ‘alternation’.²² No *one* definite description of the real can be final; yet this does not argue any skepticism. Bhattacharyya derives the fruitful concept of ‘alternation’ from the present paper published in 1925. Later on, Bhattacharyya connects this thought of alternation with the idea of freedom: in what form reality has to be taken is a matter of free choice and this choice is itself ultimately a mystery, the mystery of freedom.

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V

APPENDIX

The exegesis on Vedānta contains philosophic constructions not all of which can of course be weaved into a single philosophical theory. Nevertheless, they mark out some constants of Bhattacharyya's thought. These may be made explicit.

1. The idea of grades of consciousness or of subjectivity and objectivity continues in Bhattacharyya's book *The Subject as Freedom (SAF)* written in 1929 and his 1936 paper on 'The Concept of Philosophy' ('CP').
2. An important idea in the exegesis is that of each *grades of subjectivity* being not only isolated or made explicit but also 'informing' the lower stage. Not in the idiom of 'inform' though, the idea continues in *SAF* where on each grade of subjectivity, the (comparatively lower) grade of objectivity is *retrospectively* understood.

At this point, a study in contrast between Bhattacharyya and his great contemporary Śri Aurobindo may be fruitful. Śri Aurobindo propounded the idea of evolutionary model to interpret the passage from 'matter' to 'life' to 'mind' to 'super-mind' to 'overmind'. The question may be asked of Bhattacharyya 'If the *historically earlier* stages are unconscious (or less conscious) or less reflective than the *historically later* stages, can it not be said that the reflectively conscious or self-conscious stages *develop out* of the less conscious stages and that therefore consciousness *evolves* out of matter?"

Bhattacharyya's reply would be four-fold:

- (i) What is historically first is not philosophically so.
- (ii) The evolutionary model has *no warrant*. *How* does development take place? Merely stating the fact of development is no explanation of it. The theory of evolution is *statement* of a fact, no *explanation* of it.
- (iii) Self-consciousness is not the *terminus* of development, because it *explains* development.

- (iv) Self-consciousness explains development by looking back at development, i.e., by *retrospectively owning* it.

On the question of the disclosure of levels of consciousness, Bhattacharyya's affinity with two philosophical systems of his native tradition is evident viz., Sāṃkhya and Vedānta of Śāṅkara.

First, both for Sāṃkhya and Bhattacharyya, stages of development are stages in the actualisation of knowledge, -- discriminative knowledge for Sāṃkhya and freedom that is evident for Bhattacharyya: as the late Professor S.K. Maitra observed in one of his lectures (at the Graduate school of the University of Calcutta in the fifties of the last century) on Śāṅkhya, 'Cosmogenesis is empirico-genesis, evolution of the world is evolution of knowledge'.

Secondly, Śāṅkara in his *Adhyāśabdhāṣṭya* on *Brahmasūtras* distinguishes between *annamayakosa*, *prāṇamayakosa*, *monomayakoṣa*, *vijñānamayakosa* and *ānandamayakosa* which are levels in the achievement of subjectivity. Bhattacharyya, on his part, in his book *The Subject as Freedom*, discloses, progressively, bodily subjectivity, psychic subjectivity, subjectivity as thought etc. This brings out his remarkable affinity with Śāṅkara and also his distinct *mentalite* that marks him off theorists of evolution – Indian or Western.

3. With regard to the paper on 'Śāṅkara's Doctrine of *Māyā*', the most important points that emerge are (i) the illusory is 'unthinkably given' and (ii) because the illusory is given, given-ness as such is illusory.

This two-fold consideration is related to Bhattacharyya's observation in his 'Place of the Indefinite in Logic' ('PIL') against Hegel's Rationalistic Dialectic that reason cannot explain the emergence of the particular.

Again, it is a marvel in imaginative construction when Bhattacharyya writes that the 'illusory *in its presence*' (underline ours) is 'fundamentally different from presentation of a fact The quality of reality is explicitly felt only when it is experienced as *dissipated in an illusion*' (underline ours). The felt hiatus within experience symbolises the demand for

outgrowing experience. The boundary of knowledge, which Kant wanted to fix, can be, according to Bhattacharyya, *seen*.

From the ‘absolute denial of givenness’, Bhattacharyya proceeds to ‘the related notion of truth as utterly *un*-given, i.e. as self-luminous’.

The way is thus laid for Bhattacharyya’s philosophy of the subject which is uncompromising and radical as it does not court company with the concrete, synthetic Idealism of Hegel that comprehends the object. So too Bhattacharyya brings into sharp focus the attempt (made by Radhakrishnan, e.g.,) to compromise Śāṅkara’s Idealism by incorporating realism and objectivism into it: *in contrast*, Bhattacharyya understands Śāṅkara’s notion of subjectivity as absolute freedom from object. It may be said that Bhattacharyya’s book on *The Subject as Freedom* (1930) continues his exegesis on Śāṅkara’s acosmic Idealism written in 1927.

4. The *tattvas* of Śāṅkhya are understood as counterparts of self-knowing, self-willing and self-feeling. It seems that this interpretation, advanced in 1937, is continuous with Bhattacharyya’s reflections on knowing, feeling and willing in *SAF* of 1929.
5. In the Yoga, Bhattacharyya insightfully spots the distinctions between willing to will, willing not to will, and not willing. This interpretation, advanced in 1937, seems to be continuous with the distinction in ‘The Concept of Philosophy’ of 1936 between contemplative consciousness, objectivity of consciousness and absolute freedom and with the idea of freedom from achieving freedom contained in ‘The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance’, i.e., the idea of *Brahman* as *triguṇātīta* and again, with the idea of negation of negation or negation as withdrawal from the process of negation which had been advanced earlier in ‘Some Aspects of Negation’ written in 1914.
6. In the Yoga, Bhattacharyya spots the distinction between free ‘act’ and freedom.

Thus the Yoga, as interpreted by Bhattacharyya, marks itself off Kant’s idea of freedom as free ‘act’ and also continues the thought of absolute freedom contained in *SAF*.

7. From his study of Jaina Anekāntavāda, formulated in his 1934-article on ‘Jaina Theory of Anekānta’ (JTA), Bhattacharyya derives the idea of ‘alternation’ introduced earlier, in a muted voice though, in SAF of 1929, and continued later in ‘CP’ of 1936. In ‘JTA’, Bhattacharyya’s aim is restricted: he aims at showing that *within realism itself* there is the thought of alternation. ‘Object’ (the supreme category for Realism) conceived as distinct and definite in Realistic thought – in any type of Realism – is for Jaina Realism, as interpreted by Bhattacharyya, manifold. Its definite-ness itself is manifold and may be understood from alternative points of view.

It seems that Bhattacharyya had been groping towards this idea in 1907 when he wrote his ‘Mind and Matter’ (MM). Here he points to some features of our ordinary experience which ‘unsettle commonsense’ and suggest a new dimension of thought articulated in metaphysics. Although the paper on Jainism is not metaphysical in tone, yet the *feeling* of a *hiatus within commonsense*, first pinpointed in ‘MM’, seems to have influenced Bhattacharyya in his Jaina-studies. Later on, Bhattacharyya incorporated this idea of fragmented consciousness into his articulate philosophy of the subject in his SAF. One example may be given from the book. The perceived body of one is *felt* by one to be *something more than* its location in space.

It then appears that a retrospective of ‘MM’ of 1907 had been shaping Bhattacharyya’s mind in the thirties of the last century when he wrote ‘JTA’. SAF, and ‘CP’. The concepts of ‘indefinite’, ‘alternation’, ‘grades of consciousness’ and ‘subjectivity’ which got weaved in Bhattacharyya’s thought in the thirties of the last century seem to have been present, inarticulately though, in Bhattacharyya’s mind as early as the first decade of last century when he wrote his *Studies in Vedāntism* (from which he derived the idea of grades of consciousness) and ‘JTA’ (from which he derived the ideas of the ‘indefinite’ and ‘alternation’).

One more observation, especially related to Bhattacharyya’s Jaina-study, needs be made here. The concept of the ‘indefinite’, first formulated in connection with his Jaina-study, remained with Bhattacharyya when he wrote his ‘Place of the Indefinite in Logic’ in 1916. Here he is explicit in his criticism of Hegelian Dialectic which seeks to render the indefinite given of sense definite through thought. Bhattacharyya maintains that the dialectic fails to render the ‘indefinite’ into ‘definite’. The Jaina theory, however, (in Bhattacharyya’s interpretation) preserves the indefinite within the bounds of Realism.

CHAPTER - 2

Creative Constructions on the Western Tradition

I

Kant¹

In understanding the ‘critical’ problem after Kant, Bhattacharyya takes the first two critiques together. According to Bhattacharyya, ‘critical’ or transcendental reflection is roused² when there is the problem of adjusting two different kinds of certitude, viz., the certitude about the reality of the self in moral willing and certitude about the existence of the object of knowledge. In moral willing, there is the certitude of the self as free and in theoretic consciousness there is the certitude of the existence of the object. We have a transcendental knowledge of the self: it is what we are certain about as *not* objective. How then to reconcile the certitude about the existence of the object with the un-objective reality of the self? We have the moral apprehension of free causality in the light of which the objective world, as a determinate system of cause and effect, is ‘suspect’³.

Bhattacharyya seems to accord primacy to moral willing over theoretic reason in so far as understanding the object of knowledge as ‘phenomenon’ is concerned. In theoretic reason, self is taken to be constitutive of the form of the object known. But, Bhattacharyya points out, it is not as real or realising itself that the self is understood as *forming* the object. It is formative of the object only as the thinking form and not as a *truth* that is *known*. In the theoretic critique, the procedure of Kant is from the unitary appearance of the object of knowledge to its presupposition which is taken to be the synthetic function of the self. Thus in the first critique self is (i) only a *presupposition* of the known object and (ii) the *form* of the latter.

Bhattacharyya visualises two fundamental changes in the second critique. *First*, self is here taken to be *known*: it is known in moral apprehension of freedom. *Second*, in so far as it *known* and not merely thought as a presupposition, it is known *to be* constitutive of the object which, so far as it is thus *seen* to be constituted, comes to be understood as a ‘phenomenon’.

But, it seems, Bhattacharyya would not rest content with the two foregoing considerations in the way to understanding the object as ‘phenomenon’. He analyses moral consciousness itself to show how object is an ‘emanation’⁴ of the self. *Moral consciousness, he points out, involves the certitude that moral willing is realised in the world, i.e., objectively. So it is in moral consciousness primarily, as distinct from theoretic consciousness, that object is understood as ‘phenomenon’.*

After thus finding the roots of the idea of object as phenomenon in moral consciousness as analysed in Kant’s second critique, Bhattacharyya takes a retrospective look at Kant’s first critique and comes to orient the first critique to the second critique. This he tries to do in two ways.

First, the subjective function or act, which in the first critique is taken to constitute the object known, is interpreted by Bhattacharyya as ‘the implicate of the act of freedom’⁵. The act is *real* as free will.

Secondly, the ‘receptivity’ of the act is also interpreted anew by Bhattacharyya. Free willing, argues Bhattacharyya, involves the belief that it is ‘successful’⁶, that free causality is ‘realised in the sensible world’⁷ in two ‘series’⁸ i.e., in a necessary chain of mental appearances and in a ‘rational objective system or nature’⁹. These two series are respectively time and space. So the receptivity of the subjective act (for which object is phenomenon), viz., space and time is also interpreted anew by Bhattacharyya from the practical standpoint of the consciousness of moral willing.

Two important results we thus obtain in the way of a new Kant-interpretation that Bhattacharyya must be credited with having given. *First*, object is *understood as ‘phenomenon’ only if it is realised as ‘emanation’ in moral consciousness that is realised in the world*. *Second*, the world is a system of causes and effects, a determinate system. But this determinate system is put forth by free causality. *Nature and freedom thus come to be connected in Bhattacharyya’s Kant-interpretation* (through free causality of moral willing). Later on, we shall come to understand the precise nature of the connection.

The determinate world of space-time is, as we have seen, interpreted by Bhattacharyya as a rational system which is but an emanation of the self

realised in moral consciousness as free willing. We may here make a contrast between Hegel and Bhattacharyya as a constructive Kant-interpreter. Hegel too would regard nature as a rational system. But that the determinate system of causes and effects, i.e., nature is an ‘emanation’ of the self is far from the Hegelian thinking. This is because space and time, through which the world is *given*, are for both Kant and Bhattacharyya understood as constituting the receptivity of the subjective act of which the world is a phenomenon. The idea of ‘phenomenon’ or, in Bhattacharyya’s language, ‘emanation’ cannot be reached by Hegel, because Hegel does not understand the world as constituted in the consciousness of moral willing which involves the belief that free causality is *realised in the* world or that the world (as a determinate system of causes and effects) reflects free causality *realised* in moral consciousness. That space and time constitute the affections of the self can only be understood in moral consciousness, specifically in the self as conscious ‘act’ or freedom. The concept of such *act* is entirely foreign to Hegel’s thinking.

To put the matter in another way, Kant would maintain that the form of object of thinking is but the form of the thinking of object; Hegel would retort that the form of the thinking of object is but the form of the object of thinking; and Bhattacharyya would side with Kant but *supplement* Kant with the consideration that object’s constitution in the form of thinking is realised only in the reflective or transcendental standpoint for which object is an *emanation* of the self as conscious act, self as the free causality of moral consciousness. *But for such supplementation and re-interpretation of ‘phenomenon in terms of self’s ‘emanation’*, Kant’s theory of object-constitution would have no chance to stand against Hegel’s logicism or intellectualism. The ‘unity between theoretic reason and practical reason’ that Kant dreamt of is possible only if reason realises itself in practice, only if it *actualises* itself, only if it is understood as *act* that in moral consciousness *actualises* itself in the world. To Hegel’s logicism, the unity of the subject and the object is achieved in the absolute no doubt, but still the absolute is a reason - picture of the world : though a picture, it nevertheless remains a reason – picture; and although Kant conceived of theoretic reason as constituting the form of the object, the form is not the formed *object*. Only on the level of moral consciousness where willing is seen to realise the object as

its emanation, the unity of theoretic and practical reason can be achieved. Thus Bhattacharyya (i) accords more importance to the second critique of Kant and (ii) understands moral consciousness in a completely new light, i.e., as what the object emanates from. *The concept of emanation gives a new dimension to the moral willing of Kant's conception.*

Thus Bhattacharyya as a Kant-interpreter would press Kant's transcendental point of view into service in reckoning with Hegel's philosophy and he would pinpoint the transcendental viewpoint in self as the conscious 'act' of moral consciousness. Kant's 'constitution' - analysis is understood by Bhattacharyya as object's 'emanation' and such emanation again is understood in terms of the apprehension of free causality or 'act' as realised in the world. Thus the concepts of 'emanation' and 'act' (i.e., pure moral act) are basic to Bhattacharyya's constructive Kant-interpretation.

All parts of Kant's philosophy are sought to be derived by Bhattacharyya from the point of view of free self as known to be real in moral consciousness and object as understood as emanation.

Of particular interest to Bhattacharyya, in the context of understanding the 'affection' or 'receptivity' of the free act, is the idea of 'mind as phenomenon'.

The mental is not presented through sensation as the external object is. So it has to be maintained that 'it is the self that affects itself'¹⁰ in time. Bhattacharyya quotes Kant in support of his interpretation : 'If the faculty of self - consciousness is to seek for, i.e., to apprehend what lies in the mind, it must affect the mind and can thus produce an intuition of itself'¹¹.

But basic to understanding of the idea of the self's self affection (which is the key to our understanding how the mental object is presented) is the idea of mind as phenomenon. How does Bhattacharyya arrive at this idea ? Bhattacharyya says that the mental is known as a phenomenal fact only in the background of the free self. Bhattacharyya writes :

It is because we practically know the self as free causality know that the self is free only as refusing to be determined by the temporal and yet as having its causality realised in the temporal that the mental which is the

purely temporal is understood as the phenomenon of the free or the noumenal self.¹²

To this consideration is added another consideration. It is this : we *know* in apperception that we do *not* know ourselves as mind in apperception. *So the mental is known as what is not known apperceivingly.* Says Bhattacharyya :

We can only be apperceivingly aware or aware in the subjective attitude that we do not know the self as object, i.e., as mind by mere apperception. Such subjective awareness of our inner sensibility in the negative way is apparently involved in the practical cognition of ourselves as free cause.¹³

Apperceiving self is the unobjective self. It is thus the free self. Free self knows itself to be not determined in time. Mental states are in time. So the free self knows itself to be *not* mind. Yet it knows its causality to be realised in the temporal, i.e., *in* mind. Hence mind is phenomenon of the free self.

Now, when an external object is known, the matter of sensation is understood, according to Kant, in reference to the form of space, as ‘involved’ in space. When the mental object is understood, the matter, which is the spatial percept, is similarly known as ‘involved’ in time. Such involution is known by apperception, by awareness of the form ‘I refer’. Thus the reference of the mental to the spatial is ‘self-feeling’¹⁴.

Here the affinity of Bhattacharyya’s interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of inner sense with the Vedānta doctrine of *antakharanavṛtti* reflecting the light of the self and thereby being invested with ego-sense is obvious.

External world, space, time, causality and free causality

Under transcendental - reflection, the external world ‘gets stratified’¹⁵ into sensed matter and the forms of space, time and causality.

The procedure of involution-analysis, i.e., the analysis of something by detecting something else *in* it as constituting it is followed by

Bhattacharyya in understanding the external world, space, time and causality. Thus Bhattacharyya writes :

The sensed matter is apprehended as involved in space, the spatial matter as involved in time and this spatiotemporal matter as further involved in causality.¹⁶

The sensed matter is involved in space which is empty form. This latter is itself intuited for Kant. As Kant says, space is *given* as the *form* of all given matter, or is imaginable as empty of all objects which are, however, not so imaginable. Similarly, time is known as involved in space: to Kant, whatever is given in space is also given in time but not *vice versa*. It is *succession* which connects the different points in space. And then such succession or time is understood as involved in causality which Bhattacharyya understands as ‘empty form of causality’.¹⁷ *But causality in the world*, which Kant calls otherwise as necessity, is *understood only in reference to free causality or will-causality*. Thus it is that Bhattacharyya shows how, following the Kantian procedure which he calls ‘involution’¹⁸ - analysis, we can transcendentally deduce the external world from free causality.

In transcendental reflection, then, the procedure of involution-analysis is followed. What is involved in some consciousness may be said to constitute that consciousness. Thus space as empty form constitutes sensed-matter, empty time constitutes spatial matter and so on till the involution-analysis reaches its acmé in the free self or will-causality. This *regressive and retrospective unfolding of forms* may be understood, *in the forward looking direction*, as viewing the object of knowledge from within, as transcendentally knowing the object of knowledge. Professor Bhattacharyya describes the process of involution-analysis as ‘imaginative viewing’¹⁹ of the object. Space as *form* of the external object detaches itself from matter, becomes ‘picturable by itself’;²⁰ time as form, i.e., empty time is only symbolised through space (through a line), while causality is only schematized. Thus Bhattacharyya:

Picturing, symbolizing and schematizing are the three consecutive grades of imaginative viewing of the external object, of viewing it from within or transcendental reflection on it.²¹

A point to be noted here is this that Bhattacharyya regards transcendental reflection as ‘stratification’²². The point of such stratification is to *see* the involution of the constitutive forms in the object known or constituted. The exercise is not a logical one of proceeding from premise to conclusion in an inference nor even of arguing back to the presuppositions of a conclusion as in the method of *pramāṇa* called *arthāpatti* but one of ‘experimentation with the knowing activity’²³ As Bhattacharyya describes the transcendental method:

In the transcendental procedure of Kant, there is the exhibition of data and conclusion; but the conclusion is not merely expected-to be realised but is felt to be realised Everywhere it is a sort of seeing in the doing : the transcendental procedure is an experimental knowing, the experiment being consciously made with the self itself.²⁴

Now, Bhattacharyya interprets Kant’s theory of the relationship between a *priori* forms and object known as ‘imaginative viewing’,²⁵ of object, as viewing it from within’,²⁶ as imaginative production of perception.²⁷ He now raises the question why nature should ‘wear’²⁸ the a *priori* forms of our knowledge. He acknowledges that if holiness could be attained, i.e., if mind were free of all desires and inclinations, free of all empiricity or again if intellectual intuition were possible, there would be no gap between freedom and nature.²⁹ But, as Bhattacharyya says:

That we can know a *posteriori*, that the matter of knowledge which we could never appreciate happens to wear the a *priori* forms of our knowledge is a wonder that we can never theoretically explain.³⁰

We have to interpret it, according to Bhattacharyya, as ‘the purposiveness of nature’.³¹ *This purposiveness of nature to our mind is the transcendental principle of all judgments.* Nature or object appears from this point of view as a ‘self-subsistent value.’³² Bhattacharyya brings the fertility of his imagination to construct anew the Kantian view of the self *vis-a-vis* object:

The object ... appears as a contradiction - an emanation of the self and yet not mere idea, unthinkably real and yet having the definiteness of the

idea; and the contradiction is resolved in aesthetic consciousness into a self-subsistent value.²³

Upshot of Bhattacharyya's Kant-interpretation.

1. He understands Kant's transcendental problem as arising out of (i) the certitude of moral consciousness and (ii) the demand for adjusting two different kinds of certitude, i.e., practical and theoretical. Thus in Bhattacharyya's Kant-interpretation, the relation between the theoretic reason and the practical reason is more intimate than it is in usual Kant-interpretations.
2. He has brought his distinctive insight to bear upon understanding the relationship between *a priori* forms and object in such terms as 'imaginative production of perception', viewing 'nature from within' etc.
3. In terms of judgment of value or 'purposiveness' (as Kant calls it), Bhattacharyya understands object as 'self-subsistent value' for critical reflection. This is something novel not only because it accords prominence to Kant's aesthetic critique but, more importantly, understands the object of critical reflection as self-subsistent value.
4. Here Bhattacharyya feels the necessity of recognising that the contradiction between the theoretic and the practical reason is *given*. The problem of the 'given' is forced upon critical relection which, then, finds the only way the problem can be solved : it can be *solved* if it is *dissolved* when one's undergoes a shift in one's consciousness from its interest in theory to a new interest in aesthesia, i.e. imaginative contemplation of nature, seeing nature from the free subject's viewpoint as free efflux of it. Thus the acmé of critical relection is aesthetic contemplation of nature.

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6. *ibid., p. 305.*
7. *ibid., p. 305*
8. *ibid., p. 305.*
9. *ibid., p. 305.*
10. *ibid., p. 308.*
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12. *STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol II. p. 307.*
13. *ibid., p. 308.*
14. *ibid., p. 309.*
15. *ibid., p. 317.*
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28. *ibid., p. 337.*
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33. *ibid., p. 306.*

II

Hegel

Place of The Indefinite in Logic¹

Bhattacharyya's present essay should be understood as an essay in meta-logic. Bhattacharyya here brings out how any one logical theory indefinitely or alternatively yields place to any other; and this cannot be accounted for from within the bounds of logic as such. *Bhattacharyya has in mind, principally, metaphysical logic-s of his days. Yet, what he observes in his reflection on logical theories current in his days has relevance today not just because alternative logic-s have appeared on the scene but more importantly because the philosopher goes to the length of maintaining that thinking within the bounds of any logic has to yield place to the idea of alternation of thought which oversteps logic.*

Bhattacharyya first of all suggests a reform of logic so that it can maintain an umpire-like neutrality between conflicting metaphysical notions. It should not be modelled in such a way that it commits itself to one or another particular type of philosophical theory. Bhattacharyya's reflections on the circumstance of logic (at his time) are provoked by two important considerations, - one, the development of logic (upto his time) and two, the neglect on the part of logic, of what Bhattacharyya calls, a 'philosophy of the irrational'.² As it is, logic has committed itself, uncritically, to what can be a definite object of thought, be it a 'term' (as in empiricist logic) or 'judgement' (as in Idealistic or Conceptualistic logic) or 'reasoning' as establishing necessary and therefore intelligible relations that can render what appears indefinite into something definite (as in Dialectical or Hegelian logic). Such strands of thinking treat what appears indefinite to thought as extra-logical, subjective and even psychological.

Bhattacharyya, however, stresses the necessity of according recognition to the 'Indefinite' in logic. The indefinite has, in fact, found a place in metaphysics. Bhattacharyya says:

The indefinite has found in fact a place in metaphysics in many forms. To mention only a few at random, there is the negative matter of Plato, the *māyā* of the Vedāntists, and the '*Sunyam*' or

'void' of the Buddhists. There is the notion of objective chance in Aristotle and of the inexplicable change of direction of atoms of Lucretius. There is the conception of the indeterminate will, specially, in the extreme form of unmotived or irrational activity, as presented by a Duns Scotus, a Schopenhauer or a Bergson and there is finally the unknowable whether of Kant or of Spencer. These notions are at present homeless in logic; there is no category to express them and disputes arise in connexion with them in metaphysic which properly should have arisen in logic itself.³

In trying to find the proper place for the indefinite in logic, Bhattacharyya not only makes a critical survey of the different logical theories but also brings out why:

One should go beyond ordinary logic which simply turns its back on the outlying indefinite and looks to the definite as the sole content of thought.⁴

In the suggested reformation of logic, the indefinite should be recognised as such and not rendered 'definite' as it is sought to be rendered in Hegelian or Dialectical or Conceptualist or Empirical logic. In Dialectical or Hegelian logic, it is presumed that through the dialectic of affirmation and negation a complete or an ideal system of rational truths can be established. But, maintains Bhattacharyya, affirmation and negation are themselves 'indefinite', rooted as they are in, what Bhattacharyya calls, 'unreason'.⁵ Conceptualist logic bases itself on judgments considered as affirmative and negative, but this distinction fades into the background notion of the 'indefinite'. Against empiricist logic, Bhattacharyya points out that 'term' as the unit of thought is a determination carved out of the indeterminate.

As far as Bhattacharyya's critical survey of the different logical theories is concerned, they are of a piece with each other from Bhattacharyya's point of view. Thus empiricist logic starts with 'term' as the definite content of logic but a 'term' may be regarded alternatively as a simple thought of 'this' as in Mill or a 'passage', 'transition', 'complex of relations' as in Bain. Whichever way the term is taken, from Bhattacharyya's point of view

These conflicting views only show that the unit term or the individual is at once definite and indefinite, the latter aspect being systematically ignored in logic.⁶

Again, for conceptualist logic, judgment is the unit of thought, but affirmation and negation, the two fundamental forms of judgment, fade into each other. This becomes clear when Hegel's Dialectical logic is taken into consideration. Hegel's logic takes its stand on the negation of the indefinite, presupposing that the indefinite may be rendered definite or positive by thought (through the negation of the indefinite). Accordingly, negation of negation is affirmation in Hegel's logic. *But for Bhattacharyya, the original negation cannot definitely render the indefinite into something positive for thought or judgement. There remains an irreducible 'this' which cannot be rendered definite in judgment.* Again, reason cannot demonstrate how a particular can be given. From a necessary system of truths to the existence of a particular is a far cry. In Hegel's Dialectical logic, affirmation is intended to be negation of an indeterminate given (of Kant's conception, e.g.,) and negation is negation of affirmation and negation of negation is the original affirmation. *But in Bhattacharyya's logical theory negation of negation may 'indifferently' be affirmation or negation.* This is because the positive fact that negation wants to get at by negating the indefinite is not obtainable. It remains with its indefiniteness. So negation cannot be position. It remains as negation because the matter for it – the indefinite – it itself negation of position. All these considerations make it incumbent that one should go beyond ordinary logic which simply turns its back on the outlying indefinite and looks to the definite as the sole content of thought.⁷

What would be the 'ground principle'⁸ of such reformed logic? It should be the 'dualism'⁹ between 'the definite and the indefinite'.¹⁰ But then Bhattacharyya is careful to point out :

The line between the definite and the indefinite is itself indefinite...¹¹

This is because what is supposed to be rendered definite in judgment is itself indefinite : the 'this' in it is more than reason or judgment. As Kant holds against conceptualistic logic, though the synthetic *a priori* forms anticipate matter in general, *what* specifically matter 'will be' remains

indefinite. The given itself is not rationally determinable. Again, the given may indifferently be a simple thought of ‘this (Mill) or a ‘transition’ (Bain).

These, is short, are the criticisms that Bhattacharyya makes of existing logic-s, including empiricist logic. They boil down to one simple point, viz., no system of logic can claim finality. What is regarded as a term may indifferently be a simple sensation or a process; what is regarded as affirmative judgment may indifferently be negative and *vice versa*; and what is regarded as a necessary system of truths may itself be contingent.

Bhattacharyya’s survey of the different theories of logic should be correctly understood. It is not Bhattacharyya’s point that the theories are to be faulted on philosophical or metaphysical grounds on account of some deficiency in their governing concepts. When, e.g., he criticises Hegel’s Dialectic, his point is not simply that reason cannot explain the particularity of the given. For Bhattacharyya has no predilection in favour of the given as such: it *too may be*, according to him, *indifferently or alternatively what Mill viewed it to be or what Bain viewed it to be*.

According to Bhattacharyya, the failure of the philosophers, who conceived different logical theories, lies in the fact that they have not been able to visualise how the indefinite – that is left over as outside reason or that refuses to be rendered definite or positive by judgment or that remains as a term or as an atomic unit cut off from associated impressions or sensation – can positively determine their logical theories. It ought to be clear that the ‘indefinite’ is not a mere name for countering any definitising tendency in logic : it has a positive implication. And it is this that whatever any system of logic admits, whatever any system of reason admits, must yield place to some alternative interpretation that may give rise to a system of logic alternative to the given system. For example, reason may not demonstrate how a ‘particular’ is given but then the particular may be taken care of in empirical logic. But then the particular on which empirical logic fixes its attention is itself determined arbitrarily. It is itself carved out of an indefinite boundary. Or, again, ‘negation of negation’, which is made much of in Hegel’s Dialectical logic, may be indifferently affirmation or negation.

Now, what Bhattacharyya means *seems* to come very close to the modern idea of alternative logic-s. According to this idea, there may be

different alternative logical systems with different basic primitives. And when Bhattacharyya questions the claim to finality of any system of logic, it seems his view of different logical systems is akin to contemporary views which make room for alternative logics. In fact, Bhattacharyya himself uses the word ‘alternation’ in connection with ‘the dynamic and static aspects in dialectic...¹² in the empiricist logical theory.

To what extent does really Bhattacharyya’s idea of the place of the indefinite in logic bring him close to the contemporary idea of alternative logic-s? Is it his meaning that the ‘indefinite’ is but a name for the indefiniteness felt in a logical theory when, e.g., the theorist in question faces the possibility of an alternative logical theory? *It would be doing injustice to Bhattacharyya were only his similarity with the contemporary idea of alternative logic-s emphasized to the neglect of his fundamental dissimilarity from it.* While the ideal of alternative logics for the contemporary theorist of logic has its roots in the inadequacy or limitation that he feels about his logical theory, the idea of the indefinite for Bhattacharyya determines *any* logical theory. Bhattacharyya’s meaning is *not* that any accepted system of logic may leave open the possibility of alternative interpretations: what he positively maintains is that ‘the Indefinite’ *determines* any logical theory, that the very *consciousness of alternation* is woven into the very thought of differentiations of indefinite number of logical theories.

Every logical theory, Bhattacharyya would maintain, is constitutionally indefinite. Every logical theory has of course its definite boundary fixed by a theorist who may not have any interest in any other possible mode of thinking that oversteps his boundary. Yet, for Bhattacharyya, what goes beyond the boundary, the ‘outlying indefinite’,¹³ as he calls it, does make its incursion into the boundary; and such incursion is of course not of any interest to the logician *per sé* but is most definitely of interest to the philosopher reflecting upon logic. For by overstepping the boundary, the philosopher does not come upon anything, any metaphysical reality but reaches a viewpoint, a consideration. The consideration is this that a given logical system is a limitation or a negation, that every such *system* is negation and the negation of those positive systems is no affirmation, for affirmation too builds up a thought *system* and so is negation, *a negation from the point of view of free choice, and that* consequently any logical

system (empiricist, conceptualist, dialectical or whatever), considered as a negation from the view point of free choice, must point in the direction of *a negation of negation where logicality as such i.e., system-bound thinking as such is transcended*. From this viewpoint, any logical system indifferently, i.e., alternatively is as good as any other and all are equally to be transcended. The thought of *alternation*, not merely thought of *alternatives*, or the thought of indefinite number of logical systems thus affects logical systems as such, not however in the perception of the logician *per sé* but in the meta-logical consciousness of the philosopher.

Towards the end of this analysis, we have seen how this essay combines the concepts of the ‘indefinite’, ‘alternation’ and ‘negation’. Published in 1916, this essay is connected with Bhattacharyya’s reflections in his earlier paper on ‘Some aspects of Negation’ (‘SN’) published in 1914 and has also cast its reflection on Bhattacharyya’s later works, viz., ‘The Absolute and Its Alternative Forms’ (‘AAF’) (published 1934) ‘The Concept of Philosophy’ (‘CP’) (published 1936), ‘Lectures on Yoga’ (‘LY’) (delivered 1937). Thus in ‘SN’, Bhattacharyya, after discussing different grades of negation, ultimately comes to understand ‘negation of negation’ as negation of all position, an idea which is applied in the present essay to locate the level of consciousness from which all logical and theoretical systems may be understood as, *indifferently*, many alternatives. Then we have the essay ‘AAF’ which is based explicitly on the idea of alternation (of truth, freedom and value). In ‘CP’, we have the remark ‘There maybe alternative systems, for logic presupposes metaphysics which presents alternative theories.’ There is of course a difference between the thinking on logic *vis-a-vis* metaphysical theories in ‘PIL’ and ‘CP’ : while ‘PIL’ maintains the metaphysics-neutrality of logic, ‘CP’ takes logic to be presupposing metaphysics. But this difference is not important here. What is important is that the *idea of alternation spreads from ‘PIL’ to ‘CP’*. Then again in ‘LY’, Bhattacharyya, while distinguishing within *asamprajñātasamādhi* between *nirodha* (negative willing) and *pranidhana* (will to arrest negative willing), spots in *pranidhana*

an ‘alternation’¹⁴ between negative willing and willing not to will, or surrender to the mystery of free willing. References to these details would not be digression unless one loses the sight of the wood in the trees. The point that is sustained throughout is this that all theorisation, all adoptions of viewpoints are matters of free choice or freedom: ‘SAN’ goes so far as to say that negation of negation is negation of all positions, negation even of logical negation, negation as contradiction of positive fact realised only in spiritual freedom. This view of negation as freedom distinguishes Bhattacharyya from the Mādhyamika Buddhists for whom there is no stage beyond negation of negation.

The present essay of Bhattacharyya, then, not only helps us see the connection between the concepts of the ‘indefinite’, ‘alternation’ and ‘negation’ within it but also helps us understand Bhattacharyya’s broader concern with these concepts overstepping the limits of this paper. It is the concern with the choice of logical theories and the choice of theoretical systems in philosophy (overstepping logic). The choice is ultimately free choice. This appears before the anagelic vision of the philosopher in Bhattacharyya. For him, philosophy would be, indifferently, ‘news from nowhere’ (*a la* Thomas Nagel¹⁵) and news from everywhere. Here the dominant role is given to the notion of contradiction that is not merely formal and again not system-bound but metaphysical on the level of which all thought-systems are subject to negations and their pretensions to definiteness are undermined.

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3. *ibid.*, p. 225.

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The Definition of Relation as a Category of Existence¹

Bhattacharyya's present paper has a two fold task. First, an attempt is made to understand relation in objective terms, i.e., apart from the subjective act of relating. Secondly, it is sought to be enquired if relation can be defined in objective terms which do not presuppose the act of relating.

Relation involves at least two distinct terms. Can two terms be presented as objects of a single thought? Two terms may be presented together to thought as mere distincts or one of them may be *thought* as distinct. i.e., may be distinguished in *thought* from another. If A and B are mere distincts apart from distinguishing thought, 'and' is not separately thought from the thought of each, that is, 'and' is not distinct as A and B are, can it be said that there is a mutual distinction between them (i.e., 'A distinct from B' and 'B distinct from A')? But mutual distinction is not definitely thought and is therefore no relation. 'A distinct from B' and 'B distinct from A' are *two thoughts*. They are either fused or not. They may be thought to be fused into mere distinction between A and B which would be but 'A and B distincts together'. If, however, it is said that mutual relation alone is definitely thought in its own right, i.e., apart from the *fusion* of 'A distinct from B' and 'B distinct from A', and if each direction of the distinction is regarded as indefinite abstraction, then A and B would themselves be indefinite, not definite or distinct.

When A is distinguished from B, B is already distinct, i.e., distinct from some previous act of distinguishing thought. So 'A distinct from B' is a distinct content of thought with which 'B distinct from A' is not mixed up. B, on the occasion of 'A distinct from B', is distinct from an indefinite. B is *given* distinct and A is distinct *from* B. B is intrinsically distinct, A is extrinsically so. Their intrinsic-extrinsic distinction helps one fix the relative positions of A and B. Still, the uncertainty remains whether 'and' (in 'A and B are distincts') is objective or is subjective distinguishing.

Now B is said to be distinct from an indefinite. But indefinite cannot be any term in a relation. Relation must be between distincts. Indefinite is a term only 'in a factitious sense.'²

Can mere togetherness of distincts be regarded as a relation? ‘A’ and ‘B’ may be regarded as distinct from ‘A and B’. Now, if togetherness were a distinct, definite content, there would be a fresh togetherness of all the three, viz., ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘A and B’ and this would lead to indefinite regress.² Togetherness itself as definite content would be related to the terms which are distincts and definite and which it is supposed to relate. Thus togetherness of A and B in ‘A and B’ on the one hand and ‘A’ and ‘B’ as distinct definite contents on the other would be related. But, *ex hypothesi* this new relation would be “togetherness of togetherness of ‘A and B’ and ‘A’ and ‘B’”. So there will emerge the situation where the new relation of togetherness would have to be related to the previous togetherness of ‘A and B’ and ‘A’ and ‘B’. So there would be relation of togetherness to the “togetherness of ‘A and B’ and ‘A’ and ‘B’”. And so on *ad infinitum*.

Togetherness, however, may be said to be *common* to ‘A and B’ as a definite whole and ‘A or B’ as a disjunction : it may be said that *common* to both is ‘A’ and ‘B’ as purely together. But this cannot be said; for, there is a difference between a ‘definite whole’ and a ‘disjunction’. A definite whole is of the form ‘A and B’. Disjunction is of the form ‘A or B’. If so, togetherness, alleged to be common to the definite whole and the disjunction, would be ‘both’ and ‘not both’. This however, is no relation, but alternation. Disjunction or alternation is a ‘standing cycle’³ ABA. This cycle is no relation. It is an ‘indetermination of term and relation’.⁴

Disjunction may, however, be interpreted as an alternation of definite and, as such, as relation.

But then alternation of definites cannot go together with their unity.

Is relation, then, a static whole of terms? If so, the relation would indeed be definite. The terms too are definite. But what speciality is there in the whole to make it distinct from the terms? Why can it not be regarded as a third term? But if so, the supposed static whole and the terms would themselves have to be related and the problem of relating them would arise.

It may now be said that the whole is not static but emergent. Here the elements are ‘definitely emergent’⁵. While the static whole is a term besides the terms it is supposed to relate, the dynamic whole is such that here

the difference of the elements *emerges* and is not dependent on the distinguishing thought. So the dynamic whole is no third term. But then, it would be a ‘cyclical triplicity of relations’⁶. If the whole(W) is equivalent to the mutual distinction between(say) A and B, the equivalent of the distinction between W and A would be B and that between W and B would be A. But such triplicity is no definite content and therefore no relation.

Incidentally, it appears that Bhattacharyya here counters the Hegelian or Idealist theory that relation takes place at the background of a whole. According to Bhattacharyya, the idea of the whole should be given up in trying to characterize relations.

We have seen that when A is distinguished from B, B is already distinct. This gives us the key to understand the concept of relation. A is extrinsically distinct, B is intrinsically so. A is therefore a dependent, B is an independent. A is always thought together with some other term (not necessarily B). And ‘dependence and independence are intelligible characters of terms without reference to relations’.⁷ Relation proper is thus a togetherness of *a* dependent and *an* independent.

This definition does not itself presuppose the concept of relation. Again, in this definition the terms of relation preserve their distinct-ness which is an objective feature of the terms. Of course, it may be said that the word ‘together’ implies the subjective act of thinking the relata together. But what togetherness implies here is that, of two terms, one is distinct and another is ‘distinct from’ where ‘distinct from’ is but dependence of one term in the relation. And ‘dependence’ is an objective character and it also does not presuppose the concept of relation.

References

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Some Aspects Of Negation¹

In this essay, negation is understood by Bhattacharyya not just as logical negation or as difference but as contradiction of particular beings that are given.² Attention to the particulars which leads to the formation of the affirmative judgements, to negative judgements which construe negation as difference or which treat negation as co-ordinate with affirmation may yield place to a *new view of negation, a new dimension of thinking* in which negation is understood as contradiction. It is however not a *formal contradiction* but a contradiction that is *given* and a *contradiction of all that is given*. This novel point of view of contradiction being given contains a suggestion which is elaborated and spelt out in the paper on ‘Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Māyā’ (1925), written after this paper. It is the suggestion that what is given, what is objective is a standing contradiction to thinking, and this means that it cannot be known by thought. To Bhattacharyya’s imagination, it appears to ridicule thought and this is so because, as will appear later, it is implicitly subjective or is a pointer to that. We have considered it in connection with his essay on ‘Śankara’s Doctrine of Māyā’ – which may be appreciated as Bhattacharyya’s metaphysic or phenomenology of illusory experience *par excellence*.

However, the particular essay on negation is so important in making the transition from the concept of the given to the subjective point of view that it needs be analysed at some length. As a preliminary to the analysis of this essay, a two-fold point of importance must be kept in our mind:

- 1) Bhattacharyya discusses logical negation, but logical negation is not formal according to him i.e., no negation between ‘p’ and not-p’.
- 2) *Negation is not just one type of thought alongside affirmation. It cannot be defined in terms of judgement. Judgmental negation is just one type of thought.* Ultimate differences between types of thought are ultimate differences between *types of negation, so that negation cannot take on the character of judgement.*

The two principal contentions of the paper are:

- 1) Negation may be taken as difference, and (2) it may also be taken as contradiction.

On the level of the mere acceptance of the data of our experiences, there is no question of reality and illusion. Only when the question of asserting reality arises does the question of negation arise.

Negation, says Bhattacharyya, “emerges”³ when illusion is corrected. Negation “emerges” in the sense that ‘reality’ which was so long, i.e., in uncritical experience, implicitly accepted comes to be explicitly articulated in reflection. A particular content is ‘real’ and another particular content is ‘not real’ i.e., different from the real. Negation is thus, on this account, difference.

Such difference is no relation as the Western Idealists would suppose. There is no question of internal relation here. Internal relation is constitutive, whereas difference from what is not real does not constitute the reality of what is accepted as real.

Nor can difference be taken as external relation. Relation, whether internal or external, presupposes the same order of reality of the terms which are different. But since the notion of negation as difference springs from the difference between fact and illusion, therefore, such difference cannot be taken to be relation: Thus Bhattacharyya: “Negation is always difference in this type of thought : all relation implies difference and the primal relation is the difference between fact and illusion.”⁴ Again, it cannot be said that difference as relation constitutes the difference between ‘fact’ and ‘illusion’. It is negation, on the contrary – and not difference conceived either as constitutive or as external relation – that constitutes the difference between a particular content conceived as unreal and another particular content conceived as real.

So long negation has been interpreted as difference between fact and illusion. But how would Bhattacharyya settle accounts with one who interprets difference as mutual negation?

Bhattacharyya’s reply would be that mutual negation presupposes the unique self-identity of terms and this again presupposes negation or difference. Suppose we come to know X as a unique content and A as another unique content. So we have ‘this X’ and ‘this A’ to start with i.e., ‘What is uniquely A is *not* what is uniquely X’. Thus here difference as unique self-identity of terms

springs through negation. The opposition between the two judgements, ‘This is A’ and ‘This is X’ arises out of negation. It may be said that A’s difference from X does *not* matter in any way to X. In the present view, however, ‘this A’ is not ‘this X’. But there may be a theory according to which the negation is just difference and all relation is illusory. In the present view, all relation is at bottom negation or difference. But then this relation or negation does not constitute the identity of terms. For, *first*, here we are concerned with ‘this A’, i.e. unique ‘A’: and unique ‘A’ is not definable in terms of relation to X. *Secondly*, as Bhattacharyya points out, negation here, far from being metaphysically constitutive, is ‘really an opposition between two judgements’,⁵ viz. ‘This is A’ *and* ‘This is X’. Nevertheless, the relation is taken into reckoning. A metaphysician may start with ‘Unique A’, ‘Unique X’ and their relation. In his scheme, terms may be conceived as independent of relations and relating as independent of terms. Relations are not on this view definitional characters of terms. Still, in his scheme relations have to be recognized side by side with terms. For the metaphysician does not just start with A as bare particular, but with unique A; and, in so far as he does so (that is, start with unique A), he has to make a negative reference to (unique) X, though he is aware that A cannot be defined in terms of relation to X. In the previous view, X does not matter at all to A. Here, however, while A is recognized as unique, its relations or differences are at the same time recognized. A metaphysical scheme in which terms and relations are recognised alongside one another is the one formulated, i.e., by a philosopher of the Vaiśeṣika persuasion. Relations in this scheme are inseparable and yet not constitutive. Such a scheme is not atomistic (as the previous scheme is) but pluralistic.

When, however, relation or negation is recognized not just as existing alongside of terms but as determining the terms, we may say that A is both A *as such* and in its aspect of *relatedness* to X, i.e. is *both itself and its negation*. So there emerges the view of the identity of the position or affirmation and the negation of a particular. A particular is both itself and not itself. This is just the Anglo-Hegelian theory of concrete identity, i.e., of identity-in-difference. Both identity or position and difference or negation are positive facts on this theory and as such of the same order. Negation and affirmation are coordinate here.

The monistic theory, however, may still be transcended. Negation is viewed in this theory as position; it is as positive as the terms defined or constituted by negation. It is regarded still as self-alienation of the positive term.

X or not - A is nothing but the negation of A. Affirmation negates a negation and negation is negation of an affirmation and negation of negation would be, on this view, the original affirmation. Negation is still now viewed as some relation between positives. If, however, negation is sought to be freed from its moorings in positive facts and not understood as difference (of one positive fact from another), we take it to be contradiction of positive fact. This may occur when the content of an illusion becomes suspect in *relation to its being*, comes to be understood as 'given in mockery of thinking' – as Bhattacharyya describes it in his 'Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māya' – or comes to be understood as false, i.e. the content of a belief which appears in retrospection to be a rejected belief. The point is that in retrospection on illusion, the content of illusion appears to founder for lack of being. It is *a contradiction that is not formal but given as negation of being*. From positive fact being suspect in the experience of the illusory *to* negation as contradiction *to* subjective withdrawal from positive fact *to* freedom as contradicting all being – this is the course of Bhattacharyya's thought. There arises a dimensional change in the thought about contradiction. Here contradiction comes to be felt as negation of all being, negation of being that cannot be the subject of judgemental negation. When experience or thought reaches such dimension, contradiction no longer appears as logical but as spiritual. Spirit contradicts the reality of objects but object does not contradict spirit.

Here, then, we come to view negation as contradiction, i.e. contradiction of objectivity. No amount of turning attention to the positive facts can help one reach this level of negation. It is reached by turning attention away from positive facts.

As Bhattacharyya says, "positive attention denies itself utterly."⁶ Here positive facts and their relations are themselves constituted by subjective withdrawal. They are, therefore, constituted by contradiction or negations of positive facts. They are free functions of subjectivity which is negation of objectivity or positivity.

References

1. STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II. pp. 207-17.
2. *ibid.*, p. 209
3. *ibid.*, p. 208.
4. *ibid.*, p. 208
5. *ibid.*, p. 208
6. *ibid.*, p. 211.

CHAPTER – 3

‘The Concept of Philosophy’ – Orientation to the Absolute

Bhattacharyya’s paper ‘The Concept of Philosophy’ may be taken to embody at once his phenomenology of consciousness and language. For him, philosophical language articulates the attitudes of consciousness in symbolisms.

In his paper, Bhattacharyya, speaking generally, distinguishes between grades of thought on which science or empirical thought on the one hand and philosophy on the other are located; and then he distinguishes specifically between grades of philosophic thought.

Key observations in this regard are (i) ‘empirical thought is of a content distinct from it’; (ii) pure thought is thought of a content not distinguishable from it; (iii) ‘in philosophy, the content is not understood except as spoken’.

It is in the contrast of pure thought from empirical thought that the contrast of philosophy from science becomes clear. Pure thought, writes Bhattacharyya, is unlike empirical thought: it is not concerned with a content distinct from it as empirical thought is. It surely has an objective side, but then the internal dialectic of thought or consciousness incorporates the objective side in reflection and retrospection upon it.

The transition from empirical thought to pure philosophic thought takes place when the content of empirical thought is analytically probed into: in fact, the entire essay is consciousness’s analytic probing into its different levels. Through such probing, it comes to be disclosed to consciousness that the content of empirical thought, i.e. fact is embedded in object-consciousness.

Bhattacharyya’s analytic probing may be understood in contrast to the dialectic of consciousness presented by another philosopher, viz., Hegel.

Both the philosophers are, however, concened with the inner movement of consciousness, but then their interpretations of the movement differ.

For Hegel, with its immanent necessity, consciousness or pure thought – as distinct from empirical thought – includes the given matter of sense within its network of interpretation and then again incorporates the matter-thought content into a more comprehensive thought: the process goes on until Absolute Thought is reached as the acm  of dialectical thought.

Bhattacharyya's 'elaboration' of the levels of consciousness is not the same as Hegel's inclusive dialectic. Contrasted to the latter, Bhattacharyya's dialectic is one of dissociation (to use the diction of his *SAF*). The stages in Hegel's dialectic come to be successively included in the more and more progressive thought or consciousness; on the contrary, the levels of Bhattacharyya's dialectic retrospectively and reflectively look upon each previous level as what is consciously outgrown. In Bhattacharyya's dialectic, every successive level understands its previous level as *its own un-*reflective level and as outgrown. The point about Bhattacharyya's disclosure of the dialectic of consciousness is this, that on each level of it there is a *demand* for probing into its depth through which its *core subjectivity comes to be made explicit and its anterior non-subjectivity outgrown*. But Bhattacharyya's acuteness here has to be noted. It would be a simplistic account of Bhattacharyya's dialectic to say that his dialectic, unlike Hegel's dialectic which *incorporates* different levels of objectivity, is one of *dissociation* from these levels. Bhattacharyya, in fact, is acute in respect of the process of dissociation. Freedom or subjective freedom is the acm  of Bhattacharyya's dialectic; and freedom is freedom from both 'being' and 'negation', so that it is not only no object, not only withdrawl from object but also *negation or withdrawl from even the negation of object*. *It is this negation of negation of objectivity that marks the parting of the ways for Bhattacharyya's dialectic from Hegel's*. Bhattacharyya's essay on 'Some Aspects of Negation' contains the blueprint of this distinctive negation process. Such *negation is oriented to the absolute for consciousness; it is absolute in that it is freedom and it is freedom in that it is freedom from being and negation of being, i.e., is not relative to anything*. Absolute

freedom or spiritual freedom is not freedom from any objective situation as when a subject nation comes to be stationed in political independence from the previous situation of its foreign domination.

The progressive levels of subjectivity, re-looking at and re-assessing each anterior level on each posterior level – these may be laid bare now following Bhattacharyya.

Consciousness, for Bhattacharyya, may understand its content in the ‘objective’, ‘subjective’ and ‘transcendental’ attitude. First, ‘fact’ or the content of empirical thought may be understood in terms of ‘objectivity’ of consciousness. Then, the objective attitude, on a further deepening of consciousness, may be contrasted with the subjective attitude. The objective attitude does not add content to the subjective attitude but only comes to be re-assessed in terms of the subjective attitude as *its un-reflective level* or less reflective level and thereby *relocated in the reflective circle*. The subject is what understands itself as ‘I’ and what is objective is, in contrast and in retrospect, not – ‘I’. Then again, in the transcendental attitude, consciousness understands the object as not distinct from it but as its *un-reflective level*. And once more, the dialectic continues when its subjective level is transcended on the level of Absolute-consciousness: it is *the consciousness of the subject I as naught*. Now, ‘object’ or ‘objectivity’, the subject ‘I’, the ‘Absolute’ are concepts which only symbolise the respective levels of consciousness (with reference to them) on which they are understood. Understanding them is probing into the levels of consciousness from which they, so to speak, emanate. ‘Object is’, ‘I am’, ‘I am naught’, ‘the Absolute is transcendent of I’ – these symbolize the degrees of the in-depth achievement of consciousness. *They have only the form of judgement and they do not convey any information*. They are language-types emerging on levels of consciousness. Philosophy is in-depth realisation of the language-types. Thus philosophical concepts are transcendental concepts which emanate from consciousness’s reflective attitude. They do not supply any information relating to facts: for one thing, concept of ‘fact’ itself resolves into, what may be called, the concept of ‘objectivity’. Philosophy views science and commonsense ‘critically’ through the ‘transcendental’ concepts of ‘objectivity’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘absolute’.

CHAPTER – 4

Epistemology, the Subject and Absolute Freedom – THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM

Decidedly, the apex of Bhattacharyya's philosophical thought is reached in THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM. It elaborates the levels of consciousness's freedom from object. This is its programme. But to say this is to say very little of (i) what motivates the programmatic task of the book and (ii) what the task consummates in. What motivates the programme is a consideration relating to epistemology. This may appear queer. But it is not so. The consideration relating to epistemology is : 'how to get at the basic notion of epistemology, i.e., knowledge ?' Epistemology seeks to study of knowledge i.e., the limit of knowledge, the validity of knowledge, its conditions etc., and in such study, epistemology proclaims itself to be unique. What is unique about it? Epistemology claims that the very basic notion of knowledge is unique because it is obtained in a way or *method* that is unique. For,

- 1) 'Knowledge' has to be known as distinct in the interest of Epistemology as a distinct study.
- 2) But it cannot be known as distinct as one *entity* is distinguished from another entity. When an entity is known as distinct from another entity, both these entities are fixed as distinct from the distinguishing of them. But, apparently, knowledge cannot be fixed as distinct from the distinguishing of it.
- 3) The distinguishing of non-noetic entities is knowing them as distinct from the distinguishing act.
- 4) Can knowing be distinguished as an entity from the distinguishing of it?
- 5) Bhattacharyya would answer in the negative. He writes (in the beginning of *The Subject as Freedom*) 'knowing cannot be known unless the distinctness of knowing from the distinguishing of it appears to be illusory'.

- 6) Therefore, ‘knowing’ is no distinct entity to its knowing or distinguishing.
- 7) The distinguishing of knowing is knowing itself.
- 8) ‘Knowing of knowing itself’ is then self knowing itself.
- 9) Self knows itself as *the subject* and as *not the object*. (not as distinguished from object).
- 10) The subject knows itself as ‘I’.
 - i) In Bhattacharyya’s words, ‘my self-consciousness is incarnated in ‘I’.
 - ii) The word ‘I’ has a meaning. It means ‘any speaker’. But with that meaning it is not used by the subject or the speaker.

But does not my hearer understand me as *a speaker*? If he *does* understand me as *a speaker*, he understands me through its meaning; if he *does not* understand me through its meaning, he does not understand me at all. Then, how is communication possible between a speaker and his hearer?

- 11) Bhattacharyya replies ‘He understands me not through the meaning (of I) but through the word’. Understanding between or communication between different subjects does not necessarily presuppose their being *focussed* on one meaning. Different subjects may understand each other as subjects because the *use of ‘I’ can be replicated*.

Only the solipsist turns his back at such replicability. But then in refusing to concede to such replicability, the solipsist loses his warrant to talk to others about his thesis, i.e., solipsism.

The word ‘I’ is not used by the speaker with its meaning. It is not used to mean his self as an entity or *padārtha* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology. It symbolizes the speaker not as a ‘meant’ object but as meaning function, i.e. the function of marking the subject or the speaker off object(s). The meaning ‘function’ is the subject’s executing the function of realising or actualising itself, introspectively realising its depth.

*Introspectivity, or probing into the depth of the subject, is what is indicated in the use of 'I'. 'I' is indicator of depth-achievement of subjectivity, of self and, pari passu with such depth-achievement, the subject's marking off objectivity. Actualising subjectivity is actualising the process of withdrawal from objectivity. Actualising subjectivity is hinted at in 'I' which is no conveyer of the subject as a meant object, but the expressing of itself as meaning or introspective 'function'. Thus expressing of itself in 'I' is, on the part of the speaker or the subject, indicative of freedom of the subject; it is the subject's symbolising its freedom. It is freedom which has no being, and is not even expressible as negation of being. It is absolute freedom which has no reference to freeing in the sense that such reference does not add any content to it. It is not political or social freedom in which there is passage from one objective situation (of relatively lesser degree of freedom) to another objective situation (of relatively greater degree of freedom). Spiritual freedom or cultivation (*sādhanā*) of such freedom is in the subject's being itself and not affected by the ripples of objective situations.*

And here Bhattacharyya would demand that spiritual freedom would go to the farthest length of overcoming the subject's symbolising itself in 'I' as a meaning-function. Symbolising is, after all, through 'I' that has meaning. *Absolute freedom transcends even the meaning-symbol of the subject.* Here Bhattacharyya's outlook on absolute freedom becomes pronounced in contrast to two philosophers, viz., Kant and Hegel. 'Absolute' freedom is not free 'act' which for Kant has empirical, i.e., objective setting. Again, 'absolute' freedom, since it has no objective content, is markedly different from the Absolute of Hegel's conception which comprehends objectivity. The dialectic of the process of freedom elaborated in Bhattacharyya's *The Subject as Freedom* is radically – to be precise, spiritually – different from the dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*.

As it is, the subject is associated with the body (it feels it to be its own). And yet, the feeling of the subject (however inchoate the feeling) as dissociated from the body motivates the process of the subject's dissociation from body and from objects to which it is *in fact* related. Bhattacharyya's THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM elaborates the dialectic of dissociation. The process has its acmé in the subject's deepening its consciousness, its *being*

introspective (swagata in Indian diction). Introspectivity of the subject is its ‘function’ of marking itself off object or objectivity. From Bhattacharyya’s point of view, then, introspection as the subject’s ‘function’ cannot be interpreted as retrospection, i.e., *anuvyāvasāya* of the Nāiyāyika’s conception which is directed to a previous cognition as object (to retrospection), which understands the *knower of an object as object and not as the subject*; nor can it be interpreted as a mental state as Empirical Psychology would understand it. Further, since for Bhattacharyya introspection is the subject’s ‘function’ of dissociating from object(s), it does not add any (objective) content to the actualisation of subject-consciousness; Bhattacharyya’s dialectic is that of regression, not of integration as is Hegel’s. Subjective freedom is spiritual freedom which is not understandable in objective terms, i.e., as freedom of an objective situation from another (may be unwholesome) objective situation.

What Bhattacharyya’s dialectic of subjectivity yields finally are :

- (i) the idea of the subject as freedom;
- (ii) the idea of freedom as absolute;
- (iii) the idea of the subject as absolute for knowing.

Let us now proceed to the delineation of the levels of freedom.

Bhattacharyya's Transcendental Psychology

The Subject As Freedom

In conformity with his programme, viz., of symbolising subject's freedom through objectivity, Bhattacharyya begins with the body, because the subject is usually identified with the body, - even reduced to it in ordinary parlance.

The body may seem to be a member of the perceived world, but even so, it has a privileged position which cannot be satisfactorily explained on materialistic principles. According to materialism, body is a member of the world of objects. Bhattacharyya adduces a three-fold argument against materialism which, in the present context, may be understood as the doctrine which reduces the subject to body, the point of such reduction being to give an objectivistic interpretation of subject, since, on the materialist view, the body is a member of the externally perceived world. What now are Bhattacharyya's arguments against materialism? They are as follows:-

Bhattacharyya's first argument is that the materialist does not take into account the unique singularity of the body¹ even as a member of the world of perceived object. Everyone feels his body to be his own. A reductionist may observe that to point to this, i.e., the feeling of everyone in relation to his body is just a factual thesis and nothing of philosophical importance can be made out of it. To this, Bhattacharyya's reply would be that he is propounding a philosophical thesis, i.e., the body is understood, in the subjective context, not just in a materialistic reference, but in terms of its unique singularity which shows the door to any reductive analysis of the body in physicalist terms.

So while the objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their position relative to the percepient's body, the percepient's body cannot itself be taken to be so constituted. Another percepient's body is understood as constituted from the point of view of myself as subject. But I am not as subject so

constituted to *myself*. To *myself* then, I am dissociated from the objective framework.

The second argument fortifies the first argument that purports to establish the unique singularity of one's own body. It pinpoints the consideration that while the position of other objects is fixed as relative to one's body felt to be one's own, the position of the body felt to be one's own cannot be fixed by the position of other's bodies. One can of course *point to* my perceiving² body as perceiving or locating things in space, but then someone else's positioning of my body has again to be incorporated into *my* positioning of (that) one's body. It is indeed a fact that one can fix my body in relation to one's own; but a materialistic interpretation of this fact is found to be inadequate from the point of view of my incorporating one's positioning of my body. Immediately as *one's positioning of myself is incorporated into my positioning of myself*, a parting of the ways from materialism becomes evident.

It is, admittedly a fact that my body is perceived by another subject's body. And so it may be said that subject as identified by my body may be perceived by another subject or body. But in so far as I am a subject, I cannot be distinguished as object from the world constituted by my referring. *Either I refer or cannot be subject. Either I am subject or cannot refer.* I cannot both be subject and be referred to at the same time.

It should then be noted that, from the point of view of a strictly subjectivistic thesis as different from a factual thesis, the *question of one body as subject referring to another body as subject does not arise*: which means that the distinction between these two points of view helps us dispense with solipsism. In fact, solipsism wrongly reduces the philosophical or subjectivistic thesis to a factual thesis. It seeks to establish the 'percipi' of 'esse' in the realm of bodies, i.e., in the world of facts. Whether, therefore, there are other bodies, whether, i.e., there is any subject *other than* I as subject is a question that arises on the level of body as such, body considered as a member of the world of objects.

Since I cannot be referred to, I cannot be any part of the world as my body is. The differences between bodies do not enter into the subject.

Subjectivity consists essentially in detachment or dissociation from objects, including body.

It may be said that I as subject can be demonstrated by someone else as ‘this’, i.e., as ‘this man’, ‘this subject’. But then *from the point of view of I as the subject, the demonstrative force of ‘this’ is lost*. If it is said that the identity of myself is settled by *another* through the continuing of my body, the reply would be that my bodily continuity does not count for me in so far as my consciousness of being subject is concerned.

The gist of this second argument is then this : if I am referred to, I am not subject. This brings us to the third argument, which is a continuation of the second one.

This argument carries the point about dissociation of subject still further through the consideration of a specific fact. Bhattacharyya builds this argument on the basis of a contrast between the apprehension of the unseen half of a solid object of perception and the unseen half of my body. “The unseen face of a solid object that is perceived is imagined by the percipient by imagining his own body in a different position. To imagine the unseen half of one’s own body, however, the observer does not imagine his own body thus placed differently.”⁴ I cannot look at my body just as my own body can perceive objects. What point of philosophic importance does Bhattacharyya seek to make on the basis of a point about an empirical impossibility, viz., of my body looking at itself? The point is that myself cannot be referred to by my body, - what to speak of bodies of others. The point needs to be spelled out in clear terms.

The requirement of myself belonging to the world referred to by my body would be the sameness of my level as the subject with the body. I could belong to the world referred to by me if I could myself be referred to; and the only way I could ‘refer’ to myself would be by placing myself in the world. *But what is in the world is constituted by myself; accordingly, ‘myself’ cannot be in the world.* In this sense, ‘myself’ am dissociated from the world. I cannot even *talk of referring* to myself. Self-reference, that oft-repeated word, is just another name for my dissociation from the word carved out by my referring. Self-reference is characteristically different from ‘reference’. It

is either the name of some reflexive relations admitted in logic or, when it occurs in the context of self, the name for my dissociation from the world carved out by my referring.

The gamut of the previous arguments is, then, this that the subject is dissociated from body perceptible in space.. And the point about dissociation is carried still further in the consideration that in the attempt to reduce the *felt* body to the perceived body, we fail to do justice to the *surd* that remains. Thus the attempt may be made to reduce the *felt* body to the interior of the perceived body. But then the interior cannot be conceived to be *seen* like the perceived body. Then, again, it may be said that the *felt* body is but the perceived body with some indefiniteness about it. But the indefiniteness of the perceived body and the indefiniteness of the *felt* body are of different kinds – strictly, distinct dimensions. For example, the indefiniteness of a *felt* position can never be conceived to be defined into a perceived position. It may, however, be said that it is perceived space or physical space that is ‘complicated by geometric imagination’.⁵ But the abstract version of physical space with which we deal in Geometry falls far short of the *felt* space ‘that sets the problem of objective interpretation’.⁶ What is more, it is always ‘in advance of the interpretation’.⁷ Mathematical imagination is concretization. It may be abstract, but it is after all abstract imagination, - a point Kant made against the Platonic interpretation of mathematics. After all, as Kant pointed out, geometrical figures are imagined in space. But spatialisation in Geometry, which is definitisation of figures, cannot be anything like *felt* space: *felt* position is not even *imagined* position. *So felt space is one grade removed from imagined or intuited space* and we cannot conceive that *felt* space can be defined into intuited space, into which, as Kant pointed out, perceived space defines itself; - which means that *felt* space cannot be objectively or physically interpreted.

At bottom, then, *Bhattacharyya chooses a non-physicalistic locution that is itself determined by phenomenology of space-feeling.*

For a more fundamental reason, *felt* space cannot be understood in terms of internal objective space : at bottom, it is the so-called objective space that is understood in terms of subjective or *felt* space. Both ‘internality’ and ‘externality’ are ‘forms’ of subject, to use the Kantian diction. They fall

within objectivity not as any independent self-subsistent facts, but as *pitted over against subjectivity*. It is *in reference to the subject* that the objective is understood as external; and *then*, in the light of the borrowed notion of externality, the objectively indefinite is understood as internal. The distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’, made within objective space, (not, of course, from the objective point of view but subjectively) is thus, as Bhattacharyya says, ‘reflection’⁸ of the distinction between objective space and felt space. To quote Bhattacharyya, ‘Definite objective space is related to felt space as the objective exterior is related to the objective interior, the latter relation being, in fact, the reflection of the former relation’. Thus felt space cannot be understood in terms of objective internal space; *it is the latter* which is understood in terms of felt or subjective space. Interiority as such as not a physicalist notion. It is embedded in felt subjectivity. Since objectivity is constituted by subject, to interpret subject or subjectivity as internal as different from external space is to interpret it in terms of a notion borrowed *from itself*.

The felt body, then, is the stage where freedom or dissociation is more manifest than it is on the level of the perceived body. Yet, however, it does not amount to dissociation *par excellence*. Bhattacharyya’s principal argument to that end is this, that felt body does not *wholly* amount to non-perceptual psychic fact. That blanket term ‘non-perceptual’ occupies a central and fundamental importance in Bhattacharyya’s philosophy. It indicates a radical reversal of the relation between perceived entities. The non-perceptual is not distinct from the perceived, - it is dissociated from the perceived. Now, the point is, ‘what much of dissociation is attained at the level of the felt body?’ Of course, it is not objectively distinct from the perceived body, as the previous considerations have shown. Thus we have seen that the felt body is not the interior of the perceived body, that it is not the perceived body as indefinite, that moreover it is *not even* geometrical space. It is more than all these. Felt space or interior space is neither interpretable in terms of physical space, nor interpretable in terms of Geometrical space. Neither physical internality nor geometrical imagination can reach the felt-ness of felt space. *Thus at one stroke Bhattacharyya disposes of materialism and Platonism regarding space.*

Yet, felt body, though it is the stage which the stage of perceived body is distinguished from, suffers from *some privation*. There is of course more of freedom on the level of the felt body than there is on the level of the perceived body. Thus, though perceived body is the centre of reference to the perceived object, yet ‘there is no explicit awareness of dissociation from the object’ at this stage because at the stage of perception itself, the character of the perceived object as constituted by the perceived body cannot be noticed; on the contrary, at the level of the felt body there is not of course subjective freedom but at least freedom articulated in terms of ‘interior’ – ‘exterior’ distinction: to the felt body as ‘interior’, the perceived environment, the totality of perceived objects as such is ‘exterior’. That is to say, on the level of the perceived body there is no dissociation from object; here, on the level of the felt body, there *is* dissociation from object. Inspite of this advance, however, *in respect of dissociation from object*, the felt body remains *glued* to the perceived body. But freedom required here is not only freedom from object, but from the level of perception, from *perceptual attitude as such*.

Because felt body remains glued to the perceived body, it does not turn into psychic feeling. It is of course like a presentation or psychic fact. Just as the perceived object is distinguished from presentation in non-perceptual knowledge, so perceived body is distinguished from felt body. But unlike presentation, felt body is not suspected to be *more than* perceived body. “Body – feeling and felt body are only verbally distinct.” (*SP*, V2, p 52). This is because on the level of the felt body, there has not yet been a conscious reversal of the point of view of perception.

But then in this privation of the felt body itself lies the future promise of dissociation. For felt body may be understood either as (i) *feeling* of the body or as (ii) the body that is *felt*. As the former, it is psychic fact and as the latter, it is not dissociated from the perceived body.

How is the dissociation accomplished? It is almost a central thought of Bhattacharyya’s philosophy that the distinction between the subjective and the objective is not objective. The objective is distinct from the subjective but the subjective cannot be so distinguished. It is dissociated from the objective. The distinction between ‘distinction’ and ‘dissociation’ is of fundamental importance with Bhattacharyya, and it is itself not objective but subjective.

According to Bhattacharyya's logic of dissociation, if 'X' is distinct from 'Y', 'Y' is not distinct but dissociated from 'X'. Now, the dissociation of the felt body from the perceived body takes place when 'feeling' (of the body that is felt) is distinguished from the perceived body, when it is understood, not as *of* the body at all, but as subjective something which is no part of the world of body, which is free from that world, being not distinguishable as an object or body. This understanding is Introspection. Here the distinction of the perceived body from the felt body is reversed, the feeling being consequently understood as not in any way related to body or world that is perceived but as pure non-perceptual psychic feeling.

Knowledge of Absence as a Present Fact

The next stage of spiritual freedom is the ‘knowledge of absence as a present fact’.

A rough classification may be made of objective facts into those that are present and those that are absent. Those that are present are in spatio-temporal contexts. Those that are not present in those contexts are absent. Now, this classification will appear, from Bhattacharyya’s point of view, to be all-too-naïve. ‘Objective fact’, writes he, ‘may be said to be present as external, as internal and as absent’. With objective fact present as internal, we are not immediately concerned. But then, it appears that according to Bhattacharyya ‘present in spatio-temporal contexts’; would be only a mode of being present; another mode of being present would be ‘being present as absent’. What we have called ‘present in spatio-temporal context’ would be ‘present as external’ in Bhattacharyya’s terminology.

Even with regard to ‘space and time’ in ‘present in space and time’, some proviso is to be made. Space and time here (i.e., in ‘present in space and time’) may be taken in reference to the subject considered as percipient locating things as outside his body, as external. The body may be taken to be the point of reference and, in reference to the body, objects may be taken to be external. If this is admitted, we have objects that are present to body as external objects in a body-neutral, i.e., percipient-neutral reference. Now, if ‘present in space and time’ is ‘present to body as external’, what shall we say about, what Bhattacharyya calls, ‘present as absent’? If -- as it appeared initially to us -- ‘present as absent’ is a mode of being present in Bhattacharyya’s view, wherefrom is its presentness, so to say, derived?

Usually, by ‘present’ we mean ‘present in space-time’. From this point of view, what is not present in space-time context is absent. But Bhattacharyya insists that an object may even be ‘present as absent’. So from his point of view ‘present in space-time’ would be just a mode of being present, and ‘present as absent’ would be another mode of being present as ‘present in space-time’, is. But this is just the point at issue. *It is Bhattacharyya’s onus to show that an object that is absent may yet be said to be ‘present’.*

Everything ultimately hinges on the differentia of ‘present’. Inspite of its naiveté, the commonsense view with which we started may here throw some height. According to this view, the defining mark of ‘present’ is ‘being present in space-time’. And Bhattacharyya would say that an object that is absent has its *own* space-time.

To understand how the absent object has its own space, we have to understand the nature of space in reference to present and absent objects. The space in which a present object is located is in reference to the body of the percipient. It is a present object in so far as it is outside the percipient’s body and so far as the percipient takes himself to be a part of the spatial-framework. In the case of absence, ‘the absence is where my body is not’.¹⁰ It is ‘outside the space round my body’.¹¹ So, it may be said that space outside the body of the percipient is framework of the ‘present as present’ and space outside ‘the space outside the body of the percipient’ is the framework of ‘present as absent’. *Clearly, space is understood by Bhattacharyya in a phenomenological context.* There would be no apprehension of an object as present if the subject does not take himself to be as in his body, as percipient *in* space. His perception *for him* is his *owing* the space in which he is *located*. But the percipient is also dissociated from the body and, for that matter, from the space-framework. *Pari passu* with the different degrees of dissociation from the space round the percipient’s body, there is the realisation of different grades of absence. It is in those *phenomenological* spaces, revealed by different stages of dissociation from bodily or perceived space, that absence is to be placed. They constitute the *locii* of the different kinds of absence. Thus Bhattacharyya presents us *a phenomenology of absence* on the basis of the different degrees of *felt* dissociation from physical space. His theory is thus marked off sharply from ontological theories of absence which distinguish between different kinds of absence in a subject-neutral reference. The consciousness of detachment from space, in which absence is understood on Bhattacharyya’s theory, is as much distinguished from the (supposed) perception of absence as an objective fact of which the Realist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker speaks as from the (equally supposed) apprehension of absence through ‘ideal experiment’ on the locus (of absence) of which Bradley speaks. Neither theory does justice to the *felt detachment from space round the percipient’s body*. There is as little

mystification in assigning role to the percepient's body in regard to the apprehension of absence as there is in assigning role to it in regard to the apprehension of present object. At bottom, the point that is involved is a point about mode of interpretation : is space to be interpreted *without* any consideration being paid to its being organically felt by the body-subject? Bhattacharyya has already, i.e., in his theory of the apprehension of object 'present as external' decided in favour of the *contrary* of the suggestion contained in the foregoing question.

The cognition of *present* absence is as little a psychological affair like memory, imagination, expectation etc. as it is a cognition of a physical fact. Empirical Psychology indeed confines itself to the alternatives of 'physical' and 'psychical'. Absence cannot be located as a physical object in outer, i.e., physical space but then, on that account, the cognition of absence or the cognition of an object as absent¹² cannot be regarded as memory or imagination. As Professor Bhattacharyya points out, there may not be any definite image of the absent object and yet there may be the cognition of absence as a present fact on the locus of absence. *The irreducibility of the latter to the former* is accountable to the definite consciousness of the objective fact of detachment from physical space. Such consciousness of detachment from perceived space is characteristically different from representation of the past which we have in image. On the contrary, corresponding to the cognition of absence or the cognition of an object as absent there *is* an objective counterpart which is the present fact of detachment from physical space.

It is feeling of presentness of absence that is ignored in most of the *non-phenomenological* theories of absence, if we may so label the theories that are contrary to the spirit of Bhattacharyya's theory in which a phenomenology of negation is presented in terms of the consciousness of detachment from physical space. One of the first one to criticise Bhattacharyya's theory was Dr. A. C. Das. Referring to the instance cited by Bhattacharyya, viz., that of a person's noticing 'emptiness' on a field subsequent to his having noticed a tree on it without his being able to call up before his mind's eye the image of the tree the absence of which confers the empty look on the field, Dr. Das writes: 'I may try to indicate the difficulties involved in the situation by asking a question. When two persons come to the

place under consideration – the observer himself, and a newcomer with no predispositions whatever in regard to the field in question – after the tree has been removed, should there be a difference in the cognitions of the two men with reference to the field? I may answer for the exponent to the effect that, whereas the former may perceive emptiness as attaching to the field, whatever features the latter may come on, any sense of emptiness would be far from his perspective. Were emptiness in reality an object, or even, as has been suggested, a quality, what prevents him, I wonder, from perceiving it?”¹³ Dr. Das has his own solution: “The only thing that is, on analysis, found to account for the difference between the perception on the part of the two persons there is the relevant past experience of the observer ... the emptiness appears to be ... effect of an ideation performed upon what is regarded as its locus”.¹⁴

We have a two-fold comment to make upon Dr. Das’s contentions. First, what he says is true, but not relevant. Admittedly, there would be difference between the cognitions of the two men imagined by Dr. Das. None-the-less, there would be, on the part of the original perceiver, an awareness of present absence which no amount of ‘ideation’ could explain; on the contrary, the fact of present absence apprehended by the original perceiver leaves no scope for ‘performing’ my ‘ideation’. And this brings us to the second point which is a point about, what we have earlier called, ‘mode of interpretation’. Philosophers of Dr. Das’s persuasion ignore the fact of *felt detachment* from physical space on which consciousness of negation rests.

The present fact of felt detachment from physical space rules out the two possibilities, viz., of reducing the knowledge of absence to that of the absent and of reducing it to that of the locus. The first attempt has already been disposed of. The second attempt, made e.g. by the Prābhākara-Mimāṃsakas, is also fated to failure. Mere knowledge of the locus cannot explain the *sense of detachment* from the physical space (i.e. the locus itself) on which, as we have found, the knowledge of present absence rests. Present absence is, of course, known in connection with the knowledge of the locus, but this is not to reduce the cognition of present absence to the perception of the locus. Without the perception of the locus, present absence is of course not known, but then the perception of the locus is just a condition of the

cognition of present absence and a condition of a cognition does not enter into the determination of the nature of the cognition.

Armed with the phenomenological perspective from which we propose to understand Bhattacharyya's theory of absence, let us now make a gradational distinction between the different absences revealed through the different degrees of detachment from physical space.

First of all, absence may be understood as 'bare look' on something. To take Bhattacharyya's own example, a tree might have been cut off a field perceived long ago and the removal of the tree confers a bare look on the locus, i.e., the field. This bare look persists even if the tree is definitely remembered, - a point that ought to be remembered if only to counter the point, already disposed of, that absence is reducible to the memory or image of the absent. Now, the absence or bare look on the field may be regarded as a character as a Realist like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker would say. This is admitted by Bhattacharyya too. Says he, '...the absence of the tree is known as a character of the locus, the perceived field where the tree stood'.¹⁵ Again, 'As the place is perceived, absence as a character of the place may also be claimed to be perceived'.¹⁶ Yet, as Bhattacharyya says, there is the perception of absence 'as a character of the object in the feeling that it is not a character...'¹⁷ That is to say, the place which is now without the tree may be conceived to be 'without the withoutness', so to say. The absence *might not have been* on the locus. That is, one may have locus-less understanding of absence. So that absence or withoutness may be imagined to be outside the space-frame in which perceived objects are located. It is not so with a character of an object like colour ... 'to perceive the place with a colour is not necessarily to imagine that it might be without it'.¹⁸ The point, then, that emerges out of this contrast between a character 'in the feeling that it is not a character' and a character predicated of a substantive is this, that in the knowing of absence there is a suggestion of detachment from perceived space. '... a suggestion of the absence being outside the space where the locus stands – the space round the body...'¹⁹

A word here, It appears that understanding of locus-less absence is a pointer to apprehension of negation as negation of all that is given in experience, — a view upheld in 'Some Aspects of Negation'.

In the second place, absence may be understood in the sense of the ‘missing’ of an imagined content. Once again, to consider the suggestion that knowledge of absence is memory, Bhattacharyya writes, taking the example of a book, ‘The book as absent is immediately known as a present objective circumstance that is neither remembered nor merely imagined.’²⁰ The ‘missing’ of an imagined content is characteristically different from the entertainment of an image in memory or in imagination. When a book is missed, what is the objective counterpart to the subjective feeling of missing? Not the book, for the book is just what is missed. Corresponding to the subjective feeling of missing, there is an objective fact which, however, is not absence as in the foregoing example, but a fact which may be described as ‘something that cannot be reached by my body’, ‘something which is not on the locus that might be perceived in the sense my body could reach it but which is on the contrary outside the space of the locus of absence, which is mistaken to be perceived’. Phenomenologically speaking, missing is *not ‘not finding something in objective space’* but ‘finding something as detached from objective space’. Thus the objective fact of an imagined content being absent is not the same as the objective fact of the absence of a content, because there is the phenomenological factor of the former (i.e., the imagined book as absent) being *not* reached through my body and the latter (i.e., the absence of the book) *being* so reached. Therefore, the propositions ‘The book is absent’ and ‘There is here the absence of the book’ are not only not identical but also not equivalent.

In the third place, ‘absence’ may be understood as the absence of an object *now* absent. This is really a grade of absence more reflective than the first grade of absence which is understood in the sense of an empty or bare look in a place. The bare look that the place ‘wears’,²¹ to use the very picturesque description of Bhattacharyya’s, is a matter of perception, notwithstanding the fact that such perception is with ‘the feeling that it is not a character’. The object as now absent, i.e., the object presently absent cannot, however, be seen, cannot be located in physical space; there is, in the present context, definite, i.e., conscious detachment from physical space which was only suggested in the first grade of absence. The ‘now absent’ is ‘known in the consciousness of not perceiving it’²² and such consciousness cannot be *reduced* to the knowledge or perception of the locus, for the

perception of the locus cannot account for the sense of detachment from perceived space in which (i.e. the sense of detachment) the apprehension of the ‘now absent’ consists. The ‘now absent’, then, is known in a mode of knowledge that Bhattacharyya, with acuteness, calls ‘non-perception’²³ to distinguish it from perception which as a mode of knowledge consists in the apprehension of what is located outside the body. As to the framework in which the ‘now absent’ is to be placed – as distinguished from the framework of the ‘now present’ which is physical space – more will be said later.

In the fourth place, absence may be understood as the absence of an imagined content as characterized by the locus. This, again, is a more reflective grade of absence than the grade in which absence is understood as the missing of an imagined content. This too is a matter of conscious non-perception. Supposing I imagine my friend here. I do not miss him; I only say, ‘How I wish he were here ! His presence here is too good to be true’. His absence does not *qualify* the present place; on the contrary, his presence is imagined to be cherished in reference to the present place. As Bhattacharyya says, ‘To imagine an object in a perceived space is a special form of imagination in which the present locus is viewed as characterizing and not as characterized by the imagined content’. ²⁴ There is here, i.e., in the example cited, an immediate realisation of absence in reference to an imagined content, i.e., the place with my friend, with the *consciousness of not referring the absence to the perceived locus*, - in short, with conscious non-perception.

We now come face to face with the question of questions ‘What is the space of absence’? Of the four grades of absence we have distinguished after Bhattacharyya, the third and the fourth grades of it are more reflective than the first and the second grades of it respectively. The third and the fourth grades of absence are known in ‘conscious non-perception’. Then the question arises : what about the position or space of the ‘now absent’ object ? The ‘now absent’ object is felt to be dissociated from the space round the body. It has no position. There is a bodily feeling of not feeling it. It is thus ‘related to the feeling of the body’. It is as though present in the felt body. What, now, is this, viz., being present in the felt body? Presentness here has no space-time determinant. It is detached from physical space and therefore is not reducible to externality. Body fails to find a location for it in objective space. There is a feeling of a lack of position on account of the *attempted*

reference on the part of the body, - which (i.e., the attempted reference) is all that the presentness of the ‘now absent’ object amounts to. Really, the presentness of the felt body is only *implicit* whereas that of the ‘now absent’ object is explicit. It is implicit as it is not explicitly phenomenological, as it has not cast off its bodily attachment. When the attachment is cast off, presentness emerges as explicitly phenomenological and therefore as explicitly distinct from psychic fact that is dissociated from the present. Consciousness of the ‘now absent’ or ‘present absent’ object, then, is consciousness of what is present *minus* space-position: it is a chapter in the movement of the subject’s dissociation. It is in this perspective that Bhattacharyya’s theory of absence is to be understood.

IMAGE

Image has place in Bhattacharyya’s Transcendental Psychology quite distinct from its place in Empirical Psychology. In the latter, it is an object to introspection. In the former, it is implicitly not objective fact though not made explicit as non-objective. With ‘image’, in fact, Bhattacharyya *passes from perceptual and physical subjectivity to psychic subjectivity*. Image is the first stage in the actualization of the subjective point of view.

In conscious non-perception, as we have found, our primary interest is in the object that is absent i.e., in that which cannot be reached through the body in the space round it. The image of the object does of course flash up before the mind but then it is not of primary importance here. What is of primary interest is objective absence though objective absence is in fact implicitly distinguished from the image of the absent object, from the ‘then’. The awareness of the image on this level is still ‘bound up’ with the awareness of that object (i.e., the presently absent object which cannot be reached through the body.)

How is the image understood at this stage? That it is in some way understood, i.e., attended to cannot be denied; for, after all, objective absence is understood as what is *not* the ‘then’, what may be realised only in imagination. The interest is *primarily* in objective absence. ‘Primarily’ *vis-a-vis* ‘interest’ means that the perceiving attitude is not transcended. As a result, the image still appears to be undistinguished from the absent object. But the image appears in the reflective attitude differently. Here it is

understood that the image *was not* distinguished, though it ought to have been distinguished. It ought to have been because it is on this distinction from the ‘now’ – implicitly present on the level of conscious non-perception – that the consciousness of the ‘presently absent’, of what is sought to be reached through the body is based and also because the distinction of the image from the absent object cannot be, as the distinction of the absent from the image can be, understood in objective terms. At the level of conscious non-perception, the image’s distinction from the absent object is not yet non-objective. This realisation of conscious non-perception as a sort of half-way house, as the level on which image is distinguished from absent object no doubt but *only implicitly*, i.e., not by abandoning the objective attitude altogether is Introspection. Thus to introspection image appears merely as what is non-objective. It gradually emerges out of object. This appearance of the image as non-objective, for whatever it is worth, may be said to be the appearance of what is ‘functional’, that is, what is the subject’s function of dissociating the ‘then’ from the ‘now’. The presently absent object is understood as *distinguished* from the ‘then’. But the ‘then’ is *not dissociated* from the presently absent object. ‘Then’ is understood as a mode of body feeling, as what cannot be reached through the body. But what it *positively* is is not understood. The image appears with the absent object. There is a suggestion of its dissociation from the space round the body – the suggestion being in the form that the ‘then’ is not in the space round the body – but the suggestion cannot be made anything of as long as one is confined to the objective attitude.

Conscious non-perception is a matter of detachment from the space round the body. An image is of course involved in conscious non-perception but then knowledge of absence, though involving the image, is not knowledge of the past. As we have seen, it is *present* absence that is of concern here. So image, involved in knowledge of absence has no distinct, definite status.

But there is, however, a demand that image is known definitely, i.e., as distinct from absent object. The demand is rooted in the apprehension of the absent as such in conscious non-perception: Conscious non-perception is dependent on its distinction from the image or the ‘might be’. As

Bhattacharyya points out, the knowledge of absence is distinguished from memory, expectation and imagination.

But, again, since the image is not a *given* distinct, the demand cannot be fulfilled in the objective manner. It is wanted to be realised as distinct but cannot be so realised; so that it is not known as not objective. The awareness of the image is still bound up with the perceiving or bodily attitude. It is not understood that while conscious non-perception is distinct from image, image is not distinct but dissociated from conscious non-perception and so has to be realised in a different, distinct order of cognition.

The suggestion that the image is not a given distinct, in the knowledge that is only ancillary or auxiliary to the conscious non-perception of absence, is taken up in the introspective attitude to it. In fact, this suggestion itself is the introspective viewing of the image. Here image is understood as "*being formed*"²⁵ i.e., as *emerging*. It is understood as "functional without ceasing to be substantive".²⁶ It is 'functional' as the subject's distinguishing from object.

To introspection, image appears as 'functional', i.e., as what is *in* the subjective function of distinguishing from object and is not anything definite or distinct given apart from the distinguishing of it. It is the imaging or distinguishing of the present, i.e., the space round the body from the 'then'. It is not even understood as detached from the space round the body, there being no attempt at pointing to that space as there is on the level of the knowledge of present absence: as already point out, the knowledge of present absence is still a mode of body-feeling. *On the level of the apprehension of image, the reference to the space round the body lapses altogether, there being not even any negative references to that space. Accordingly, it indicates the transcendence of the bodily or perceptual point of view. Here lies the importance of the image, or, the distinctive method of distinguishing it, in a spiritual reference.*

So image appears to introspection as distinguishing from object, as imaging, as 'functional'. But introspection consciously testifies to it as existing outside of it. The point is that without introspection testifying to it as functional, image is nothing, - it remains chained to the conscious non-perception, but although introspection testifies to it – as consisting in the

distinguishing from object – it testifies to it nevertheless, as distinguishing from *object*, as emerging from *object* : so that introspection testifies to it as ‘distinguishing from object’ and as yet ‘distinct from introspective distinguishing’. So *under* introspection, as Bhattacharyya points out, image is functional and yet does not cease to be substantive²⁷: as a distinguishing from *object*, it is distinct from introspective distinguishing and so it still appears to be a substantive. As still emerging from *object*, image at least *negatively refers to object*. It is distinguishing from *object*, whereas introspection is no distinguishing ‘from’. As long as there is the process of distinguishing from object, reference to object does not cease or the objective attitude is not suspended and therefore the subjective act of distinguishing does not come to be fixed on itself. *Image, then, as distinguishing from object and as, therefore, negatively referring to object is outside introspection, - a function without losing its substantive character.* To introspection, therefore, image, even in the sense of imaging, appears to be ‘outside’. ‘Outside’ here has to be taken in pejorative sense: ‘distinguishing’ must be complete in itself and yet imaging or distinguishing is from *object*. So that, ideally speaking, i.e., from the point of view of introspection as distinguishing by itself, image remains a substantive, an object to introspection.

Not that imaging is chronologically prior to the image. Not that first there is imaging or forming and then the image. Yet there is a difference of image from imaging or forming. Forming is not in time. There is no factual or genetic consideration at all here. Within the introspective process, there is the emergence of form. ‘Forming’ – ‘form’ distinction is not a factual distinction side by side with distinction between two events of which one might be said to be earlier and another later. It is a distinction within one and the same introspective or reflective process in which the distinction between ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ is resolved into that between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’. To revert to the terminology of the distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘functional’, the distinction is rooted in the methodological distinction between the ‘unreflective’ and ‘reflective’.

From the above analysis, the indefinite-ness within image becomes manifest. Bhattacharyya has pointed out that image is a “forming form”,²⁸ and that it is both “within” and “outside” introspection. To introspection, image is not an accomplished fact but appears only as what is formed in the forming

of it, in the detaching from the absent object. Even the forming is not anything more than imagined, as the image is *positively* experienced as *non-detached* from the absent object. The positive experience of the image as *non-detached* from the absent object along with unrealised imagination of its complete detachment from the absent object shows how introspection can at once contain the image and fail to cancel its (apparent) outsidedness, so to say. Image thus comes “under” introspection and also remains “outside” it. Thus image is (i) experienced as *non-detached* and (ii) *not* experienced as *detached*.

The fact of the matter is that consciousness has not become fully introspective or swagata (in the Indian diction) on the level of the image.

The indefiniteness within image is to be distinguished from the indefiniteness of percept. As Bhattacharyya points out, “The incompleteness of a percept is in reference to a fuller percept; taken by itself, a percept is finished... The sense given cannot be incomplete in itself. ...The image, however, is incomplete not merely in comparison with a percept but in itself ...”²⁹ When the indefinite-ness of a percept goes, the percept remains, it only becomes clear. But when the indefinite-ness of image is removed on the achievement of the next grade of subjectivity, the image itself is transcended (in Thought, as we shall see).

This qualitative difference between the indefiniteness of percept and that of image is not understood in empirical Psychology which conceives of their difference only in terms of degree. But we cannot say that image is a faint copy of a percept. They do not belong to the same order or level. The analogy of an original and a photograph would be of no avail here, for the photograph is as good a thing as the original is and so comparison or contrast between the original and the photograph is between two *things*. The analogy breaks down particularly when we see that, first, the image is no object – it arises through the dissociation (in however imperfect a manner) from object (the absent object, as we have seen); and secondly, the object itself, which is assumed to be self-complete and finished, arises through the dissociation of the image from it. So a comparison or contrast between ‘image’ and ‘object’ is out of question. We cannot say that, in relation to a thing, an image is bright, clear or distinct etc. or less bright, faint, unclear, indistinct etc. For

however bright or clear or distinct an image may be it would still fall short of a percept. Nor, for that matter, can an image, wrongly described as less bright in relation to a thing, be conceived to have intensified itself to the maximum extent of turning or transforming itself into the thing. Likewise, a thing cannot be conceived to have shed off the intensity or brightness of its lustre to the extent of having been transformed into an image. Bright or faint, clear or unclear, distinct or indistinct, an image stands by itself. So too does the percept. Neither shades off into the other.

The point of the foregoing considerations is to bring out that image and percept belong to two orders of being and that the failure to recognise the difference in their orders would give rise to the sort of arguments we have adduced against the objective interpretation of image. Here, it cannot be argued that because image and percepts shade off into the one another, we cannot conclude that they cannot be compared and contrasted. The photograph and the original do not shade off into one another and yet they can be compared and contrasted. However, this example will not affect our contention. For an image, in the way Bhattacharyya uniquely understands it, is *no thing* but arises by way of *dissociation* from it. The incompleteness or indefiniteness that is within the image is because *its being is in process*; and because its very being is in process and not in *rerum natura*, its indefiniteness cannot be compared or contrasted with that of a percept. Hence the indefiniteness of an image is not objective. The indefiniteness of image and the indefiniteness of a percept are of two different levels. If it is said that the relative distinction that we often in fact make between different images as more vague or less vague, more clear or less clear, more complete or less complete brings out clearly our acceptance of an objective standard of comparison or contrast, the reply will be that what is suggested is true but *not* relevant. The indefiniteness or incompleteness within image has to be regarded as constitutional, as not admitting of any degree.

The constitutional indefiniteness of image has to be considered in itself and not just by contrasting it with the indefiniteness (or definiteness) of percept. In our consideration of image, we should start not with image as a self-subsistent thing but with the complex affair, viz., ‘image-of-object’. This complex affair must not be understood as a relation between ‘image’ and ‘object’. There is no relation between them, because we do not get image by

itself. Image is necessarily ‘image of object’. Not that ‘necessarily’ means ‘logically’ or ‘analytically’. That is to say, it is not that the concept of ‘image’ involves the concept of ‘object’. There is a two-fold absurdity involved in such a position. First, what according to this (supposed) position is ‘concept of image’? Is it ‘image’ as concept, like ‘horse’, ‘centaur’ etc. as concepts? But ‘image’ as concept, or image-concept is ruled out by the very nature of image. An image is image of a *particular object*. Does the position amount to saying that from the very dictionary meaning of the word ‘image’ it follows that an image is of object? What ‘follows’? From a dictionary meaning of a word, it does not *follow* that there *is* any object corresponding to that word. The relation between a particular word and a particular object is always known empirically, i.e., by observing their association in experience. So in whichever way we may try to understand the supposed ‘concept of image’, no transition from it to any object is possible. Secondly, what can be ‘concept of object’ in the context of the present position? From image, one cannot come to ‘concept of object’, for image is of a *particular object*.

So when it is said (as by us) that ‘image’ is ‘necessarily’ of object, the word ‘necessarily’ has to be understood in a non-logical or non-analytical sense. At the same time, ‘necessarily’ does not mean here ‘empirically’ or ‘associationally’. An empirical or associational sense is ruled out, once again, by the very nature of image: we *could* speak of association if we *could* fix upon image as a distinct thing.

There is a third kind of relation possible between image and object. This may be called ‘relation of intrinsic reference’. It may be observed that ‘Image is necessarily of object’ amounts to saying ‘Image intrinsically refers to object’. That is, there is no image which refers to object : image is imaging, i.e., referring to object. Some Indian philosophers speak of ‘*Svarupasambandha*’, a kind of relation in which its term is both term and relation. We may conceive of the relation of image to object on the analogy – a rough analogy though – of ‘*Svarupasambandha*’ : image *is* referring to object. It is no substantive.

So the complex affair, viz., ‘image-of-object’ is found out at long last to be a case of, what we have called, ‘relation of intrinsic reference’. Now, it is because this complex affair, or, for that matter, the relation of

intrinsic reference of image to object is not noticed or understood that a two-fold mistake is made by ordinary psychology. The first mistake concerns a point about an analogy; the second one relates to a point of view. It is because image has been traditionally considered by itself or just as image, that is, as pitted over against objective facts and not in its referential aspect that it has been figuratively described as a mental picture as though like a physical picture it could be fixed upon by itself. Secondly, image is considered by itself in psychology as if psychology is concerned with a separate realm of its own corresponding to natural sciences which are concerned with a distinctively non-subjective world. It is presumed that in its intentions and motivations psychology is a science like a natural sciences and has a world of its own where it can find access to distinctive mental entities of which 'image' is one.

But the mere mention of the complex affair, viz., 'image-of-object' cannot make the change of the point of view of psychology explicit to us unless we ask ourselves, 'what sort of statement is made in saying that image is image of object or in other words, that imaging is referring to object? Which picture refers to which object is an empirical question. When the psychologist generalizes that image is 'copy' of object, he transforms a philosophical thesis into an empirical thesis. But when it is said that image-object relation is an instance of the relation of intrinsic reference, this relation is not empirical: in understanding the image-object relation, we do not consider which image of an object does in fact fit in with a particular object. Here we consider the reference of image to object. This 'reference' cannot be reduced to 'picturing' without conflating the reflective point of view with the empirical. 'Reference' is not understood empirically: we do not in fact discover it as a feature either of the object imaged or of the image of the object. Reference is understood as the subject's 'referring', which cannot be reduced to 'picturing'. 'Picturing', as the image is conceived to be in psychology, is understood in reference to object; whereas 'referring', as the image is conceived to be in philosophy as different from psychology, cannot be understood in reference to the object known. It is, on the contrary, understood as what is supplied by the understanding in order that it can understand (object). 'Reference' is understanding's reflecting on itself, i.e., subjectivity. Thus the subjective or reflective understanding of 'image'

represents a parting of the ways from the objective standpoint of natural science.

Thus we see that we have to distinguish between two aspects in image, namely, image as ‘picturing’ and image as ‘referring-to-object’. Image ‘pictures’ as a particular; and it is not particular as ‘referring’. Since image ‘pictures’ as a particular and is not particular as ‘referring-to-object’, there is, as Bhattacharyya points out, an indefiniteness within an image which is of a radically different kind from that of sense-context. A sense-content is indefinite in reference to another sense-content; whereas an image is indefinite not in reference to a sense-content but in itself. We can conceive of a definite sense-content in contrast with an indefinite sense-content; but the indefiniteness of an image, of *any* image for that matter, is in reference to itself. We cannot also say that two images can be compared or contrasted just as two sense-contents can be. For one thing, since ‘indefiniteness’ in respect of image is of a radically different kind, two images cannot be objectively compared or contrasted. The intrinsic indefiniteness of image is another name for its being *particular and not particular* at the same time; it can be removed only through concentrating on the referential aspect of image and dissociating it from its picturing aspect. As thus *dissociated*, i.e., *as purely, referential without picturing*, image is idea.

If psychology wants to get at image and at the same time distinguish itself from physical or natural sciences, it must carefully understand what is involved in the subjective point of view. It is not just by saying that image is a mental picture that the psychologist may make the subjective standpoint secure. Something more must be done. The subjective standpoint requires that image should be understood as dissociated from object, as ‘referring-to-object’. Because image is (intrinsically, as we have found) ‘referring-to-object’, is sundered from existence in the Bradleyan idiom of thinking (though Bradley’s observation of this shortcoming is in relation to ‘thought’ and Bhattacharyya’s view of the shortcoming of the image is in the context of subjective or reflective analysis), it is not itself object and cannot also be conceived – as it is conceived in psychology – as another kind of object, viz., mental object side by side with physical objects. The complex affair, viz., ‘image-of-object’ or ‘referring-to-object’, then, succinctly indicates the

subjective point of view as the true point of view from which image is to be understood.

THOUGHT

Thought is “the awareness of the unimaginability of the specific content”³⁰ and as such “involves a complete detachment from objectivity.”³¹ The content of thought cannot be imagined and thus thought is detached from objectivity. The “detachment from objectivity” is secured through ‘meaning’, i.e., independence of space- time context. ‘Meaning’ is involved in the very structure of thought and, in that sense, thought ‘involves’ detachment from objectivity. ‘Meaning’ is at once a promise and a privation for thought. It is a promise in that it enables thought to release itself from its imprisonment in space-time context of our experience. Through meaning, thought comes to be explicitly *of* the object, - a feature which marks off thought sharply from image just to unpack which from object is the problem at the level of thought. Hence thought too, like image, exists apart from introspection. But image appears to introspection as quasi-objective, as *not*-detached from the object, but thought is “of something about the object that is definitely unobjective”³². Now, the ‘something about the object’ is known in the object in, what may be called, lower grade of thought; and when it is known as ‘unobjective’, we have higher grade of thought. In either case, thought is ‘presentation’, - either appearing objective or as appearing as ‘unobjective’ something about the object. Example of the former are universals, relations etc. (through which the object thought about is interpreted) appearing as objective; examples of the latter are thought- ‘forms’ isolated in philosophical and logical reflection. In both the cases, it is witnessed by introspection, - either as detected in the object or as dissociated from the object (that is, as unobjective); and therefore, in both the cases, thought is presentation, existing apart from introspection. Negatively speaking, in neither case is thought subjective fact as the self is.

What has to be marked in the case of thought is Bhattacharyya’s view that thought is ‘objective’ inspite of its being, according to Bhattacharyya himself, ‘unobjective’. As Bhattacharyya writes, “As... referring to the object, meaning is still objective ... being a presentation, not a free subjectivity.”³³ Again, “... thought is about the object and as such

should be called ‘presentation’.”³⁴ Further, “Compared with the awareness of I, thought is objective and ,objective in its very dissociation from objectivity”³⁵. We should immediately fix our attention on the observation that thought’s objectivity is “in its very dissociation from objectivity”. For purposes of our understanding of the present point about the (alleged) objectivity of thought, we should take up another observation made by Bhattacharyya, viz., ‘It (i.e., thought) has still to be characterised in reference to the object as what the object is not’³⁶. This means that thought has to make some reference to object. ‘Reference’, however, is not to be taken in regard to any external or independent object. It is to be contrasted to, what Professor Bhattacharyya calls, ‘dissociation’, a concept that is pregnant with significance in Bhattacharyya’s methodology of consciousness’ self-reflection and it is, as Bhattacharyya has pointed out, in terms of ‘dissociation’, not ‘reference’, that thought’s objectivity is to be understood.

Armed with this perspective, we can now understand that thought remains objective to the end of the chapter. Thought is to be understood as the ‘form’ of the object, the form that (to use a Kantian term) ‘constitutes’ the ‘object’. What does ‘of’ indicate in the present context? Not ‘reference’, but ‘dissociation’; for the distinction between thought and object, ‘forms’ and the object formed, ‘category’ (to use Kant’s diction) and the ‘categorially constituted object’ is not a distinction between two things as though both of them could be present before an angelic vision at the same time. It is a reflective distinction. For, the ‘formed object’ is all that we, in point of fact, have; and, the ‘form’ – ‘object’ distinction is understood in form’s dissociating itself from, or reflectively and retrospectively turning its attention upon, the formed object, the amalgam in which it was involved. This dissociation brings out or explicates thought as constituting ‘form’ of the object. Thought’s being is, in fact, in the dissociating or unpacking of itself from object. Had there been no dissociation from object, thought would have been achieved subjectivity; so that, thought, to repeat Bhattacharyya’s observations, ‘has still to be characterised in reference to the object’³⁷. There is consciousness of ‘form’ only as long as there is consciousness of object : ‘form’ is nothing if not apprehended as form *of* object; or, to bring the dissociating act, which constitutes the role of ‘form’, ‘form’ is form in so far as it is apprehended as dissociated from the formed object.

The result of Bhattacharyya's speculations concerning thought, viz., that thought is 'unobjective' something about 'object' may be instructively compared and contrasted with those of Kant and Hegel (concerning thought). The issue is a two-fold one : (i) whether 'thought' is 'subjective' and (ii) whether its subjectivity makes its constructions 'appearances', not real.

Of the three thinkers, Kant and Hegel would give an affirmative answer to (i). To Kant, an affirmative answer to (i) would entail an affirmative answer to (ii) as well. To Hegel, an affirmative answer to (i) is all the more the reason why (ii) should be answered negatively; for, according to Hegel, when pure subjectivity is achieved, Reality is reached, so to say. To Bhattacharyya, however, an affirmative answer to (i) is not possible at all. For thought is "objective in its very dissociation from objectivity". In thought, there is still *something* to be dissociated *from*. In so far as thought-forms appear in the dissociating from objectivity, they appear to the subject which imposes the forms, as *its* objective appearance, i.e., as the forms which are *sought to be owned* by the subject but which yet appear *foreign* to the subject. This standing fact of its own forms appearing foreign to itself is another name for thought existing 'apart from introspection'³⁸. Thus appearing foreign to subject, thought is not wholly subjective; and, therefore, Bhattacharyya concludes, thought is 'appearance'. In short, thought is subjectivity but not subjectivity deepending itself to the extent of being introspective. For Bhattacharyya's dialectic, till subjectivity matures itself, there is that appearance of something to be dissociated *from*.

Is this conclusion the same as Kant's? It does seem to be so. Indeed, one may say that Bhattacharyya comes to the same conclusion as that of Kant, viz. that thought is appearance, but by a different sort of argument. But when we see how Bhattacharyya takes up 'appearance' within his general theory of subjective construction, the identity between Bhattacharyya and Kant appears as nominal. On the contrary, their differences seem to be fundamental. Thought-forms are indeed 'constructions' as Kant views them and they are 'appearances', but that is so because they are only initially i.e., till the maturation of the subjective viewpoint, outside the subject; when the subject transcends the attitude of thought, those appearances do not appear. So, from the point of view of such transcendence, those appearances are *retrospectively viewed as only not-subjective and not as some subject-neutral*

appearance with regard to which even the question of cancellation does not arise.

The twin aspects of thought -- ‘form’ we have sought to bring out following Bhattacharyya afford us an opportunity to situate his views (on thought) in the contemporary perspective. ‘Forms’, we have seen, initially appear to be (i) outside the subject which *ultimately* (ii) takes them up into *itself*, so to speak, as ‘What are *now* understood as *having* been not-subjective’, i.e., in a reflective-retrospective consciousness expressible in such a form. The fact of their appearing outside is made much of by Kant who says that they are, in so far as they appear that way, ‘appearances’. To Bhattacharyya, ‘appearance’ as a pejorative term cannot be applied to them just because they are (*ultimately*) taken up into the subjective act. When they appear to be outside, how is ‘outside’ to be understood? Without doubt, any interpretation of ‘outside’ as ‘neutral’ would be forbidding as much in the context of Kant’s as in that of Bhattacharyya’s Transcendental Idealism. The forms appear as ‘outside’ in the sense that they are tinged with subjectivity. And, so far as the forms appear to be so, Bhattacharyya would go beyond the restricted bounds of his controversy with Kant and make a breakthrough towards a larger construction. He would bring all that has accrued to him through his reflective understanding of ‘forms’ to bear upon the contemporary theory of logic which understands logic as a formal science (‘formal’ being understood as analytical or, better still, tautological). To Bhattacharyya, a formal system, such as logic is claimed to be in contemporary philosophy, is a system constructed by or assumed by the understanding in order to understand in a particular sort of way, so that logic is nothing if not the assumed form of the understanding. As *its* form, ‘form’ is indeed subjective, but yet as form, it is not the forming act; and it is only as form which has a subjective core in it that thought is studied in logic. If, at this stage of our study, we are asked; ‘What is the status of logic?’, the reply will be that there is a fringe of subjectivity in the forms studied in logic, that it is a philosophical subject only because it elaborates the forms of the subject in its self-consciousness.³⁹

FEELING

'Feeling' occupies a very important place in Bhattacharyya's Spiritual Psychology. Something must be said first by way of bringing out the exact logic of the relation of feeling to its content before we may hope to understand the distinctiveness of feeling as a stage in the attainment of subjective freedom.

The stage of subjectivity in which the content appears to be *outside* is, from the point of the degree of achieving subjectivity, outside introspection. That is to say, neither on the level of 'image' nor on that of 'thought' consciousness has become introspective, -- in Vedāntic diction, *swagata*. Feeling has nothing outside of it, according to Bhattacharyya. So it is not outside introspection. Here lies the distinctiveness of feeling as a stage in the process of spiritual freedom. Bhattacharyya says that feeling is "explicitly unobjective"⁴⁰; on this ground, feeling is distinguished by him from thought which is "presented ... as the unobjective something about the object"⁴¹. Feeling, too, like thought, is "explicitly unobjective"⁴² but, unlike thought, it is "positive as subjective fact without any reference to objective fact"⁴³. Since feeling is without any such reference, it follows – from the very logic of the process of dissociation – that it is not 'outside' introspection: since feeling itself has not content outside it, it is not itself outside introspection.

The above gives us the conspectus within which 'feeling' has to be placed. But in the way of our understanding of feeling, everything ultimately hinges on the point Bhattacharyya makes, viz., that feeling is explicitly "unobjective".

To that and, two things have to be borne in mind, viz., (i) what is historically last may be philosophically first and (ii), as heretofore, the retrospective method is to be adopted: report about the content of feeling is to be obtained from feeling's retrospective view of thought.

Image and thought have contents distinct from them. So they are outside introspection. But the content of feeling is not distinct from it. 'Distinct from' is a category in terms of which objective relations are understood. In the case of feeling *vis-a-vis* its content, the category of

objective distinction would be of no avail. For it is unlike other stages in the process of spiritual freedom : these latter could not (as they are viewed retrospectively by feeling) shed off their objectivity. Since feeling sheds off the last vestige of objectivity that is there in thought, its relation to its content cannot be understood in terms of objective distinction. Consciousness becomes more deepened, more mature, more introspective on the level of feeling than it was on that of image or thought. So the content of feeling is not distinct from it, not known. To quote Bhattacharyya, “The consciousness of the *merely* unknown as distinct from what is known as *object* that is also unknown is feeling.”⁴⁴ Again, “feeling ... may be said to have a content, an unthought or unmeant content...”⁴⁵ Feeling retrospectively understands its content as what was symbolised as known or as distinct.

Yet, our doubts as to whether Bhattacharyya is not introducing, *ab extra*, considerations of spiritual psychology into empirical psychology are not stilled. We ask: what is there to show that feeling is ‘unobjective’? Again, what enables Bhattacharyya to claim that feeling is unlike other stages of subjectivity?

A telling reply is given by Bhattacharyya when he points to a fact our experience, viz., the experience of the illusory object, that was meant, in order to bring home to us the idea that feeling has a content which is (i.e., to feeling) “unthought” and “unmeant”.

In this connection, Bhattacharyya brings his analysis of Śankara’s Doctrine of Māyā⁴⁶ to bear on the present discussion. According to his analysis of Śaṅkara’s doctrine. “The denial or the illusoriness of the given would be inconceivable but for the fact that the illusory itself is given.”⁴⁷ To Bhattacharyya, the fact of illusion takes away from the pretension of meaning (through which object is thought to be necessarily given) to be self-complete. With reference to the illusory object, it cannot be said that it did not appear. The appearance of the illusory object, the lapse of its meant-ness notwithstanding, has then to be traced to some subjective distemper, to “the objectifying or self-externalising function of the will,”⁴⁸ to the attempt to think or objectify what cannot be thought or objectified. It cannot be urged that while the illusory object may be understood as not meant, the same thing cannot be said in respect of objects of normal perception unless we try to

explain normal perception by an aberration. For, what the instance of the illusory object brings out is that ‘meaning’ itself is self-externalising of the will; it is because of ‘meaning’, i.e., self-externalising that object as such – not merely the object of illusion – appears. All meaning, then, is self-externalising; and so the object of normal perception as well as that of illusory perception can be brought under the same yoke, i.e., can be understood as will’s projection. What then appeared to be self-complete meaning on the level of thought appears to feeling as will’s objectifying.

Introspection : the freedom from distinct being.

Introspection is the acmé of subjectivity for consciousness.

Introspection is to be understood at the background of feeling. Before, however, we can bring out the nature of introspection, a bit of retrospection is needed. Such retrospection should be in two stages, viz., (1) that of the transition from ‘thought’ to ‘feeling’ and (2) that of the transition from one grade of feeling to another.

Now to lay bare these stages. While thought is the understanding of its content as ‘meant’, feeling is the understanding of the same content successively as ‘symbol’ and ‘unmeanable’. What was actually thought may, on the first level of feeling, be understood as what *might be* thought, as the content of possible thought. On a more reflective level of feeling, even possible thought may be denied : such denial arises out of the consideration that what appeared as meant not only did not appear but also was not any content of thought at all, that there was only an illusion of objectivity through some subjective distemper and therefore it could not be entertained for thought at all. It was not a content which might be entertained for thought, - it is just ‘unmeanable’. Thus the two stages of feeling in which the content of actual thought may be viewed (or reviewed) are those of possible thought and freedom from possible thought : in the former stage, what is apprehended is only ‘symbol’ of thought, while in the latter stage – when even the symbol is denied – what appears is ‘unmeanable’.

It is the latter stage of feeling which should engage us in our attempt to understand the nature of introspection. How does feeling view itself, so to say, in this stage? It may be said to sit in judgment upon itself, negate its

tendency to objectify. What appears to such self-negating attitude of feeling is ‘unmeanable,’ in other words to (retrospectively) understand what appeared as ‘meant’ as really unmeanable is to proclaim *now*, i.e., on a deeper level of reflective consciousness, the subjective distemper of feeling.

‘Self-negation’ or ‘feeling of freedom from feeling’ or ‘freedom from possible thought’ is negation of the *being* of feeling, i.e., of the very roots of the subjective distemper through which the meant object appears. Since the very subjective illusion goes at this stage, “it is already the attitude of knowledge.”⁴⁴

It is ‘self-negation’ in the sense of being the negation of the meaning attitude of self, of the attitude in which self projects the object as meant. That attitude has to be transcended in order to understand self-negation: such transcendence *is*, in fact, involved in self-negation. Otherwise, if self-negation is understood as *at par* with the unmeanable as meant, if, i.e., unmeanable is itself taken to be *meant*, the exact level from which self-negation is possible is ignored. Self-negation or appearance of the unmeanable is through the transcendence of the meaning attitude, so that it is no negation of the meant. The unmeanable cannot be meant and so it cannot be negated; which means that self-negation (the unmeanable) and the ‘meant’ are not of the same order. Therefore, knowledge implicit in self-negation, in so far as the ‘unmeanable’ appears to it, cannot yet be said to have attained its gradational difference from the meant. If the feeling purges itself of the will to objectify, it has already entertained the ‘unmeanable’, but if the ‘unmeanable’ is still conceived as meant, the discovery of the idea of self-negation is of no avail; all that we got through the discovery is thrown overboard. In entertaining the ‘unmeanable’, the self is indeed “in the attitude of knowledge”, but this knowledge has not yet clearly or explicitly recognised itself in its transcendence of the meaning or objective attitude, not recognised itself as ‘function’ through which only is the ‘meant’ given and which therefore cannot be understood through the ‘meant’. The functional aspect of knowledge is brought out in Introspection which, as not *being* or *existent*, cannot be asserted or negated like the ‘meant’.

While on the one hand the appearance of the ‘unmeanable’ is the indication of outgrowing the subjective distemper through which the object

(as meant) appears, none-the-less its appearance is a fact that has to be explained, not explained away. Its appearance is, of course, the indication that we are in the attitude of knowledge as different from the objectifying attitude of feeling. But then although we are installed in the attitude of knowledge, such knowledge implicit in the self-negation of feeling has still before it the appearance of the ‘unmeanable’. ‘If the appearance is there, what can be done about it?’ – it may be asked. The suggestion obviously is that the appearance just is there and no philosophical theory can remove it. But the philosophically interesting thing is that the appearance calls for an explanation and that admittedly on subjective lines: the ‘unmeanable’ appears because ‘knowledge’ has not explicitly recognised its gradational distinction from the ‘meant’, has not understood it to be the constituting *of* the meant, i.e., to be ‘function’ and not a meant *being*; so that, much as feeling as negating itself contains the promise of the denial of distinct being, it cannot fulfil that promise.

This promise is fulfilled in ‘Introspection’ in which there is an explicit transcendence of ‘meant’ or distinct being. So introspection cannot be denied or negated as ‘meant’ being can be. The question of negation or denial, however, must not be construed as *extraneous* to the consideration of the nature of introspection; introspection is to be *defined* in terms of such negation. Introspection is just ‘what is not distinct or meant being’. It is the function of meaning which is ‘detached both from being and from negation...’⁵⁰ Therefore, the *Cartesian doubt in respect of self is not just possible; it would be possible only if the meaning-function belonged to the same grade as the meant*. About the ‘meant’, affirmation and negation are possible, but about the meaning-function ‘negation is not even tried to be meant’⁵¹; it is not tried because the question does not arise except in ‘logical sport’⁵².

For the same reason, the old sceptic doubt in respect of the world constructed by the subject is impossible. Such doubt can only be possible if negation of self is conceived as being at *par* with the negation of the meant object, because such doubt is in respect of the world constructed by subject; it, in fact, fixes precisely on the subjectivity of the construction. But self-negation involves transcendence of the meaning-attitude. The self and the ‘meant’ object belong to different orders, and therefore the self cannot be

negated in the way the meant object can be. Yet if we talk of self-negation, that must be from a level different from that of the meant object. But the sceptic speaks of self-negation without distinguishing levels. The sceptic, precisely because he does not recognise the transcendence needed for self-negation, cannot recognise self-negation at all: what may pass as self-negation in his philosophy would be negation of the self involved in the meaning attitude; and the transcendence we have spoken of needs to be recognised precisely to cancel the negation of the self. Thus the sceptic is to be confronted with a dilemma; ‘if you speak of doubt, you have to recognize the transcendence of self-negation and thus contradict your starting-point; but on the contrary, if you do not recognise such transcendence, you cannot speak of doubt’. Thus either the sceptic contradicts himself in conceiving the gradational distinction of (self as) ‘meaning’ – function from the meant or he stultifies his doubt. The sceptic position, then, is either self-contradictory or self-stultifying.

Not only the sceptic but also the Kantian is to be confronted with the same sort of argument from the point of view of the transcendence in self-negation which really amounts to the recognition of the self as meaning ‘function’ as different from the ‘meant’. It is because of *its* transcendence that the self can explicitly recognize its constructions to be its construction, i.e., *own* those construction. Otherwise, if it were merely a part of these constructions, then, as Kant recognised and rightly so, it would not have seen them from a distance, as it were. Transcendental Deduction in fact becomes possible because the self not only constructs the world but also can stand apart from it. Only then by recognising the transcendence implied in self-negation could Kant answer the sceptic doubt of Hume. To understand the world as ‘construction’ of the self is not to look at it empirically; it is to look at it and at the same time to transcend it. If such transcendence is not recognized, then the empiricist or sceptic doubt of Hume cannot be answered. Thus the upshot of our criticism of the sceptic position amounts to rescuing the meaning function from the meant, locating its distinct grade, bringing out its transcendence. We can thus see the point of the Kantian insistence on self, as the platform of the argument against skepticism, in its proper perspective.

It may of course be asked: Can there be no doubt about subjective constructions at all even by one who *does* make a gradational distinction between the subjective function of ‘meaning’ and ‘meant’ being? It is of course possible to doubt the world constructed by the subject. What to speak of the sceptics, even among anti-sceptics there have been, in fact, philosophers who have initially cast doubt upon the world of our experience. A supreme example, it may be pointed out, is Edmund Husserl of the Cartesian *Meditations*-period. But, then, we might ask our sceptic opponent: what precisely is the ground for doubting the world recognised to be subjective construction as much by the anti-sceptic as by the sceptic? If doubt about this world is possible, that is because it is ‘meant’; the ‘meaning’-function which constitutes it, its subjectivity cannot be the ground for doubting it. On the contrary, its apparent non-subjectivity or meantness is precisely the ground for doubting it. As a matter of fact, doubt about the world is resolved by detaching, isolating, or – in Husserl’s language – “phenomenologically clarifying” the subjectivity that was not unpacked from in unreflective experience. On his own admission, Husserl’s doubt lasted as long as ‘phenomenological clarification’ was not achieved. Hence the sceptic’s attempt to turn the tables on us is unavailing.⁵³

Thus we counter the sceptic doubt on the basis of the gradational distinction between meaning-function and the meant being. The meaning-function is just what is introspection; and therefore, introspection cannot be the meant. Because introspection is not meant, it cannot itself be an *introspectum*, i.e., object of another introspection. It is “not itself meant even as the unmeanable...”⁵⁴ Therefore, introspection is neither the content of actual thought nor the content of possible thought, nor is it freedom from possible thought : thought is the awareness of a meant content as distinct from it, whereas “Introspection is essentially the annulment of all distinct being...”⁵⁵

This long discussion on the nature of introspection has been necessary if only to bring out the logic behind the definition of it. We raised the question whether the negative definition that introspection is ‘what meant being is not’ is not extraneous to the discussion of introspection. And we have answered negatively. Precisely, introspection is distinct from distinct being, i.e., it is not merely distinct from what is ‘meant’ – *it is distinct even*

from the distinction from the ‘meant’. Introspection is what is not meant, i.e., what does not appear to be distinct. And now that we bring out the transcendence of introspective or meaning function as lying in ‘distinction from distinction’, we can make a breakthrough towards a new point of view. Introspection represents the point of departure from Thought which ‘means’ its object. And in so far as ‘distinction from distinction’ is recognized or not, in so far as what is accorded primary importance is the point of view of *introspection* or of *thought*, we have the *categorically divergent varieties of Idealism*, viz., *Indian and Western, Vedāntic and Kantio-Hegelian*. And, it is to Bhattacharyya’s credit to have brought out the categorical difference between these two varieties of Idealism. Nor is that all : Bhattacharyya goes to the further length of explaining the advance that Indian Idealism can make upon its Western counterpart. For the strictness and severity, unflinchingness and rigidity of Bhattacharyya’s thought or his constructive interpretation of Indian Idealism does not permit him even to rest content with using ‘distinction from distinction’ in respect of introspection. The expression that will do justice to the spirit of the distinction between thought and introspection, ‘meaning’ and ‘transcendence of meaning’ is *dissociation*. Introspection is complete dissociation from meant being in the sense that it has *not even any negative reference to thought*. The ‘unmeanable’ that appeared on the second grade of feeling does not appear on the level of introspection. If the second grade of feeling is self-negation, introspection is self-identification in which there is ‘annulment of all distinct being’⁵⁶. Such “annulment of distinct being” was not possible on the part of Kant.

Importance of the recognition of ‘Distinction from distinction’

This importance may be studied by contrasting Bhattacharyya’s standpoint with those of Kant and the Existentialists.

- 1) Kant – Annulment of objective appearance or distinct being was not possible for Kant because the impossibility of meaning the subjective ‘function’ of meaning was not conceived by him. Subjective ‘function’ was conceived by Kant as constituting meant being and, of course for Kant, ‘function’ (as constitutive of the meant) was non-reducible to the meant. Yet non-reducibility which is negative avails of nothing. ‘Function’ must be positively

conceived as freedom, i.e., as ‘distinct from distinction’. ‘Non-reducibility’ is still an objective category, whereas ‘distinction from distinction’ is the categorical description of the subjective sphere: it brings out the very logic of subjective freedom. Kant could not disabuse his mind of the last vestige of objectivity, although his point of view of ‘function’ was precisely a demand upon him that he should proceed in that direction.

- 2) Existentialists – An implicate of ‘distinction of distinction’ is absolute freedom, i.e., freedom from the very freeing process. That the Existentialists who accord almost central importance to the notion of freedom could not approach the point of view of absolute freedom was because the category of ‘distinction from distinction’ was lacking in their thinking.

Bhattacharyya formulates his standpoint, and also his reaction to Western philosophy, through the Vedāntic doctrine of Māyā or more precisely, through his interpretation of the doctrine. The central point which he brings out of the doctrine is the given-ness of the illusory object: the illusory object, by being given, suggests its cancellation. It is given “in absolute mockery of thought”, “presented as a contradiction”⁵⁷. The fact of its being presented as a contradiction suggests the transcendence of the point of view of thought. The object appears to Kant because it is distinct from the subject, because it is ‘unknowable’ or ‘unthinkable’ being not amenable to ‘thought’ through the categories. Thought however tries to catch it and it is not rid of its malady because thought is bound to make the content appear as distinct, whereas its distinct-ness itself is precisely what has to be denied. If we are to understand Kantian philosophy in Bhattacharyya’s terms, thought (which is condemned to the ‘unknowable’ appearance) would be somewhat like feeling of the second grade, -- because though thought, like the second grade of feeling, faces the ‘unknowable’, yet feeling, unlike thought, consciously negates the subject’s tendency to objectify, to know in the mode of ‘distinction’. So Kant could not disabuse his mind of the category of ‘distinction’ or of thought. Of course, Kant regarded self as the thinking function which constitutes the object, but then, while thinking makes object appear as distinct, subjective ‘function’ is transcendent of the distinct, i.e., is distinct from distinction ; so that, the concept of ‘thinking function’ is

contradictory. Kant can extricate himself out of difficulty only by strictly adopting the viewpoint of ‘function’ and setting aside the viewpoint of thought or ‘meant’ object.

The Ultimate Breakthrough – the Subject as Freedom

For a little while, let us allow Bhattacharyya to speak for himself. About introspection he writes, “It is just the function of meaning the feeling...”⁵⁸. Again, “Meaning as a function as distinct from the meant is intelligible only after the self-negation of feeling...”⁵⁹ Earlier, he writes. “It is the persisting will to think that constitutes the *being* of feeling in the lower stage. Freedom from the will to think is thus feeling that has no being...”⁶⁰ The higher stage of feeling is “the feeling of self-negation”⁶¹; it is subject’s negating itself or negating its tendency to objectify as is evidenced in the frank confession of the “trying to think”⁶². It is, as we have already seen (in the section on Introspection), not negation of ordinary logic. For it is no negation of a ‘meaning’; it is transcendence of meant being as such. Since, then, introspection is understandable only “after” the “self-negation of feeling”, it follows that the point of view of introspection, of ‘function’ that constitutes ‘meaning’ (as Kant, e.g., would say) is that of the transcendence of meaning. Indeed, we can say that Transcendental Idealism involves the thesis of transcendence of meaning.

But from the point of view of the achievement of self as “freedom”, introspection stands at the cross-roads. It is both a promise and a privation in the last stage of the journey to freedom. Introspection place in our hands the promising notion of the ‘I’ – function or speaking-function⁶³. As subject expressing itself, ‘I’ has no meaning. ‘I’ – function or speaking function is nothing accidental but involved in the process of articulating and achieving freedom.

But there is still a demand that the subject’s or speaker’s expressing itself to another subject or speaker, i.e., *to a hearer* should be transcended. The subject is “self-evidencing”⁶⁴ (through ‘I’) *to another subject*: it is of course not understood as meant through the ‘I’ or as meaning itself through that word. Still there is demand that the subject as “incarnating”⁶⁵ itself should be transcended. The transcendence would be of all that ‘I’ – function has created. Thus it has created (i) another ‘I’. (ii) Again, it has created a ‘social’⁶⁶ world or

a world of ‘I’-s. (iii) It has incarnated itself. So, the transcendence of ‘I’ would result in a ‘self-evident’, as distinct from a ‘self-evidencing’, subject. Then, again, such transcendence would do away with other subjects: there would be no subject to be *appropriated*.⁶⁷ When I transcend my ‘I’, other ‘I’-s are transcended; when I as “individual”⁶⁸ go, other individuals go. When my incarnation goes, *the absolute self becomes evident*. The absolute is not free from anything or any self: it is *freedom*.⁶⁹ *The world is, then, seen as a community of subjects as not free, but as freedom, as emanations of freedom. From the point of view of freedom, a subject, i.e., any subject is expression of freedom.*

What then does Bhattacharyya’s Spiritual Psychology yield us in the ultimate reckoning? This new kind of psychology is, as Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya has pointed out, ‘not the science of psychology’. Our study of this psychology has raised one principal issue which is important both from the point of view of its restricted aim and also from that of situating it (i.e. Spiritual Psychology) in the context of Bhattacharyya’s thought. That issue centres round the idea of Spiritual Psychology as a self-symbolising of subjective freedom.

There are two things to be considered here. The first is the idea of self-symbolising in respect of spiritual psychology as a philosophical study; the second is that of self-symbolising in respect of spiritual process of freedom. Can the idea as self-symbolising in these two contexts, which to all appearances are different, be said to be used in the same sense? If the answer is in the negative, then Bhattacharyya’s ideas regarding epistemology or Spiritual Psychology must be said to be queer : it would seem that he is importing spiritual considerations into the sphere of philosophy. If, on the contrary, the answer is in the affirmative, then Spiritual Psychology would be seen to be permeated by a new conception of philosophy.

Bhattacharyya says, ‘The facthood of the knowing function and of subjective function ... is elaborated into a system of symbolisms in a new philosophical study which may be called Spiritual or Transcendental Psychology’. This brings out before us in clear light the roots of epistemology and the task of epistemology. Epistemology has its roots in the belief in the ‘facthood’ of the knowing function : to *know ‘knowing’ is already to be*

installed in the attitude of self. Knowing is subject's freeing itself. The reality of the subject consist in the realising of it. So the ‘belief’ in the facthood of the knowing function is no fancy; elsewhere, Bhattacharyya understands belief in the sense of faith viz., when he sets his face against Kant’s ‘realistic belief’ in the ‘thing-in-itself’.

The task of epistemology is to ‘symbolize’ the process of subjective freedom. ‘Symbolising’ must be taken in the proper context of Bhattacharyya’s entire thought some aspects of which are anterior to *The Subject as Freedom* and some posterior to it. Although the concept of ‘symbolising’ explicitly emerges in Bhattacharyya’s thought in *The Subject as Freedom* (published in 1930) and the papers on ‘The Absolute and Its Alternative Forms’ (published in 1934) and ‘The Concept of Philosophy’ (published in 1936), yet it was foreshadowed in the paper on ‘Some Aspects of Negation’ (published in 1914) and ‘The Place of the Indefinite in Logic’ (published in 1916).

But let us first of all try to understand the concept of ‘symbol’. In a sense, every theoretical study articulates what it studies in a system of concepts, statements, arguments etc. etc. But this is not the sense in which Bhattacharyya would understand epistemology as the symbolising elaboration of subject’s freedom. The faith in subjective freedom permeates epistemology.

We, then, come upon a novel concept of philosophical studies according to which philosophy is the systematic ‘symbolisation’ of concepts that are ‘enjoyingly’ believed, - an idea fully explicated in ‘The Concept of Philosophy’ published subsequent to *The Subject as Freedom*. A brief indication of how the articles prior to *The Subject as Freedom* foreshadow the concept of ‘symbolisation’ may be given by calling attention to the articles on ‘Negation’ and ‘Indefinite in Logic’. The given or definite thing is regarded as a ‘free determination’ of negation or as the ‘indefinite play of non-being’. It is, as Kalidas Bhattacharyya has pointed out, the ‘inscrutable sport of the absolute’ corresponding to which we have the ‘Śaiva concept of Śakti in its *Icchā* form’.

‘Self-symbolisation’ or ‘negation’ or ‘*Icchā*’ is not to be taken in a metaphysical sense at all. These are to be taken in a sense of free-creation or *Citi Śakti* of Śiva. Failure to understand this may raise the question whether

Bhattacharyya does not go against Vedānta tradition in giving importance to the process of achieving freedom.

The symbolising process, precisely because it is symbolising, is spiritually rooted. Is not symbolising ultimately, (i.e., from the point of view of freedom) ‘false’? We may point out that instead of the word ‘false’, Bhattacharyya uses the word ‘outgrown’ in respect of the stages of freedom. For a stage being ‘outgrown’ is not (for it) to be rendered nugatory; on the contrary, it is outgrown or it outgrows itself in so far as it falls within the spiritual process. So the ‘false’ assumes a new meaning in Bhattacharyya’s hands. And this would be quite in conformity with Vedānta. Bhattacharyya’s Vedānta is distinctively his – it is an addition to the corpus of Vedānta literature. The addition is rooted in the introduction of the concept of ‘symbol’ in respect of the spiritual process.

And, now, we can proceed to situate Bhattacharyya’s thought in a bigger perspective. ‘No philosopher understands his predecessor until he has rethought their thought in his contemporary terms...’. So writes Professor Strawson. For us, Bhattacharyya of course founds a phenomenology of the subject; a phenomenology of the subject is not a presuppositional study as Kant’s ‘Deduction’ of subject was. It is rooted in the ‘faith’ in the ‘facthood’ of the knowing function. From Bhattacharyya’s viewpoint, a study of subject or subjectivity must be phenomenological in method; at every stop, it must be permeated by the knowledge of self. And this study is at bottom a display of the subject’s freeing itself, subject’s being itself, deepening itself. And so far as it is a display of the subject, it is the subject’s play.

What sort of philosophy, then, is Bhattacharyya’s philosophy of the subject? In the ultimate reckoning, it is a self-transcending phenomenology. Concepts may be said to be transcendent in the sense that they speak of ‘transcendent’ realities. But in Bhattacharyya’s philosophy we are concerned not with transcendence; we are concerned with *self*-transcendence in which sense only can ‘symbolising’ of the ‘facthood of knowing function’ be understood. ‘Subjective freedom’ is spoken of in a language which is a necessary symbolisation of subject. ‘Freedom’ cannot be a *meant* content; nor is it a transcendent reality like the unspeakable or *avāñmanasagoçara* of the Upaniṣads which may be taken to be pointed to by language after any such

realization that language creates or distorts, that our world is a *nāma-rupa-samghata*. But freedom can be understood in terms of the freeing process, in the language of the phenomenological process of freedom or process of freeing (as the process might be indifferently called) and that is not because of any reason extraneous to the sphere of freedom; if there is any reason, it is immanent in the process. That immanent reason is just ‘self-symbolising’ or self-transcendence. There is a necessary self-transcendence in the sphere of freedom (which i.e. the sphere embraces the process); that transcendence is the transcendence of the ‘meaning’ – use of language typified in ‘I’ which ‘incarnates’ self in language. To have finally suggested the way to such a self-transcending phenomenology redounds to Bhattacharyya’s genius.

A Résumé of the Conceptual Structure of the SAF

The SAF elaborates the levels of Bhattacharyya’s dialectic of subjective freedom. Its distinctness from Hegel’s Dialectic in his Phenomenology of the Mind has already been hinted at different places.

The moving spirit of the dialectic is the notion of the subject incarnated in ‘I’. The entire book is encapsulated in this notion of the subject incarnated in ‘I’ which has a meaning.

But a very important and radical departure from the realistic ontology of meaning propounded e.g., by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is made by Bhattacharyya when he understands the meaning of ‘I’ as the subject’s self-conscious symbolising. Bhattacharyya sets his face against the Nyāya realistic ontology, for which the word ‘I’ (*'Aham'*) means the *thing-self* (so to say). For Nyāya, object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge is what is meant by a word, what is the *artha* of a *pada* or a word, the *accusative* of a word. So the Nyāya goes on to maintain that the word *'aham'* means the self and the self is an object of knowledge and an ontological entity. Nyāya thus combines semantic realism with epistemic realism with ontological realism. For Bhattacharyya, however, the subject, symbolizing itself in meaning, at once marks itself off object that is meant and, what is more, marks itself off any construal of itself as object.

The entire conceptual structure of the book may be presented now.

- i) The subject expresses itself in ‘I’.
- ii) The word ‘I’ has a meaning.

- iii) But it *does not mean itself*, as a *padārtha* or object, through the word ‘I’.
 - iv) It understands its expression in ‘I’ – which has a meaning -- as its symbol.
- Here is Bhattacharyya’s novelty: he interprets the meaning of ‘I’ as the subject’s symbolizing itself.
- v) So, it can be said, “I (the subject) am ‘I’ (to myself)”. It is not ‘I am I’ which could be dismissed by Ayer as a ‘degenerate proposition’ of which the predicate is a ‘sleeping pastner’. “*I am ‘I’* is self-symbolization, no predication. It strikes a new level of consciousness contrasted with ‘I am I’ conceived as attempted predication: “*I am ‘I’*” does not even try to make any predication.
 - vi) Through meaning-symbol, the subject becomes *as though* ‘meant’, i.e., object.
 - vii) So the subject at once symbolizes itself through meaning and transcends meaning-symbol.
 - viii) Weaved into its symbolising is the demand to transcend symbolising.
 - ix) In symbolising itself through ‘meaning’, the subject forestalls ontology of meaning or ontology of self.
 - x) Thus self-symbolising involves the demand to transcend meaning of ‘I’, transcend the thought of the subject as object.
 - xi) In Bhattacharyya’s diction, self-symbolising negates the ‘being’ of meaning.
 - xii) Contrasted to the meant *being*, the subject is meaning-*function*. I mean through ‘I’, through meaning-symbol.
 - xiii) That is, I (as the subject) execute my freedom from object through ‘I’ (which has a meaning). For me the ‘I’ – symbol stands for the subject and not the object.
 - xiv) I not only negate the ‘being’ of the meaning of ‘I’, I not only (i) negate my representation as object-self or *padārtha* but also (ii) negate the negation of my representation as object because the negation (i) does *not add any content* to my realisation of myself as the subject. Representation in ‘I’-symbol does not add content to the subject’s realisation of itself as subject.

In the realisation of the subject, the negation of the meaning-symbol ('I') is negated. While Hegel's dialectic negates every level prior to the actualization of the Absolute consciousness because it is incomplete and, for that reason, incorporates itself in the comparatively higher thought, Bhattacharyya's dialectic negates all the levels prior to the actualisation of the Absolute-consciousness and *negates even the anterior negations*. For Hegel, negations of lower levels would all be affirmations on the relatively higher levels as those negations would *add content* to the level next to it. For Hegel, negation of the lower level would be affirmation on the higher level. But for Bhattacharyya, the affirmation would itself be negated on a still higher level. For Bhattacharyya, then, the Absolute-consciousness is reached through negations of negations.

This is not verbal quibble. The basic point, in respect of Bhattacharyya, is that the symbolisation of the subject I is through 'I' which has a meaning and yet the subject does not represent itself as a 'meant' object, - '*padārtha*' in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* diction. So the meant being of the subject, its symbolisation as *padārtha* has to be negated. But again in its introspectivity or reflectivity – 'inward attitude' as the late Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya would call it --, the subject negates even the negation of the symbolisation of itself in 'I' *lest* negation comes to be taken, in the context of spiritual realisation, as co-ordinate with affirmation. So then on the subjective or introspective or spiritual level, there emerges negation of negation which cannot any further be used to affirm (or negate) any 'being', any object.

Till the subject realizes its depth, till it becomes introspective, till it annuls distinct being, the dialectic continues.

Here and here at last is realised the subject as freedom from object, freedom that is free even from the process of achieving freedom from object.

This, then, is the story of the dialectic of the subject as freedom.

References

1. SP, Vol II, p. 50.
2. *ibid.*, p. 50.
3. *ibid.*, p. 50.

4. *ibid.*, p. 50.
5. *ibid.*, p. 51.
6. *ibid.*, p. 51.
7. *ibid.*, p. 51.
8. *ibid.*, p. 52.
9. *ibid.*, p. 55.
10. *ibid.*, p. 56.
11. *ibid.*, p. 60.
12. That these conditions are distinct will be shown later.
13. NEGATIVE FACT, NEGATION AND TRUTH. (Calcutta. 1942.) p. 18
Underline ours.
14. *ibid.*, p. 18.
15. SP, Vol II, p. 57.
16. *ibid.*, p. 57.
17. *ibid.*, p. 57.
18. *ibid.*, p. 57. Underline ours.
19. *ibid.*, p. 57.
20. *ibid.*, p. 57.
21. *ibid.*, p. 59.
22. *ibid.*, p. 59.
23. *ibid.*, p. 59.
24. *ibid.*, p. 59.
25. *ibid.*, p. 67.
26. *ibid.*, p. 67.
27. *ibid.*, p. 67.
28. *ibid.*, p. 69.
29. *ibid.*, p. 67-68. Underline ours.
30. *ibid.*, p. 70. Underline ours.
31. *ibid.*, p. 70.
32. *ibid.*, p. 70. Underline ours.
33. *ibid.*, p. 70.
34. *ibid.*, p. 71.
35. *ibid.*, p. 71.
36. *ibid.*, p. 71.
37. *ibid.*, p. 71.
38. *ibid.*, p. 71.
39. I have tried to understand Kant's logic in terms of its moorings in reflective consciousness in my paper for the Fourth International

Kant Congress at Mainz, Germany 1974 entitled ‘Constructing a Theory of Logic on Kantian Foundations.’

- 40, SP, Vol II. *p.* 73
- 41, *ibid.*, *p.* 73.
- 42, *ibid.*, *p.* 73.
- 43, *ibid.*, *p.* 73.
- 44, *ibid.*, *p.* 73.
- 45, *ibid.*, *p.* 73.
- 46, SP, Vol I. *pp.* 95-106.
- 47, *ibid.*, *p.* 96. Underline ours
- 48, SP, Vol II. *p.* 75.
- 49, SP, Vol II. *p.* 78. Underline ours.
- 50, *ibid.*, *p.* 81.
51. *ibid.*, *p.* 81.
52. *ibid.*, *p.* 81.
53. E. Husserl : CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS (trs. D. Cairns. Martinus Nijhoff. 1960)
54. SP, Vol II. *p.* 81.
55. *ibid.*, *p.* 82.
56. *ibid.*, *p.* 82.
57. SP, Vol I. *pp.* 96-99.
58. SP, Vol II. *p.* 80.
59. *ibid.*, *p.* 80.
60. *ibid.*, *p.* 77.
61. *ibid.*, *p.* 77.
62. *ibid.*, *pp.* 74-76.
63. *ibid.*, *p.* 83.
64. *ibid.*, *pp.* 84-85.
65. *ibid.*, *pp.* 20,84.
66. *ibid.*, *p.* 85.
67. *ibid.*, *p.* 87.
68. *ibid.*, *p.* 83, 87.
69. SP, Vol I, *p.* 100.

CHAPTER – 5

Philosophy as the Self-articulation of Consciousness

In trying to follow Bhattacharyya's paper 'The Concept of Philosophy', one must at the outset be clear about *what the paper is not*.

It is not any analysis of the 'concept' of philosophy, if conceptual analysis is taken to be consciousness-neutral.

Two questions arise immediately on one's reading of paper. First, what has the definite article 'the' to do with the 'concept' of philosophy? And secondly, what has the word 'concept' to do with 'philosophy'?

With regard to the first question, it must be noted at the very outset – lest there be no misunderstanding – that Bhattacharyya surely does not intend it to be conveyed to his reader that *his* is *the* concept of philosophy. That he does not do anything of that kind is borne out by the sort of way he unravels the concept of philosophy; here he has as his peers Kant and Hegel, his differences with them notwithstanding. And here we come to the answer to the second question; Bhattacharyya does not analyse the concept of philosophy but instead presents, what may be called, the *analytique* - a word that has a Kantian ring – of philosophy, i.e., he *unravels or unfolds philosophic consciousness*, - a task in which Kant and Hegel had been engaged. For Bhattacharyya, then, his paper 'The Concept of Philosophy' is an in - depth analysis of the Concept of philosophy. And in - depth analysis of a concept, as much in Kant as in Hegel as in Bhattacharyya, would consist in probing into the consciousness from which springs the concept, - here 'philosophy'. The very idea of philosophy may be said to be a transcendental idea *a la* Kant and Hegel, i.e., an idea that is not distinct from the philosophic consciousness. As philosophic consciousness deepens itself, the concept of philosophy becomes clearer on different levels of consciousness.

Philosophy, observes Bhattacharyya, is, 'like science', 'an expression of the theoretic consciousness'.

What is 'theoretic consciousness'? How does it align philosophy with science? Is there *one* theoretic consciousness which binds science and philosophy (and which gives Bhattacharyya his warrant to speak of 'the'

theoretic consciousness)? But if philosophy is ‘an’ expression of the theoretic consciousness, where is it *distinct* from science?

We turn then to the point that philosophy is ‘like’ science an expression of theoretic consciousness.

Science is expression of theoretic consciousness in that it, whatever may be its kind, involves a good deal of theorizing. Examples of theorizing are forming of hypotheses, making assumptions, arriving at laws, articulating methods etc. Of course, such activities have to be understood as contextualised, not generalized, because they vary in respect of what they come to attend to or how they come to attend to what they in fact attend to. In forming hypotheses – to take only one instance of how theorizing assumes different contours in different sciences –, history may attend to inscriptions, records of the past etc., whereas physical or empirical science may attend to some sense-matter and its behavior either to reach a theory (or law) or to show how the sense-content illustrates a theoretical model and provides material content to it. Again, a scientist may hit upon a theory and come to see how it overlies sense – matter. Again, the assumptions and presuppositions and methods of deductive – mathematical sciences are different from those of the empirical sciences on behalf of which one may, following Hume, claim that they have distinct theoretical frameworks. And again, both are different from historical, cultural and civilisational studies which have their distinct theoretical structures.

It would not, however, be enough for a student of Bhattacharyya’s thought to identify theory-content in science and maintain that philosophy, ‘like science’, is an expression of theoretic consciousness. For, in Bhattacharyya’s paper, the likeness of philosophy to science is as soon made light of as soon as it is mentioned. The former is subordinated, in Bhattacharyya’s consideration, to the distinctness of philosophy from science. Here, what is of essential importance for Bhattacharyya is the concept of ‘the expression of theoretic consciousness’; for, it is from the point of view of how theoretic consciousness is expressed in the philosophical context that assessment of science is made retrospectively. In fact – and this is a point to of methodological importance –, Bhattacharyya’s distinction of grades of consciousness is at bottom retrospective: it is the

higher grade of consciousness which retrospectively assesses the comparatively lower grade. Contrasting empirical thought and philosophical thought, Bhattacharyya observes, (1) that philosophy is concerned with ‘pure thought’, (2) that ‘pure thought’ is not thought of a content distinguishable from it as empirical thought is, and (3) that ‘in philosophy the content is not understood except as spoken’. So, philosopher as he is, historically proceeding from science to philosophy does not interest him so much as retrospectively assessing how theoretic consciousness deals with its content in science and in philosophy in distinct ways. The problem of *how the content is spoken in science and how the content is spoken in philosophy* arises here. The problem of understanding and of *distinguishing between speech – modes in science and in philosophy* arises through reflection on the content of empirical thought or science. Bhattacharyya points out that the content of empirical thought is ‘information’ which ‘is understood without reference to the spoken form’. It is when the content of empirical thought or science is taken to be ‘understood with reference to the spoken form’ that, retrospectively, the philosopher has the warrant to observe ‘In philosophy, the content that is not intelligible except as spoken’. Thus it is that the problem of understanding and distinguishing between speech-modes in empirical thought or science and in philosophy comes to assume importance. The distinction between science and philosophy is initially the distinction between the ways of understanding the contents of science and philosophy and the latter again is rooted in the basic distinction that counts with the philosopher between speech-modes in science and in philosophy. Add to this latter distinction Bhattacharyya’s observation ‘To speak is to formulate a belief’. Philosophical contents, then, must be admitted to be believed. But they are not believed as pieces of information. How are they believed then? Here, to get Bhattacharyya answer this question, one has follow him in his acute analysis of the way philosophical contents are spoken. They are not spoken of as information. What is spoken of as information is what is ‘literally spoken’. What is ‘literally spoken’? To Bhattacharyya, what is literally spoken is what is ‘meant’. Philosophical contents, not being literally spoken, are not meant. Are statements in philosophy, then, meaningless? No, they are not, because they are not *intended* to be meaningful. How then, do they come to be spoken i.e., uttered? Bhattacharyya answers: they are spoken

not literally, but only symbolically. They are not intended to convey anything meaningful. To say this amounts to saying either that they are not statements which have meaning, i.e., they are not meaningful *statements* or that they do not mean *anything*. On the former alternative, philosophical statements would be unverifiable, while on the latter alternative those statements do not mean any ontological reality. The former alternative would be the verificationist's alternative, the latter would be the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika alternative. Which of these does Bhattacharyya have in mind? Is it that, according to Bhattacharyya, it is out of question to apply either the verificationist criterion of meaning or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontological theory of meaning of a word or *pada* to philosophical statements? For Bhattacharyya, neither the verificationist's criterion of sentential meaning nor the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of ontological meaning *can even be tried* to be applied to philosophical statements, what to speak of impugning those statements. How does the attempt to apply the two criteria of meaning to philosophical statements become infructuous? Here the basic consideration with our philosopher is encapsulated in these observations of his, viz, 'In philosophy, the content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken. 'Pure thought' is not thought of a content distinguishable from it...', '..a believed content that has a necessary reference to the speaking of it is not spoken of as information'. Philosophical statements do not speak of sense-contents by appeal to which they might be either verified or rejected as meaningless, nor do they speak of entities that are accusatives of words, i.e., *padavācya-s*. There is no philosophical content that can be said to be *padavācya*. Are they then *apadas*? No. Examples of *apadas* are 'hare's horn', 'square circle' etc which are not believed whereas philosophical contents are believed. They can only be said to be *pada-avācya-s*, i.e., contents that can only be said to be spoken and cannot be said to be spoken of as *accusatives* of words are.

So we have to *mark off padavācyas from apadas* and then distinguish between *padavācyas and pada-avācyas*. Philosophical concepts are *pada-avācyas*, i.e. concepts for which there are *padas* which (latter) yet do not mean or refer to anything distinct from them. In philosophy, contents are not distinct from the speaking of them. (This is why, Bhattacharyya concocts the locution 'spoken' – as distinct from 'spoken of' – with reference

to them). For that matter, philosophical concepts are not assessed or justified with reference to facts as empirical concepts are. Empirical concepts are abstractions from facts experienced. Similarly, empirical laws are short-hand registrations of facts experienced. But philosophical concepts have no factual content. They are, in Kant's idiom, 'transcendental', i.e., connected with the consciousness of them. They, so to speak, emanate from the consciousness of 'objectivity', of the subject 'I' which is nothing distinct from the consciousness of the subject (the subject understands itself, properly speaking, as "I that is 'I'").

Thus Bhattacharyya would, in respect of according legitimacy to philosophical statements, bypass both the verificationist's thesis of sentence-meaning and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontological thesis of meaning; and although he maintains that philosophical contents are believed, yet since they are *not* for him entities or accusatives of speech or of statements about them but are, on the contrary, believed only as they are spoken, he cannot be charged with ontologising philosophical statements.

Just as philosophical statements are not *about* anything, just as philosophical contents are not spoken *of*, similarly they are not believed *in*. Such *non-prepositional and non-transitive use of 'speak' and 'believe'* is a peculiarity of Bhattacharyya's discourse: such uses cannot be exemplified. Speaking a philosophical content or believing a philosophical content cannot be construed as understanding a philosophical content as accusative of speech. Why? In answering this question, 'speaking' and 'believing' may be taken together since, for Bhattacharyya, 'to speak is to formulate a belief'. Different speech-modes emerge and therewith emerge different believables. Believables are not facts that can be referred to or meant i.e. accusatives of words.

'Philosophical content' and philosophical speech are interwoven. What is a philosophical content? Is it a concept?

It is and it is not a concept. By 'concept' we may mean abstraction from content. The concept 'horse' is abstraction from the actual horses seen which give content, so to say, to the concept. A philosophical concept, however, has no content distinct from it. In philosophy, the concept is the content or the content is the concept.

We can do no better here than taking Bhattacharyya's examples of philosophical concept / content. Of course, examples, if any, would be from within the process of deepening of consciousness. They are not standard examples which *cite cases*. Here the case is but the process within consciousness. Here the case is but the thing to be revealed.

In 'I am', says Bhattacharyya, 'I' is both the content and the concept, i.e. concept of the subject. Self-consciousness is expressed or can be expressed only in the sentence "I am 'I'". So the subject I is spoken, not spoken *of*, - it is spoken in 'I', reflected in 'I'.

And just this and this is the case with all philosophical concepts / contents. When they are spoken of, they come to be understood as *what* they are *as* they are *spoken*. Then, again, 'objectivity is' is understood only as 'objectivity' is spoken as contrasted with the subject 'incarnated in' 'I', to adopt Bhattacharyya's telling expression in the *The Subject as Freedom* (of 1930, i.e., earlier than the present paper of 1936). In both these cases, the contents, i.e., the subject and the object *are what they are in being spoken the way they are spoken*.

So too with another philosophical content. 'I am not', i.e., the negation of the subject together with the *appreciation of the absolute*: it is consciously negating the 'I' or the incarnation of the subject, consciously overcoming the incarnation, being *one with the incarnation* or the language-form for the self and again being one with the dropping of the incarnation for the self, i.e., 'I'.

In these contexts, what is spoken is what is believed, or what comes to be believed. The subject is spoken as 'I' and the 'I' reflects the subject believed. Speaking of the subject is the subject speaking itself (not *of* itself), incarnating itself (in 'I'). Speaking *of* the subject is *being* the subject and being the subject is believing the subject, no believing *in* the subject as though it were an entity distinct from the speaking or the believing. 'In philosophy the content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken'. The content is here not distinct from the speaking of it, not distinct from the consciousness or the believing of it.

So it may be said that philosophical language is anchored in self-consciousness' being or – what comes to the same thing – that *philosophy is self-conscious anchoring in language*. In philosophy, language is being. The Subject anchoring itself in ‘/’ is being /, i.e., realizing itself as the subject.

A question arises here. Following Bhattacharyya, we have come to view philosophical contents as not distinguishable from the speaking of them. But in virtue of what uniquely are they ‘philosophical’?

In tune with Bhattacharyya’s spirit, the answer would be that philosophical contents are not distinguishable from the speaking of them. Speaking of them is actually revealing them. We may say that speaking of philosophical contents is *executing the hermeneutical task of unfolding the contents*. In Bhattacharyya’s words, philosophical contents are ‘believed to be self-evident’. They are not independent of the speaking of them, of the speech forms that constitute them. Thus ‘objectivity’ is the form in which object is understood in philosophy as constituted and therefore the object is nothing independent of the form in which object is spoken. The speech forms thus ‘constitute’, to use Kant’s idiom, philosophical contents (of which ‘objectivity’ is one). But in science or commonsense, the content spoken of is not understood as constituted by the form in which it is spoken. ‘Form’-consciousness, in fact, does not arise in the context of science or commonsense. In science or commonsense, that is, content is just spoken of, i.e., its being spoken of is an accidental fact such that it is not understood as constituted by the fact of its being spoken of.

Bhattacharyya’s observations in this context of distinguishing between contents of commonsense thought and science on the one hand and philosophical contents on the other have to be studied a bit more accurately. He writes ‘There are accidental forms of speech but there are also certain structural forms that are unavoidable in the communication of belief The unavoidable forms of speech are constitutive of the meaning (i.e., of the content)’. These unavoidable structural forms are understood in consciousness’ reflective or inward attitude as constituting the objects of knowledge. In so far as they *constitute* the objects or contents spoken, they are not subject to verification by appeal to those objects. Does not one find the echo of Kant here? Surely, one does as far as Kant’s constitutive

programme is concerned. This programme certainly binds Bhattacharyya with Kant. However, Bhattacharyya has added a new corpus to Kant's philosophy in tune with Kant's transcendental programme of isolating the constitutive forms of knowledge. What he has added is the idea of the structural forms of language to Kant's epistemology. What gives Bhattacharyya the warrant to *incorporate the idea of linguistic structures into Kant's epistemology or theory of knowledge?* How does the idea of the linguistic structures fit in with Kant's theory of knowledge? How can forms of knowledge be viewed as forms of language or speech forms?

Here Bhattacharyya would derive support for the supplementation and the incorporation he has made into the Kantian structure, *from the basic inwardness or reflectivity of the structure itself.* In the Kantian structure, 'forms' of knowledge are sought to be 'deduced' from self-consciousness in its apperceptivity. Bhattacharyya would point out that the *notion of apperceptivity or subjectivity has to be formulated or expressed in language*, otherwise it does not do what is demanded of it in the Kantian programme, i.e., make explicit the subjectivity of the structure. The subjective is nothing, he would point out, if not expressed in 'I'; otherwise, the subjective is dumb to itself and cannot distinguish itself from what is objective. The subject is nothing if not felt and it is felt only as 'incarnated' in the word 'I': it is felt as "the 'I' that is I". Self becomes *conscious of itself as Self* in 'I' and then it can consciously retrospect upon (and thereby own) the different stages (of the Kantian programme) of elaborating subjectivity in the forming or constituting of objects. The retrospective look is possible only when subjectivity can understand the forming structures as informed by it as self, as 'I'. It can thus be claimed, on behalf of Bhattacharyya, that the Kantian transcendental problem -- of making explicit the forms of consciousness as the constitutive forms of object of knowledge -- is at bottom the problem of making manifest the basic linguistic structures through which the cognitive structures are defined. *Thus Kant's transcendental problem is at bottom a linguistic problem.* As it is, subjectivity is only presupposed in the Kantian structure. Of the subject, we have no knowledge, according to Kant, because it is not intuited. Bhattacharyya provides the much-needed ground to the Kantian structure when he maintains, in his **THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM**, that subject is what knows itself in the word 'I'. Subject-

consciousness, for Bhattacharyya, is nothing without the subject being felt as 'I'. Subject consciousness thus is consciousness of the 'I' - symbol: it is symbolising consciousness. Here is Bhattacharyya's genius, viz, in introducing the notion of 'symbolising consciousness' into the Kantian structure. And this symbolizing consciousness, in Bhattacharyya's rendering of Kant, inform the Kantian structure. Bhattacharyya thus makes major supplementation to the Kantian understanding of forms through the two-fold idea of symbolizing knowledge of subjectivity i.e., of 'I' as *informing* the 'forms'.

One word more in this context of discussion on the 'unavoidable forms of speech' which philosophy is concerned with according to Bhattacharyya. These 'unavoidable forms of speech' are not the a priori or categorical necessities of the Kantian kind. With reference to the Kantian necessities, the question has been justifiably raised if they are unique and comprehensive. But this question cannot be raised about the 'unavoidable forms of speech' that Bhattacharyya has in mind just because they are necessarily implicated in any talk about the world. Thus in Bhattacharyya's view the world is 'object' which but resolves itself into 'objectivity' which, again, is speakable in so far as it is certified by consciousness verbalized in 'I'. Indeed, it is this last which is basic to the transcendental philosophy of Bhattacharyya as distinct from that of Kant: Kant's a priorities are not certified in the consciousness of the subject felt as 'I'. The unavoidable forms of speech are not, properly speaking, deduced from the act of consciousness but are felt as *one with the process* of the achieving of the consciousness of them.

Standing on the grade of the consciousness of the subject as incarnated in 'I', Bhattacharyya executes a two-fold task. First, he reviews the antecedent grades of 'theoretic' consciousness; second, he makes further advance towards the consciousness of, what he calls, the Absolute.

In order to follow Bhattacharyya in his execution of the tasks, we have to ask ourselves first "why does Bhattacharyya call the different grades of consciousness 'theoretic'?"

Now, we have already seen how theory construction plays a major role in the forming of a science. Theory formation has different facets. But

what has the notion of ‘theoretic’ consciousness to do with theory formation (with its different aspects) in the sciences ? The question may be pressed further. It may be asked how ‘theoretic’ of Bhattacharyya’s conception impacts on theory forming in the sciences. Or, after philosophy (whatever its grade) takes the reflective-retrospective look upon science, does it retain the content(s) of theory formation in the sciences? Is theory formation in the scientific contexts incorporated in philosophy that is, professedly for Bhattacharyya, ‘like’ science ?

The answer to these questions would be that philosophy impacts on science in a contrasting way. It is on the grade of philosophic consciousness that it can be understood, retrospectively, that in science the content that is spoken is distinct from the speaking of it. In Bhattacharyya’s dialectic of consciousness, the passage from science to philosophy is assessed retrospectively on the grade of philosophic consciousness.

But why call science and philosophy as expressions of ‘theoretic’ consciousness? Bhattacharyya answers that ‘theoretic consciousness is the understanding of a speakable’. He writes further ‘Speakability is the contingent character of the content of empirical thought but it is a necessary character of the content of pure philosophic thought’. In philosophy, the speakable is not distinct from the speaking of it; it is ‘not intelligible except as spoken’. It is in reflection that the philosopher comes to understand science and philosophy as two distinct expressions of theoretic consciousness. The philosopher reflectively and retrospectively comes to understand how what is spoken in science and what is spoken in philosophy stand to the speaking of it. Also, it comes to be revealed to him how speakables emerge on the different grades of theoretic consciousness. The speakable contents may be taken to be different theoretic constructs needed for understanding different contents, but then the constructs are not just abstract concepts but *emanate* on the grades of consciousness. They do not just conceptualise facts or contents but emerge with grades of consciousness. That explains why they are called by Bhattacharyya contents of ‘theoretic consciousness’. The objects or contents of theoretic consciousness, then, are emanations of grades of consciousness or part of the consciousness of them, not abstractions as theoretic constructs are or are taken to be. In respect of them, theory forming and consciousness - achieving are two facets of the

same process. With the deepening of consciousness, different contents come to be revealed to it and different modes of speech in relation to the contents emerge. In a nutshell, philosophic contents, philosophic concepts and philosophic speech are interweaved.

A similarity of Bhattacharyya's with Kant may bring home to one the concept of 'theoretic' consciousness. The 'categories' of Kant's first critique are not empirical concepts nor are they abstract concepts of formal logic. They are indeed structural concepts of the knowledge of objects, but again according to Kant himself, they are, because they are cognitive concepts, structures which are 'deduced' from self-consciousness. Of course, Kant himself, because he had a lurking doubt about their objective validity, went on to deduce them objectively, i.e., by appealing to the objective unity of representations of sense through them. And where Kant appeals to 'deduction', Bhattacharyya appeals to 'emanation'. Since they are 'emanations' of self-consciousness (for Bhattacharyya), they are certified in self-consciousness and there remains no room for deducing them objectively. This difference between two philosophers is indeed very important from the point of view of transcendental philosophy: it appears that Bhattacharyya has firmly fixed himself in self-consciousness which for Kant itself needed to be 'justified'. Despite this (important) difference, however, the similarity between the two philosophers' ways of looking at the structures of knowledge in the light of self-consciousness remains a fact.

It has already been noted that philosophy, as expression of the theoretic consciousness, impacts on science in a contrasting way. In science, the content is distinct from the speaking of it, whereas in philosophy it is not distinguishable from the speaking of it. But is there no relation between them content-wise, i.e., from the point of view of the content of theory formation in both? The answer has to be in the negative, because theory formation in the two contexts is according to the content(s). There are differences indeed between theory-formation in the different sciences according to the subject matters or contents of the different sciences. But over-riding this distinction between theory forming in the sciences, there is a fundamental distinction between theory – construction in science and that in philosophy. And this difference relates not so much to the content, but to the *ways* the content are viewed respectively in science and in philosophy. To repeat what has been

noted earlier in this connection, in science the content is distinct from the knowledge of it whereas in philosophy content is not distinguishable from the knowledge or consciousness of it. Theory then has distinct roles in science and in philosophy in relation to their respective contents. Therefore, theory as conceived in philosophy cannot be incorporated into science.

Nevertheless, from the point of view of the emerging of 'speakables' (to use Bhattacharyya's diction) in philosophic consciousness, it can be said that since the speakables emerge in self-consciousness, i.e., in the inwardisation of consciousness and since only in self-consciousness knowledge-object distinction can be made, therefore for science (that adopts the objective attitude) the world may remain unknown in the sense that it does not have the wherewithal to distinguish 'object' *from* 'knowledge' .

Is there one theoretic consciousness running through science and philosophy? For Bhattacharyya, both science and philosophy are expressions of 'the' theoretic consciousness. Does not the definite article 'the' identify one theoretic consciousness that may be said to be stratified in science and philosophy? From the point of view of Bhattacharyya, it may be said that the philosopher can reflectively and retrospectively understand how theoretic consciousness functions in science and philosophy. He brings theoretic consciousness' play in science into his retrospection and finds that both science and philosophy are in the same continuum. To an extent, Bhattacharyya would move in the company of Hegel who held that thought is confronted by sense matter and seeks to overcome the alienation of sense by the graduality of more and more comprehensive thought until Absolute thought is reached in which there is no dualism of thought and sense-matter. Bhattacharyya, it appears, faces the same problem in the sphere of empirical thought or science (science and empirical thought seem to be identified by him.) Hegel thought that Absolute thought completely overcomes the alienation of sense. Such alienation of sense concerns both the philosophers. This is just the transcendental problem of Kant and of Śaṅkara. For both, the world is *given*. Bradley, who was called more a rebel against Hegel than his follower, maintained that thought is 'cut loose' from the immediacy of experience in which subject and object coalesce. And Bosanquet, more in tune with the spirit of Hegel than Bradley, maintained that 'ultimate judgment is the whole of Reality predicated of itself'. Kant would not agree to such

attempt at synthesis of thought and reality. To the end of the chapter, dualism of understanding and sensibility remains for Kant. Bhattacharyya here would rather court the company of Kant than that of Hegel. For him, in theoretic consciousness on the grade of empirical thought the content is distinct from the speaking or the consciousness of it. Theoretic consciousness in which ‘successively’ ‘object’ is understood as ‘objectivity’ constituted by the subject and the subject is understood as transcending its objective determination in ‘I’ and again the Absolute is understood as more than the individual subject incarnated in ‘I’ overcomes the content-consciousness distinction. Now, the transcendental problem which confronts Hegel is speculatively solved by him. To Kant, speculative thought is not certified in self-consciousness. Can Kant be credited by Bhattacharyya with solving the transcendental problem in terms of self-consciousness or the subject as overcoming thought? The answer must be in the negative; for the subject is not known for Kant, it being not ‘intuited’. Since the subject is not known for Kant, it cannot, so to speak, *phenomenologize the unity with the object* which remains as the unfulfilled demand for it. Here Bhattacharyya supplements Hegel with Kant and then supplements Kant with his own insight into being (or reality) in the consciousness of the subject as ‘I am’, as the subject objectified in ‘I’ and then, again, overcoming the objectification in the consciousness of the Absolute.

We now make a digression here. Are science and empirical thought same for Bhattacharyya? Bhattacharyya’s observations in this connection may be recorded.

‘Empirical thought is the theoretic consciousness of a content involving reference to a content that is perceived or imagined to be perceived ...’

‘Science deals with the content of empirical thought’.

We have two replies to make from Bhattacharyya’s point of view. First, ‘empirical thought’ of Bhattacharyya’s conception is not ‘empiricist thought’, if by ‘empiricist’ thought is understood collocation of facts. If this latter is allowed to pass for empirical thought, then crude empiricism comes to be given the status of a scientific theory. Crude empiricism has never appeared in human thought. Hume, the empiricist *par excellence*, brought out

the role of the ‘laws of association’ in building up his empiricist *theory*. For Bhattacharyya, empirical thought is thought as referring to a content. Secondly, Einstein, while recognizing that the theoretical scientist is guided by formal or mathematical considerations in his search for a theory, insists that ‘the observed fact is undoubtedly the supreme arbiter’.

It is enough for Bhattacharyya to recognize that science deals with facts concerning the world. As a philosopher, he is troubled by what Kant called the transcendental problematic of reason which is this that the world is given. The problematic is not any problem. A problem needs to be solved. But the problematic demands to be *dissolved*. And it can only be dissolved by the ‘culture’, as Bhattacharyya calls it, of the inward attitude of consciousness in which the given appears as *not* self-justifying or self-evident.

Now to go back to the grade of theoretic consciousness in which ‘objectivity’ comes to be revealed. The question arises ‘how does objectivity stand to object which is the concern of science?’. The object is understood in science in the objective attitude as distinct from the subjective or inward or, as Bhattacharyya would like to call it, the ‘enjoying attitude’ of consciousness in which the object of consciousness is felt as ‘not distinct from the consciousness of it’.

What has philosophy to say about science ? That is, about the scientific attitude to object? Philosophy understands object as constituted. But understanding the object as constituted, philosophy may yet retain the objective attitude. This is the metaphysical attitude in which object is understood as constituted and yet the constitutive forms of object may be understood or ‘distinguished’ – as the late Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya used to observe – *in* the object. Or, as Bhattacharyya himself observes in his book on **THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM**, they are ‘abstracted’ *in* the object. The main thing is that the objective attitude is retained here. Then the question arises, ‘if both science and philosophy of the object or metaphysics are objective in attitude, how then are they distinct?’. They are distinct because in science object is *not* whereas in philosophy of object *it is* understood under the forms, though, on a different grade of consciousness, i.e., the subjective grade of it, the constitutive forms of the object are

themselves demanded to be known. That explains Bhattacharyya's observations, viz, that philosophy of the object deals with object as what is believed to be known in the objective attitude as distinct from 'the subjective, enjoying or spiritual attitude'. 'The objective attitude is understood only in contrast with the subjective attitude' and 'metaphysics elaborates the concept of the object in reference to the subject'. Bhattacharyya's point is that as such in the objective attitude there is no question of any reference to the subject and yet, the objective attitude is understood 'only' in contrast with the subjective attitude in philosophy. Thus the metaphysician, adopting the objective attitude, goes on in his own way without reference to the subject. He can even write a metaphysic of the mind about, say, mental acts, dispositions, computers and mind, intellect, imagination etc. And yet there is point in Bhattacharyya's observation 'The rationale of any distinction of metaphysical contents is to be found in an introspectively appreciable distinction within spiritual experience'. The meant object or *padārtha*, e.g., is a concept of Vaiśeṣika ontology and yet the philosopher of the subject may understand the 'meant' in the light of 'meaning' function – as Bhattacharyya himself does in his SAF -- as what is spoken *of*, spoken as distinct from the subjective speaking function (symbolised by 'I'). In other words, when in the subjective or spiritual attitude the constitutive forms are demanded to be abstracted, only then do they become explicit. The metaphysician, however, is not as such a subjectivist philosopher, and yet he retains his distinction from the scientist in this that he spots something in the object which is available only to reflection.

Is not however, reflection on science but what is called philosophy of science? If so, there remains no scope for the metaphysician to lay claim to find a distinct study.

For Bhattacharyya, however, the philosopher of science enquires into the postulates and axioms of science having the scientific notion of object in mind and, therefore, his work cannot be taken over by a metaphysician who has a different and distinct notion of object. 'The postulates of science neither lead to nor are deducible from any metaphysical conception of the object'.

Can a synthesis of the results of different sciences pass as philosophy? That is, can philosophy be conceived to be but a synthesis of sciences? All that can be achieved by such synthesis is a ‘loose descriptive concept’, not a law. But a loose descriptive concept is neither a scientific law nor does it have the a priori certitude of a theory of logic or metaphysics. It is at best ‘an imaginative description of the world’ – which would be ‘not only not actual knowledge but not also a hypothesis that may be intended to be turned into knowledge’.

But can it not be said that philosophy is methodology of science? Methodology of science depends upon the scientific notion of object from which the philosophical notion of object is distinct. Philosophy is neither science nor methodology of science. Philosophical methodology, such as we have in Descartes or in Kant, elaborates the deepening of consciousness *pari passu* with reflection on knowledge of objects. Methodology of science is after all world -- oriented and is not concerned as philosophy either for Bhattacharyya or for Kant is with the constitution of the world in consciousness.

Thus philosophy is not only not science, but also not philosophy of science or methodology of science.

CHAPTER – 6

Knowledge And Truth¹

Bhattacharyya here seeks to locate the distinct grade of consciousness in which knowledge is known to be *evident*. It is the transcendental grade of consciousness as distinct from the level in which consciousness is outward, i.e., objective. In this grade of consciousness, consciousness or knowledge reaches a certitude which cannot be obtained on the level of objective knowledge.

Bhattacharyya orients his point of view to Kant's reflections on the transcendental method. Kant maintained that through transcendental analysis the presuppositions of knowledge come to be known. The search for the presuppositions of knowledge may be taken to be a second-order enquiry. But transcendental analysis was not intended to be an enquiry of such kind. For what Kant wanted to do through his transcendental enquiry was to lay bare the constitutive presuppositions of knowledge of objects and such presuppositions, according to Kant, have to be known as constituting the objects of knowledge. Such knowledge is possible only on the *level of self-consciousness*, the level on which consciousness becomes conscious of itself as constituting objects of knowledge. Transcendental knowledge, therefore, is knowledge turning its attention inward and understanding itself as 'function' of constituting object and as therefore unobjective.

But in spite of his intentions the programme of transcendental analysis could not reach its fruition in Kant because of his agnosticism of self.

Bhattacharyya here supplements Kant's programme with the concept of Truth. Truth is self-evident knowledge distinct from object of knowledge. But for this concept of truth, the transcendental programme cannot be executed. For truth rescues knowledge from any kind of uncertainty that affects knowledge in its objective attitude.

And the concept of truth brings a new dimension to epistemology. Epistemology cannot merely rest content with knowing the presuppositions of knowledge. Kant envisaged that epistemology would be a 'critical' study distinct from all kinds of enquiries in the objectward attitude of

consciousness. A complete parting of the ways from objective enquiries is possible only if epistemology stands on the concept of truth. Otherwise, epistemology would just be a study of the cognitive presuppositions in the role of a watchman which it would take over from other objective enquiries. Presuppositions would, in such attitude, be known just by the same method by which 'object' of knowledge comes to be known, with the result that such knowledge of presuppositions would ever be haunted by doubt or uncertainty. For 'critically' marking off the knowledge of presuppositions from objective knowledge, epistemology must depend on a concept which defines its distinctive point of view; and this is for Bhattacharyya the concept of truth. As self-evident truth defines the point of view of epistemology, it may be regarded as a *meta-epistemological concept*. If epistemology is a 'critical' study (as Kant envisaged it to be), truth as defining its point of view is a meta-critical concept.

In so far as truth provides for the self-conscious attitude of knowledge on which epistemology intends to base itself and helps it mark itself off from all objective enquiries, epistemology can critically distinguish between cognitive enquiries and enquiries based on willing or feeling. A voluntarist epistemology, e.g., would be put out of court as willing is not known.

There is an argumentative side to Bhattacharyya's present paper.

The argument aims to establish the connection between knowledge and Truth. It may be stated as follows :

(1) Knowledge is known not as an entity distinct from knowledge. It is known by itself.

(2) It is known by itself as self or the subject over against any object of knowledge.

(3) Thus knowledge of knowledge is knowledge of the subject.

(4) The Subject is what is conscious of itself as 'I am'.

(5) Consciousness of 'I am' – *asmitā* in Indian diction – is consciousness of I or the subject as real.

(6) Hence knowledge as consciousness of the subject need not be certified as true by anything extraneous to it, anything a-noetic, e.g., coherence, pragmatic test, consilience.

(7) The demand for co-herence etc. is demand for *demonstrating* the truth of knowledge.

(8) But the demand for demonstrating of knowledge is a social demand, not noetic.

(9) Therefore, truth cannot be settled a-noetically.

(10) Knowledge is knowledge of knowledge which is knowledge of truth.

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CHAPTER – 7

The False and Error

While for Bhattacharyya truth is knowledge as self-evident, the false is what is ‘given’ and stands in ‘absolute mockery of all thinking’ as Bhattacharyya understands it in his ‘Śankara’s Doctrine of Māya’. In the same article, Bhattacharyya contrasts truth as ‘self-shining’ with what is false, i.e., cannot be the subject-matter of any judgement, including negative judgement. In ‘The False and the Subjective’, Bhattacharyya maintains that the false is what is disbelieved, a contention that is same with the contention in ‘Correction of Error as a Logical Process’ that when error is corrected, the content of error is disbelieved and that what is disbelieved cannot even be negated. In ‘The False and the Subjective’, a special point is made, viz., that the ‘false’ content is disbelieved, that is, it is the content of a belief that is past, i.e., rejected and therefore it is not the content of a ‘belief’ in the epistemological sense. The false, then, is no content of any judgement, is not the content of any belief and *not therefore the content of cognitive belief*. It just stands to be impugned. Hence it is that Bhattacharyya names it ‘the false’.

Bhattacharyya’s reflections on error and the ‘false’ are contained in three articles, (i) ‘Śankara’s Doctrine of Māyā’, (ii) ‘The False and the Subjective’ and (iii) ‘Correction of Error as a Logical Process’.

Śankara’s Doctrine of Māyā¹

Bhattacharyya distinguishes between different stages in the apprehension of the illusory content. As he says, ‘The snake is first presented, it is next corrected and then it is contemplated as corrected’.² In the first stage, the illusory object is understood as implicitly real; its reality is only not denied and therefore there is no question of asserting its reality. In the next stage, there is the correction of the presentation. The correction is effected through the perception of what is judged to be real. However, what is important is that in this second stage the content corrected still appears as objective ‘no-fact’,³ and not as a null content or an unreal content like the hare’s horn or the son of a barren mother. The contrast with *asatkhyātivāda* is obvious. The correcting or retrospective consciousness cannot be

articulated in a negative judgement. The third stage in the apprehension of the illusory content is most important. Aurobindo Bose has quite rightly observed that in this stage the illusory snake assumes ‘paramount importance’.⁴ In this stage, the illusion is not only corrected but also ‘contemplated’ as corrected. In the second stage, the illusory content, even after being detected as illusory, yet appears as a presentation. To the correcting consciousness, the illusory content is not a nullity. The consideration which weighs with the *asatkhyātivādin* in calling it a nullity may be articulated in the form of the following inferences :

- (1) The illusory content is not real;
what is not real is unreal;
 \therefore The illusory content is unreal.

- (2) The unreal is nothing;
The illusory content is unreal;
 \therefore The illusory content is nothing.

To Bhattacharya, this kind of consideration does not do justice to what *appears* to the correcting retrospective consciousness. What distinguishes the third stage from the second stage is the fact that the third stage is more reflective than the previous one. In the second stage, the attitude is still outward. In the third stage, consciousness asks itself “what does the appellation ‘correction’ signify?”.

Correction involves the following :

1. First, it implies the absolute denial of the existence of the illusory content. What to speak of its being not real when it appeared as a presentation (in the second stage) or when it was positively contemplated as corrected, it was not real even when it appeared. Existence is denied of it for the three periods of time (*trāikalikanisēdha*). A modern, i.e. the Strawsonian version of it will be: existential presupposition is not fulfilled when the snake - appearance of the snake-rope illusion is

corrected through the perception of rope; retrospectively speaking, the snake did not exist.

2. Secondly, correction implies that no *judgement* can be passed about the illusory content. This second implication follows from the first one. Since existence is denied of the illusory content for the three periods of time, no judgement can be formulated about it. The judgement, ‘It does not exist’ is inadmissible here. The snake, e.g., is not even suggested in any other context. It cannot be said to be an ‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ content as Alexander or the *Anyathākhyātivādin* would hold. For *that individual* snake not only does not exist now but also did not exist when it appeared.
3. Thirdly, the correcting consciousness brings it out that since no judgement can be formulated about the illusory content, far less can a negative judgement be passed about it. Here is, as will appear in the sequel, another point of basic distinction between Bhattacharyya and the *Asatkhyātivādin*.
4. Can the illusory content be regarded as a ‘possible’ content, a ‘subsistent’ in the Neo-Realistic diction, a denizen of the Meinongian world ? No, and this for the following reason : a Meinongian entity is not an individual entity that is felt to be perceived, whereas the illusory content has an individuality which is bound up with the (wrong) perception of it.
5. What is the nature of the apprehension of the illusory content? Is it not perception? Do we not say ‘The snake *was* perceived’? Was there no real subjective fact of perception of which the snake was a wrong outward projection?

What does memory testify? Does it testify to perception? No; perception is known as a fact when its object is remembered. To the correcting consciousness, the illusory object is cancelled. Hence correcting consciousness cannot establish perception as a fact. It testifies only that the snake was *felt* to be perceived. A past perception can be vouchsafed by memory no doubt but that can be

only through remembering the object. But to the correcting consciousness, the objectivity of the illusory content is cancelled, and so correcting consciousness cannot testify to any real subjective fact of perception of the snake.

6. The illusory content then is neither an objective presentation nor a subjective fact. It is no possible object.
7. Since it is no possible object, therefore even the ‘presupposition of existence’, in Strawson’s diction, that must be fulfilled for a judgement to be made about anything existing cannot be made about the illusory content. Therefore, no judgement, not even a negative judgement, can be made about it. According to Bhattacharyya, it is ‘incapable of being presented as the subject of a judgement of which existence can be denied.’⁵ Its existence is denied absolutely - it is not even suggested.
8. Granted that existence is denied of it absolutely. But, then, can non-existence be predicated of it? To Bhattacharyya, the snake is referred to *now*. i.e. in the state of correction, by a ‘self contradictory judgment’ viz., ‘That snake is unreal’.

And here, in the conception of the self-contradictory judgement, lies the fundamental difference between the *asatkhyātivādin* and Bhattacharyya. For to the *asatkhyātivādin*, ‘That snake is unreal’ is a negative judgement, whereas to Bhattacharyya, the (supposed) judgement refers to a content which cannot be the subject of any judgement whatsoever and yet appears to be given. It is given in ‘absolute mockery of all thinking’ in Bhattacharyya’s language. The concept of ‘self - contradictory judgement’ emerges, striking a new dimension to Bhattacharyya’s thinking. The problem of thinking itself is given or forced upon us. The illusory is ‘unthinkably given’ and the presentation of appearance of the given unthinkable suggests the conception of reality as ungiven, as unobjective, as self - shining truth. Thus Bhattacharyya writes : ‘Śaṅkara’s doctrine of māyā is the logical pendant to the doctrine of Brahman as self - shining truth.’⁶ So, it can be observed that Bhattacharyya’s analysis of the illusory content or illusory experience points to a wider conception viz. the conception of reality as subjective.

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1. *STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol I.* pp. 95-106.
2. *ibid., p. 96.*
3. *ibid., p. 97.*
4. *K.C. BHATTACHARYYA MEMORIAL VOLUME* (Amalner. Indian Institute of Philosophy. 1958) .p.5.
5. *STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol I. P. 98.*
6. *ibid., p. 95.*

The False and the Subjective

According to Bhattacharyya, awareness of what is false is awareness of the subjective. The false is nothing if it is not understood in *retrospective correcting* awareness as what *was* believed. The present correcting consciousness rejects what was believed to be real. The correcting consciousness corrects a previous belief. It rejects the previous belief. The correcting consciousness is, then, the present belief which has the previous belief as its content. The present belief refers to (i) the previous belief rejected by it, and (ii) the content of (i).

So to say that something is false is to imply that it was the content of a belief rejected by the present (retrospective) belief. Thus ‘x is false’ implies present belief rejecting the past belief in it (i.e. x).

What is the ‘present belief’ in a situation in which the false is detected ? It is retrospective subjective consciousness (of a previous belief). Without reference to the retrospective subjective consciousness, the false cannot be understood (as false). Hence Bhattacharyya writes that ‘consciousness of the false is consciousness of the subjective’.

Bhattacharyya goes farther to analyse in depth ‘retrospective consciousness’. For him, it is ‘disbelief’. ‘Disbelief’, writes he in the article under consideration, ‘is a positive mode of consciousness and is not merely privation of belief’. Disbelief declares the false content as what *was* not believed, *is not* believed and *will not* be believed. The content of a disbelief is not a ‘this’ i.e., ‘this snake’ but ‘this that appeared as snake’. ‘This that appeared as snake’ cannot be the subject of any judgement, not even of a negative judgement. Therefore, it is no object of knowledge. *Object of disbelief is no object of knowledge*. To put the same thing in another way : Object of ‘correction’ is not the object of ‘knowledge’. ‘*Correcting*’ consciousness and ‘cognitive’ consciousness are distinct.

Can the ‘false’ content be regarded as ‘Subsistent’? Bhattacharyya answers that (i) the ‘Subsistent’ is (as understood in Neo-Realism advocated

by the American Realists in the last century) neither subjective nor objective and (ii) the false, on the contrary, is object of ‘disbelief’ or retrospective belief and hence is subjective.

It cannot be said, following the *Naiyāyika*, that the false object is presented through *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*, that is, contact (*sannikarṣa*) with previous cognition of it, because, the false content, the individual snake was (during belief in it) not. As Bhattacharyya has observed; the subject of the (apparent) judgement ‘It was snake’ did not exist even when it was believed to be existent. It is a disbelieved content that cannot be object of any judgment, negative judgements included.

Can it be said to be a ‘null’ content as an *Asatkhyātivādin* would take it to be ? For Bhattacharyya, as for Vācaspatimīśra in his *Bhāmati*, the illusory content is an appearance that is cancelled (*avamatabhāsa*). A null content, a nothing cannot appear. Then Bhattacharyya would go forward to fit the illusory object to a mode of awareness. This latter is ‘Disbelief’. *To this* is the false attached, at its bar is it impugned. The null content of the *Asatkhyātivādin* has no *mode of awareness to fasten on to*. Bhattacharyya here has the concept of ‘Disbelief’ for the false content to fasten on to.

Thus the most important point about Bhattacharyya’s analysis of the false content is the prominence he accords to ‘disbelief’. It is ‘disbelief’ which gives one the warrant to speak of the false content. *Disbelief is retrospective belief in a belief that is rejected. It does not refer to any belief pure and simple. ‘Belief’ is epistemological : it may and indeed is intended to attain the rank of ‘knowledge’. It has object. But disbelief is a mode of awareness which is subjective, i.e., dissociated from content. Since it has no object, it is not cognitive belief:* Bhattacharyya writes that cognitive consciousness ‘may be characterized as the consciousness of something which is speakable without reference to the consciousness’ but ‘the disbelief ... the content of which is the content of the belief which is speakable only with reference to the disbelief, is a form of non-cognitive awareness’.

Thus at one stroke, Bhattacharyya

(i) pinpoints ‘disbelief’ as a mode of awareness,

- (ii) thereby, parts company with the *Asatkhyātivādin*'s view that the illusory object has no awareness or *pratiti* on which to anchor itself (*nirālambapratiti*) ,
- (iii) understands 'disbelief' as a mode of awareness that is non-cognitive in that it is retrospective and that again in that it is subjective,
- (iv) thereby, understands disbelief as having no object, and therefore as having no object for negation, - no object for judgmental awareness at all.

'Disbelief', then, is pivotal to Bhattacharyya's analysis of 'illusion' or perceptual error.

Before closing, a note of caution has to be given lest Bhattacharyya is not misunderstood. When he maintains that 'X' is false implies present belief rejecting the past belief in X, 'implies' is not to be taken in the sense in which it is understood in logic. Bhattacharyya is not concerned with understanding relation between 'X is false' and 'This is X' as propositions. He is concerned with the *conscious* passage from a rejected *belief* to a present *belief*.

‘Correction of Error as a Logical Process’¹

The main contentions of Bhattachayya’s are as follows :-

1. The false cannot be understood as either subjective or objective.
2. Error is not mere non-distinguishing. Not that when we get out of error we are conscious of having known a unity. But then we do not feel either that we *were* aware of an indefinite content, i.e., aware of ‘this’ and ‘snake’ as unrelated. *Retrospectively speaking*, we were not aware of an unrelated content. This view of Bhattacharyya’s contrasts with the Prābhākara view that error is a confusion in that it confuses two contents, one a ‘percept’ and another an ‘image’, which were unrelated.
3. Correction is disbelief in a previous belief. Therefore, correction is no belief in a negation. After having got out of the illusion of snake in the rope, we cannot say ‘that snake is not real’. For, first, negation is of a content that is suggested in some context of space or time or both. But, the correcting consciousness does not retrospectively testify that the illusory content was suggested in some context. Correction implies absolute disbelief in the content. Secondly, negation is a judgement and a judgement must have a subject-matter. But the correcting consciousness does not testify that there *had been something* which the correcting consciousness *now* negates. Thirdly, negation is of a believed content but correcting consciousness is disbelief in the content (of illusion).
4. It cannot be said that the content of a previous belief is included in the wider content, i.e., ‘this snake’ is ideally included in ‘this rope’. The content of valid knowledge cannot be demonstrated as wider.
5. The false, i.e., the content of illusion cannot be asserted to be objective, because to the correcting consciousness it is ‘what was *believed* as such and such’. Neither can it be said that the illusory content is subjective, because it is not imagined but believed as *fact*.

Since it was *believed*, the illusory content cannot be said to be *objective* and since it was believed as *fact*, it cannot be said to be *subjective*.

6. *Before* the illusion is detected, the (illusory) content was a fact, but no truth-claim was made about it; *after* it is detected, it is only ‘what – was – believed’. So to the present correcting consciousness reflecting and retrospecting upon it, it is only a meaning. It is thus not understandable either in subjective or in objective terms.

This essay was written in 1931. Some parts of it echo ‘Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Māyā’, written in 1925. Bhattacharyya is there concerned with the metaphysical concern of understanding the world to be illusory in the light of, what he has called in the essay, the ‘epistemology of illusion’.² Here, i.e., in the present essay however, his concern seems to be more phenomenological; he appears to be concerned with how the illusory content reports itself to retrospective-reflective consciousness and not with making any metaphysical suggestion of the world being illusory in the light of empirical illusion.

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2. STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol. I. P. 96.

CHAPTER – 8

‘Mind, Matter’ And Metaphysics

This article is not included in the two volumes of Bhattacharyya’s *STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY* edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya. It was published for the first time by the present writer with Preamble, Analysis and Upshot under the title ‘Towards a Metaphysics of Self’ in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, (1981) Dordrecht, Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Co.

Though primarily it is about the distinction between mind and matter, yet this article raises some very general issues on metaphysics that would interest any student of contemporary philosophy. Of central importance here are the following issues:

1. There are some considerations, which have their spring in certain modes of experience, which appear to *unsettle* commonsense.
2. There are occasions when one can ‘peep over the barrier of commonsense’.¹ In such contexts, there is, what may be called, an *intimation* of metaphysics and appreciation of the ‘bounds of sense’ *a-la* Peter Strawson. We use Strawson’s idiom but not his thought.
3. As we shall see, the boundary of sense is not carved out by Bhattacharyya in Strawson’s manner. Strawson, in conformity with - what he calls - ‘Kant’s principle of significance’,² carves out the boundary on its outer side. He is concerned with investigating the ‘limiting framework of all our thought about the world and experience of the world’³ within which our talk about the items of the world make sense and outside which such talk would be nonsense. Bhattacharyya, however, is concerned with those experiences where we can ‘peep over’⁴ the barrier of commonsense. He points to certain considerations in our experiences which appear to unsettle commonsense. Strawson has a defined theoretical task of *constructing* the limiting *framework* of our experience. Bhattacharyya’s task is in

reckoning with certain considerations in *experience* which imply ‘peeping over’ the limits of sense.

4. The above contrast points to a thought in Bhattacharyya about metaphysics according to which it is a *demand* that the considerations just referred to be attended to and the suggestion of crossing the bounds of sense be *actualised*.
5. But though metaphysics has its spring in certain *experiences*, it is ‘necessarily incapable of receiving adequate sense-content’.⁵ For those experiences remain, till commonsense is recast and reordered in the light of them, as *mere intimations* of the different sort of ways in which commonsense may be reviewed, its hidden implications unearthed and its ingrained inhibitions, standing in the way of reaching the distinctively metaphysical viewpoint, laid bare. A metaphysical theory cannot be supported by sense-experience.

Thus for Bhattacharyya, metaphysics is not to be rejected because experience does not give content to it; on the contrary, for him, experience has to be recast and re-ordered in the light of the *intimations of metaphysics in experience itself*. It is interesting to find in the present article, written in 1903, a statement that *ante-dates* the verification theory. Thus:

If the thought of the real magnitude of the moon turns into knowledge, without the real magnitude been directly seen or intuited, it is because similar thought or thoughts deduced from it have often received sense-verification⁶.

The context in which the statement occurs concerns the contrast between thoughts receiving sense-verification and metaphysical thoughts that do not receive such verification.

6. Metaphysics has its springs in considerations that present themselves in our ordinary experience ‘which at any rate *puzzle* commonsense’⁷. Such questioning of commonsense is something that does not occur to Strawson. He would say that in such questioning one may find only ‘revisionary metaphysics’⁸.

7. When considerations in our ordinary experience ‘puzzle’ commonsense, one may indeed try to resolve the puzzle by enriching one’s knowledge and perception and by removing the ignorance that one is confronted with relating to a particular subject matter or field of enquiry. Ordinarily, as we go on extending or adding to our stock of knowledge, no question arises in our mind as to the completion of our knowledge, as to the maximum limit after which there may not be anything for us to know. But metaphysics is rooted precisely in such limit-consciousness. The metaphysician feels that progressive acquisition of knowledge in innumerable ways and of innumerable kinds of things of the world (laws, measurements, facts etc.), -- for whatever such acquisition is worth, viz., enrichment of one’s culture, addition to one’s stock of knowledge, widening of one’s mental horizon -- does not satisfy one once one’s mood urges one to ask the question ‘Can such extension of knowledge put a stop to further search on man’s part?’ *Metaphysics is based on such perception of the limit that affects our knowledge as such.* Bhattacharyya calls such ‘limit’-perception as ‘consciousness of ignorance’ and he says:

This consciousness of ignorance is at least as interesting a mental fact as the consciousness of knowledge and the psychology of it is capable of being as effective an introduction to metaphysics as ordinary epistemology.⁹

In sum, then, metaphysics

- i) has its springs in some considerations in our experience;
- ii) but those considerations *puzzle* commonsense;
- iii) thereby, those considerations imply a *demand* for one’s (that is, of one who is confronted with those considerations) installation in a *mental attitude* in which the puzzle is *not merely solved but dissolved*;
- iv) *contra* Strawson, Bhattacharyya would maintain that in so far as metaphysics involves peeping over the barrier of sense, it

is *not descriptive*, i.e., does not describe the actual structure of our thought of the world. It may be called ‘revisionary’¹⁰ as it demands a mental attitude in which the puzzle presented in commonsense is dissolved. But then the puzzle is after all presented in commonsense. In fact, *it is hard to separate ‘descriptive’ metaphysics from ‘revisionary’ metaphysics: an explicit ‘revisionary’ metaphysics is implied for one who comes to be confronted with puzzles in our everyday experience.*

We now turn to Bhattacharyya’s essay on ‘Mind and Matter’ which is a brilliant piece of exercise in metaphysical reasoning.

The belief in the reality of mind and matter is shared by the metaphysician with the man of commonsense. Yet, metaphysicians ‘affect to deal with the subject as an open question’.¹¹

1. This is so because of some considerations which appear to unsettle commonsense. There may be experiences which makes it conceivable, if not believable, that material things are after all mental or *vice versa*.
2. There is a ‘basal consideration’. It is the consideration that arises out of the consciousness of an intellectual difficulty. Normally, this consciousness is not attended to. There is the presumption of the omnipotence of knowledge. Such presumption is created through the continuous progress of knowledge; but then, before the progress is in fact achieved or the barrier of ignorance crossed, there is the *consciousness of ignorance*. The psychology of such ignorance can be as effective an introduction to metaphysics as epistemology.
3. ‘Illusion’ and ‘Illusion’ of Illusion’ —
 - (i) Something illusorily believed to be material is later on believed to be mental (illusion).

- (ii) The initial belief in something as material, succeeded by the illusory belief that it is mental, is restored as belief in something material (Illusion of illusion).
- 4. Our knowledge is at every moment based on illusion : all our perception (and knowledge) is based on mind-body identification.
- 5. It may be said, however, that the time-honoured distinction between mind and body renders mind - body identification illusory.
- 6. Granted that mind-body identification is illusory and that their distinction is real. But then, a distinction has to be made between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent illusion’. Mind-body distinction is *only thought*: but the thought -- in so far as actual knowledge is concerned -- *does not get actualised into knowledge* (i.e., knowledge of their distinction). As far as actual knowledge is concerned, it is only of the body and not of the self as distinct from the body. Self is *never presented*, it is *only thought*.
- 7. Two alternatives seem to be open at this stage. Either, the self may be regarded as *not presented* and as *only thought* (and not *known*). Or, the self may be regarded as *known in being thought without being presented*. According to the former alternative, presentation is essential to knowledge while it is not so according to the latter alternative.

According to the commonsense alternative, all that we know or all that is presented is matter. Self is no presented reality. Even the states or phenomena of self cannot be said to be presented (*as states of self*), for they are in time and, being shifting, must require a permanent substantive and this (supposed) substantive cannot be *known* or *presented*. It can only be body. So if mental states are presented, they are presented as states of body, of the ‘sentient’ body (to speak of ‘mental’ states, from the viewpoint of commonsense, is to speak of ‘sentient’ body. Compare Čārvāka.) The identity of body and mind thus is given (in the form of ‘sentient’ body).

9. So much for the commonsense alternative. What about idealism regarding self? Materialism scores, *prima facie*, an advantage over idealism because it starts with the *given* identity between mind and body. To proclaim idealism when self is regarded as ‘not given’ would be, then, ‘hypocrisy’.¹² With the given identity as its datum, materialism is at least ‘brutally frank’.¹³
10. Yet, however, the question arises ‘how is this hypocrisy of idealism possible?’.¹⁴ It is possible when thought of self is regarded as transcending the given identity between mind and body (and not regarded as what is ‘not known’). In the presence of this thought, the given identity is ‘thought to be illusory’.
11. Yet, however, idealism is only *thought* and does not amount to *knowledge*; and because this is so, idealism cannot immediately be accepted as the ‘true’ philosophical theory.
12. But why does idealism appear to be mere thought ? Because we demand sense-verification of it. ‘As a metaphysical theory, i.e., as a theory about knowledge in general or being in general, it is necessarily incapable of receiving adequate sense content’.¹⁵ (1. The first part of the statement immediately secures Bhattacharyya a place among the ancient metaphysicians. 2. The second part of the statement has a strange positivistic ring in it.)
13. In metaphysics, ‘the true theory must arise from my true being. I have no right to call the self known till I am truly myself, i.e., till I am rid, in life of the illusion of the identity between mind and body’.¹⁶ (Compare Sartre on ontological proof being reversed in metaphysics. Here we do not proceed from thought to being, here we find that ‘existence’ involves ‘essence’ and not that ‘essence’ involves ‘existence’.)
14. Now, the distinction between subject and object is a *thought* and not *knowledge*. But the distinction between subject and object is *involved* in every grade of knowledge.
15. Of course, we have merely the ‘abstract idea’ of self on the different grades of knowledge. Chained to materialism, we first

assess the idea of self in terms of the given identity of body and mind. The only concession we can make to science, while still entrenched in materialism, is to think of ‘Sentient’ body. But this would not satisfy the metaphysician. He would immediately point out that ‘Sentient body’ is not a scientific concept. The Ārvākas, e.g., were not scientific. They were materialists, but philosophers. Here Bhattacharyya points out that the given identity of mind and matter demands to be broken. ‘Sentient’ in ‘sentient body’ was adjectival. (‘Was’, i.e., past tense is used by us from the point of view of the collateral reduction which retrospectively views ‘sentient body’.) It demands to be realised as substantive. So, then, the given identity of body and mind is broken up in the direction of philosophy which wants to realise the self. Science as such does not have anything to do with self. It cannot even be said that it is ignorant of self. That would be to pronounce a judgment upon science which is wholly unwarranted; because it is never intended by science to know the self. Only one discipline which proclaims itself to be science tries to know the self. That is psychology. But psychology is only half scientific. What is more important is that it is half-philosophical. It alone, as distinguished from the sciences strictly speaking, wants to know self. But, employing as it does the scientific method, all that it can secure as its datum is self as *glued to* the body, i.e., ‘sentient’ body. So in respect of psychology it can be said legitimately that it cannot *know* the self. It has to cross the barrier of ignorance. ‘Ignorance’ here is not something negative, no lack of knowledge but positive knowledge of what is not realized. So it is that Professor Bhattacharyya says that the ‘psychology of ignorance’, when probed into, leads to the grasp of self as what is *not given*, as what transcends the given, as what is *known as unknown* (and *not as not known*). In science, there is no place for ignorance. Object, for it, is what is necessarily known. And the frontier of knowledge or the domain of ignorance in which philosophy is interested would be -- to quote Bhattacharyya in another context,

viz., ‘The Concept of Philosophy’—‘scouted as mystery’ by a scientist. Within the given identity of body and mind, within the illusion of their identity, philosophy finds the *suggestion* of self - though as adjectival to body; and it is realised as substantive when self is known as unknown, as *not* presented. With this realisation, there is the parting of ways from science. And in passing from what is suggested at the stage of the given identity of body and mind to the full realisation of self, philosophy deepens the consciousness of self. Such culture of self would be metaphysics for Bhattacharyya. Bhattacharyya accords importance to Ignorance, i.e. knowledge of ignorance. It is ignorance of self.

Ignorance is positive, not absence of knowledge. Ignorance cannot be understood as *implied* in knowledge. For implication is a logical relations; and it would be conflating ‘experiential’ with ‘logical to maintain that the *feeling* of mind-body complex implies self.

Mind-Body complex is felt, i.e., experienced. It contains the hint of unrealized self and points to a change of dimension in consciousness from what is objective to what is, implicitly, subjective and yet not realized as subjective.

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CHAPTER – 9

‘Believed’, ‘Disbelieved’ and ‘Subjectivity’

‘Fact and Thought of Fact’¹

Subjectivity, it has become clear by now, is our philosopher’s main concern. He has proposed a classificatory scheme in which subjectivity, which is ‘believed’, is distinguished from other believed contents and then again marked off ‘false’, ‘unreal’ and ‘contradictory’ which are disbelieved. Here we have to follow his paper on ‘Fact and Thought of Fact’.

This paper of Bhattacharyya’s may not only be affiliated² to the contemporary views on unactual entities but also be taken to be a contribution to the debates on unactual entities, subsistent, contradictory, false etc. We shall later on see how Bhattacharyya’s views can be mapped out in a classificatory scheme. But first let us, following Bhattacharyya, highlight his main contentions in this paper.

1. ‘Fact’ is ‘what is believed’. In reply² to Dr. R. Das’s criticism, Bhattacharyya maintains that whether the proposition ‘Fact is what is believed’ is analytic or synthetic cannot be determined, for ‘fact’ that is not believed by anyone can neither be asserted nor be denied. So ‘what a person believes... is a fact to him’³. Any proposed definition of fact as, e.g., what stands in a system of relations, what is not constructed by mind etc. would ‘assume some fact’⁴.

Fact need not be existent. Moral ought or freedom are facts that are believed though they are neither existent nor non-existent.

2. ‘Thought’ is belief in a fact which is assertible as either existent or non-existent. Nothing can be said to be thought about which no actual question of existence arises. Since ought is not assertible either as existent or as non-existent, it is not thought.
3. Sometimes ‘Subsistent’ entities have been regarded as thought-contents.

But what is subsistent must either be related to existence or is nothing. The ‘Subsistent’ may, however, be regarded as a thought content that is a possible existent.

But then we do not want to know anything about it except that it exists or not. It may be said that its compatibility with other thought contents is *known*. But the problem about compatibility is not answered without reference to existence or non-existence. It may be said that the answer is self-evident. But then it is not self-evident like an axiom. It may be said that what is subsistent may be the explication of a meaning or it may be a meaning that is compatible with another meaning. But compatibility itself is no meaning. It may then be said that a thought-content may be identified with equivalence of two meanings. But this is thinking of meaning or their equivalence without any *content*. Neither is thought-content (i.e., subsistent) identifiable with what is contradictory. For a contradictory thought is no thought.

4. A speakable content which is not thinkable having no reference to existence is no fact. What is false, e.g., is speakable but not thinkable and hence no fact: it is not thinkable because no question of its existence arises.

It may, however, be insisted that what is false *is thinkable*. It may be regarded as a speakable content (wrongly) taken to be a proposition as a thought-content which is denied in a judgement.

But the awareness of a content as false cannot be expressed in a negative judgement. For (1) a false content is rejected or negated without such negation being taken to be a thought-content because its supposed subject-matter does not exist. (2) Though a negative judgement rejects a belief, such rejection involves a qualified belief. ‘The book is not here’ involves the belief ‘The book is there’. *But what is false is absolutely disbelieved. Hence it cannot be the subject matter of any negation. What is false is disbelieved and what is disbelieved does not exist and what does not exist cannot be the subject-matter of any negation and therefore it is not thinkable.*

These speculations echo Bhattacharyya’s contentions stated earlier on false and error in ‘The False and the Subjective’, ‘Correction of Error as a Logical Process’ and ‘Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Māyā’.

But do not ‘golden mountain’, ‘hare’s horn’ etc. which are purely disbelieved, have any reference to existence? They are thinkable, it may be said, and so possibly existent.

But does the person who *thinks* of them but at the same time *disbelieves* them take them to be possible existents ‘during his disbelief’?⁵ In forming the negative judgement ‘A is not’, one at least ‘entertains’⁶ the question of A’s existence. To quote Bhattacharyya:

In forming a negative judgement like ‘A is not’ one entertains the question of A’s existence, the content of the undecided question being just the proposition.⁷

‘Perhaps A could exist’: this thought is not ruled out and no decision made on such entertainment of A’s existence. The proposition is hence the content of the undecided question. But in citing the hare’s horn as an example of the false or unreal, we do not have an undecided question of its existence in our mind. We do not actually ask if it exists : we can only imagine ourselves asking it.⁸

Now, postponing the discussion of the ‘false’ a little, we shall consider at some length Bhattacharyya’s idea of the ‘content’ of undecided question, because we think that we can make a fruitful use of the idea in the context of contemporary controversy regarding entities the question of whose existence can at least be entertained by one without one’s being committed to any ontology.

As against Meinong’s ontologizing of what he called ‘ideal entities’, Russell reacted first; and then Strawson reacted against Russell. From Bhattacharyya’s point of view, both Russell and Strawson too (like Meinong) were guilty of ontologizing. Russell maintained that a proposition about ‘Pegasus’, e.g., appears to be *about* an object called ‘Pegasus’. But there is no Pegasus, nothing which could be said to be the bearer of the name ‘Pegasus’. Russell then became concerned with the problem as to how a statement concerning Pegasus could be meaningful though there was *no entity* of that name, though there *was nothing* for the statement to be *about*. Russell tried to solve the difficulty by distinguishing between a ‘name’ and a ‘description’. ‘Pegasus does not exist’ amounts to saying that there is no entity corresponding to the description ‘a winged horse’.

Strawson criticised Russell. He analysed the sentence ‘The King of France is wise’. He pointed out that the problem of reference concerning

such sentences arises only because of a failure to distinguish between a *sentence* and the *use* of the sentence.. the sentence cannot be used *now* as France is not a monarchy. The presupposition of existence which must be fulfilled if the sentence can be used to refer is cannot be fulfilled by the sentence in question as there is no king of France.

From Bhattacharyya's point of view, we can say that both Russell and Strawson are guilty of ontologizing the issue. One may not decide in favour of the existence of A in the foregoing example of Bhattacharyya's, viz., 'Perhaps A could exist'. Still, one may 'entertain' the question of A's existence without being committed either to its existence or to its non-existence. In spite of their differences, both Russell and Strawson tried in their analyses to do away with the apparent references of the sentences 'The King of France is wise' and 'Pegasus does not exist'. Reference, they took it for granted, would be either ontological or no reference at all.

Bhattacharyya's position strikes a mean between, what we may call, the reference-theorist and the no-reference theorist.

5. We have seen that, according to Bhattacharyya, about the false we can *imagine* ourselves asking the question about its existence.

As distinguished from the false, the contradictory has no such reference at all. '... a question (of existence) is not even imagined about the contradictory'.⁹

The false is not thinkable and what is not thinkable is not assertible. It is unassertible because it is 'purely disbelieved'¹⁰.

The false is 'unassertible that is not a fact'¹¹.

But the false presupposes some possible existent, some indeterminate existence which is distinguished as *object* believed from *believing*. If, then, there is a believed content that is yet not other than the believing, it would be an 'unassertible fact'¹² and as such distinguished from the false content. While the false is the unassertible unthinkable *no-fact*, *this fact* is unassertible and unthinkable. Bhattacharyya calls such unassertible unthinkable fact 'Concrete subjectivity... the spiritual in our ordinary parlance...',¹³

The following classificatory scheme, constructed on the basis of Bhattacharyya's reflections, may map out the concept of 'existent', 'non-existent', 'false', 'contradictory', 'ought' and 'subjectivity'.

Fact-Believed					Disbelieved	
Existent	Non-existent	Possible Existence (Thought)	Neither existent, nor non-existent (ought and Freedom)	Subjectivity (unthinkable)	False, unreal (imaginary Reference)	Contradictory (imaginary reference denied)

It appears from this scheme that Bhattacharyya would turn his back at the Meinongian attempt at ontologizing so-called subsistent entities. In three ways, he differs from Meinong. First, so-called subsistent entities would not be reduced by him to 'possible existence' or thought. And, as he asks about a subsistent entity: 'Is anything sought to be known about it except whether it exists or not?'.¹⁴ For him, the answer would be in the negative. Secondly, while Meinong would include 'golden mountain', 'hare's horn' etc. in his subsistent world, Bhattacharyya would maintain that these have only 'imaginary reference to existence'.¹⁵ The difference lies in this that a possible existent is that about which *at least a question of existence arises*; whereas, with reference to 'golden mountain' etc. we have *not only not* an 'undecided question'¹⁶ of their existence but *also not* an 'actual question',¹⁷ in our mind. The person who disbelieves the content does not take it to be a possible existent 'during the disbelief'.¹⁸ The possible existent is a content of thought; and 'Nothing is properly said to be thought which does not imply the question of existence',¹⁹ whereas 'golden mountain' etc. – the false in short – is no content of thought at all: it is 'unthinkable' as 'implying the absence or withdrawal of the question of existence...'.²⁰ The former is at least believed as fact. Thirdly, where Bhattacharyya goes even farther than Meinong is in his distinction between the false and the contradictory. The contradictory is not only not included in thought, i.e., among 'existent', 'non-existent' and 'possible existent' (into which 'subsistent' is reduced by Bhattacharyya) but also not included in the 'false': while the false has at least imaginary reference to existence, the contradictory

is devoid even of this reference. It is clear then that Bhattacharyya's classification of unactual entities is wider than Meinong's.

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CHAPTER – 10

An Outline of Alternative Reason

An outline of Alternative Reason, distinct from Hegel's conception of Reason, is found in Bhattacharyya's paper on 'Neo-Hegelian Conception of the Individual self'.¹ This paper is of fundamental importance in the thought-system of Bhattacharyya. It concerns itself, at bottom, with certain concepts which are recurrent concerns of Bhattacharyya's viz., the concepts of 'reason', 'unreason', 'freedom', 'necessity', and 'alternation'.

Although primarily concerned with some Neo-Hegelians' reflections on the place of the individual self in Hegel's 'system', this paper consummates in a point of view that provides a counter to the 'Systemic' view of Reason in Hegel. Hegel's conception of a monolithic reason (that, according to Hegel's critics and some Neo-Hegelians, fails to deduce the finite individuals) is sought to be counteracted in this paper by a *more inclusive concept of reason* according to which reason as spirit 'reveals' itself in many unpredictable forms. In the view of Bhattacharyya, the Hegelian intention to deduce the finite beings is *fulfilled*; but such fulfilment comes only after a complete transformation of reason in terms of free spirit. If reason is the 'efflux' of free spirit – as Bhattacharyya says in his article on 'Swaraj in Ideas' –² then its *proclaimed necessity is not itself necessary*: the necessity of Hegel's 'system' is but a *fact*. In other words, instead of the 'given' fact being reduced to the necessity of reason, to logic -- a reduction that Hegel attempted of Kant's thing-in-itself--, logic or reason itself may be taken to be an expression of free spirit, *alternative to 'unreason'*.³

We now turn to the main contentions of the paper.

Initially, the paper addresses itself to Dr Haldar's view that the individual self is as real as the absolute self and not created by the absolute. Dr Haldar maintains that the individual self's relation to the absolute is solved by finite reason itself with the emergence of new categories.⁴

To this Bhattacharyya replies that Dr Haldar's claim is based on the idea of necessary thought, idea of the completeness of logic which Hegel himself had propounded; Dr Haldar, in other words, could not move out of the Hegelian circle.

Neo-Hegelians like Royce maintain that the finite self is related to the absolute through its relation to other individuals, i.e., ‘by relation to concrete social wisdom that is already objective.’⁵

Bhattacharyya replies that concrete reason or society cannot justify ‘my mode of goodness’⁶. So it appears that we have to go back to Hegel. This is what Bhattacharyya himself does. In three ways, the retrospective looking at Hegel is justified.

Firstly, Hegel was not, as Bhattacharyya points out, content with showing that the absolute must be.⁷ Our actual experience, according to Hegel as interpreted by Bhattacharyya, ‘presented a rational system’⁸. As Bhattacharyya points out, Hegel’s philosophy oversteps his logic. His philosophy of nature tries to show that ‘reason *as a matter of fact* is completely revealed’⁹.

Secondly, Bhattacharyya points out that Hegel appeals to religious experience of worship in which the finite self surrenders its individuality and finds itself re-created by the absolute.

Thirdly, Hegel’s logical thought undergoes a fundamental change in his philosophy of religion in as much as philosophy of religion for him is a rational system in which, as Bhattacharyya points out, ‘ever new religions’ are exhibited.¹⁰

Bhattacharyya recognizes the importance that Hegel accorded to the necessity of showing that reason ‘as a matter of fact’ - not just as a matter of necessity - is revealed. As he says :

There is, to my mind, no getting away from the logical demand that if truth be assumed to be rational, the given matter of our beliefs must be shown as verifying it in our intuition.¹¹

A rational system must be shown to be ‘presented’¹². And here Bhattacharyya supplements the Hegelian idea of reason with the idea of revelation: reason ‘as a matter of fact’¹³ comes to be revealed in spiritual or religious experience.

Conceived as revelation, reason comes to be seen as including within itself ‘unpredictable forms of itself’¹⁴, as ‘free’¹⁵. From the point of

view of its supplementation by revelation, reason may be regarded anew as spirit, and the unpredictable forms of revelation would be viewed as unpredictable forms of spiritual intuition.

And since forms of revelation or spiritual intuition are admitted to be unpredictable, therefore it is also to be admitted that there may be infinite ways in which spirit reveals itself in different religions, infinite number of revelations or religions.

As embracing the possibility of unpredictable forms of revelation, reason is not only free, not only free spirit but also may demand ‘a creation of unreason’¹⁶. Reason as a system is only one form in which truth is revealed to spirit: *truth may not necessarily be a rational system*. As Bhattacharyya says :

It is no use pointing out that the form of philosophy is reason or discussion and that its content therefore must be reason itself. For to prove that truth may or must be non-rational is not necessarily a contradiction. That a revealed content is felt to be reason does not mean that it *must* be so felt, that necessity itself is necessary.¹⁷

Necessity is in fact *given*, i.e., has no necessity itself. A necessary structure, in other words, is *given* as a form of spirit. So the concept of an over - arching reason with which Hegel’s name is generally associated comes to be supplemented by Bhattacharyya by a more inclusive idea of reason that accommodates an indefinite number of forms of spirit. Compared to the latter concept of reason, the former one is abstract, petrified, narrow, exclusive, and -- to quote what Bhattacharyya says in his ‘Swaraj in Ideas’ -- ‘unregenerate’.

Generalizing Bhattacharyya’s reflections in the present paper, it may be said that according to him reason is but one expression, among many unpredictable expressions, of spirit that is more inclusive than logical reason, and that necessity is an expression of freedom.

The concept of reason yielding place to ‘unreason’ is also to be met with in Bhattacharyya’s essay on ‘Some Aspects of Negation’ (published in 1916) which *ante-dates* the present article. And the idea of necessity or

determination being an expression of free will is continued in Bhattacharyya's *later concern* in the 'Lectures on Yoga' delivered in 1937.

What is of wider cultural interest is that the idea of an inclusive reason is continued in 'Swaraj in Ideas' delivered as address to his students by Bhattacharyya in 1928. There, Bhattacharyya attacks those Indian intellectuals (and 'reformers') who used to interpret Indian culture in terms of a 'single universal reason',¹⁸ simplified and generalized Indian ideals, customs etc. through 'unregenerate understanding',¹⁹ ignoring the different forms and institutions of Indian life. According to Bhattacharyya, these can only be understood sympathetically through a new form of rationalism that understands reason as 'born after the travail of the spirit'²⁰, a travail that involves an 'imaginative effort'²¹ to understand Indian life. Edward Said pointed his accusing finger at 'totalizing theories'²² that seek to exhaust the subjective experiences of colonized countries. Even so, we may, using Bhattacharyya's reflections as the plank of our reaction to the reformers and interpreters of Indian thought in the nineteenth and (part of) the twentieth centuries, set our face against the totalizing concept of reason.

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CHAPTER – 11

Bhattacharyya on Value

Bhattacharyya's reflections on value are contained in his paper 'The Concept of Value'¹. The paper has two sections. A study of this paper helps one *situate* Bhattacharyya in many contexts of present discussions on value - theory. We now follow Bhattacharyya.

I. VALUE OF A KNOWN OBJECT

The problem is : how an object that is *known* can be *valued*, i.e., felt as a value? The problem is at bottom the problem that arises with reference to the statement that has a judgment - form, i.e., 'This object has value'. It is the problem of reconciling two incommensurable contexts, viz., the object *known* and the value *felt*.

A large part of this paper is *criticism of subjectivism in value theory*. Subjectivism reduces value to the feeling of the person making the evaluation. Bhattacharyya recognizes the feeling in the understanding of the object valued and yet maintains that the valued object is *felt*.

At the very outset, Bhattacharyya dismisses subjectivism at one stroke. The subjectivist may interpret the statement 'This object has value' as 'We *feel* the value of this object' and thus maintain that the judgment-form of the sentence is only symbolic and that it is really to be understood in terms of subjective feeling.

Bhattacharyya's primary criticism of subjectivism in value-theory is two - fold. *First*, he asks the question about the role of the transitive verb 'feel' with reference to the object felt. *Second*, he points out that the problem *remains*, on the value theory, as to how 'we' can have feeling in respect of an *object*.

To take up the first point of Bhattacharyya's criticism. Bhattacharyya insists that the *transitivity of feeling* has to be explained, not explained away. On the subjectivist theory, the transitivity is the very thing that is explained away.

A large part of this paper is specifically an attempt to account for the transitivity in question.

To account for it, Bhattacharyya proposes a theory of a ‘single consciousness’²: in which the value felt and the object known are unified.

However, Bhattacharyya forewarns us of a possible misinterpretation of his theory. It is not his intention to suggest that knowing and feeling ‘make up one consciousness’³: there is this difference between them that what is known is known as ‘completely distinct’ from knowing and what is felt is only ‘imperfectly distinct’⁴ from feeling.

Bhattacharyya’s suggestion is that there is a ‘single reflective consciousness’⁵ in which the object known appears to be the same as the object valued.

Reflection is the consciousness of consciousness as ‘a function implied in the content’⁶. Bhattacharyya makes this notion of reflective consciousness with reference to content clear when he says ‘The known object in fact is actually *felt* in the reflective feeling’⁷. It is not subjective feeling but the *object* felt. Here is the basic point against subjectivism in value theory. It is by taking the *object* felt within reflective feeling that Bhattacharyya departs from subjectivism. Subjectivists do not employ the reflective method of understanding the object felt. Bhattacharyya does.

Again, the felt or valued content is objective for Bhattacharyya because, when one feels in a certain way, one feels *also* that ‘any one’⁸ should feel⁹ in the way ‘I feel’. That is to say, one takes it that ‘the felt content’ is somehow in the object¹⁰. This is Bhattacharyya’s second point of criticism of subjectivism in value-theory.

Yet though it is objective, the felt content cannot be claimed to be *known*. *Cognitivism in value - theory is thus ruled out by Bhattacharyya*, because value is ‘not speakable without reference to the feeling’¹¹; yet value is objective, because it is objective to reflective feeling. It is secured in reflective feeling. In primary or first order feeling, the object appears to be one with the feeling, but in reflective feeling it appears *at a distince from the feeling*. In reflection, the object indeed appears to be valuable to the subject’s feeling. Yet it *appears* still. For the object to appear to be the content of

feeling - the term in which the subjectivist understands value of the object -, the object must at least *appear* and this can only be made possible through reflective consciousness which distinguishes between the *object felt* and the *feeling* of the object. The subjectivist cannot even talk of the object valued as a content of feeling without appealing to reflective consciousness. To reflective feeling, the value appears to be *as though* known. This '*as though*' disposes of cognitivism in value theory. But in so far as it appears to be as though known, subjectivism again is disposed of.

In this connection, Bhattacharyya insists that attention should be paid to be form in which we speak of value. We speak of value in the informative mode, viz., 'The object has value'. Actually, it is exclamation, viz., 'How valuable is the object!'. Yet, there is a point in speaking of value in the informative mode: 'It is to mark the objectivity of the feeling-content'¹² and this objectivity is 'induced'¹³ by the 'impersonalisation'¹⁴ of the feeling. The feeling is not only my feeling but *any one else's*.

Thus by insisting on the informative mode of speaking of values, Bhattacharyya goes against the exclamatory theory of values. Value - judgments are indeed exclamations; yet to say this is *not* to accept the exclamatory theory of value. Against the exclamatory theory, Bhattacharyya holds to the objectivity of values and here, he points out, there is a point in speaking of value in the informative-mode: it is to emphasize the objectivity of values. As Bhattacharyya says, 'value - judgment is primarily an exclamation toned down into affirmation'¹⁵. 'Toning down' has precisely the effect of emphasizing the objectivity of values in the value - judgment.

Yet, the fact remains that Bhattacharyya himself has maintained that value - judgment is 'an exclamation'. How to explain this?

Strangely, the interpretation of value - judgments is turned in a direction by Bhattacharyya that would take one away *from*, rather than *towards*, the exclamatory theory of value. In two ways, Bhattacharyya proceeds to do this.

First, Bhattacharyya maintains that though value is referred to the *known* object, it is 'not known as a *character* of the object'¹⁶. It is only, what

Bhattacharyya calls, a ‘floating or free adjective of the object’¹⁷. That is to say, it is not a real determination of the object, as an adjective is.

Linked with this consideration is the *second* one relating to the point about exclamation contained in value - judgments. When one says ‘The scene is grand’, one really *does not speak in a subject - predicate form of judgment*. ‘The scene is grand’ is at bottom ‘How grand is the scene!’ The predicate in ‘The scene is grand’ is only apparently a predicate; it is not a qualification *added* to the subject i.e. the scene. On the contrary, *it is in terms of the predicate* that the ‘scene’ comes to be understood. The scene loses its particularity and ‘partakes’¹⁸ of the idea of Grandeur, the universal, the substantive. The relation between the ‘scene’ and ‘grand’ is no longer —, when the scene is ‘exclaimed’— a substantive - attributive relation. The scene is an ‘expression’¹⁹, as Bhattacharyya says, of Grandeur, an idea. As Bhattacharyya says, ‘.... value is expressed in the object as a feeling is expressed in the face’²⁰. The judgment-form (in which value is expressed) is indeed symbolic as was stated in the beginning but then the symbol here is of an Idea which cannot be spoken of in the predicational manner.

We thus see how interpreting value - judgment as exclamation, Bhattacharyya yet takes us away from the exclamatory - theory of value. While the ordinary exclamatory - theory has a subjectivistic undertone, Bhattacharyya’s exclamatory theory has absolutistic overtones. The Grandeur of the Taj Mahal becomes an absolute for the connoisseur.

Let us now make a résumé of Bhattacharyya’s views so far.

1. His theory is not subjectivism but objectivism;
2. it is objectivism, but not cognitivism;
3. it is not cognitivism but (in a sense) an exclamatory theory;
4. it is exclamatory theory *minus* subjectivism;
5. it is exclamatory theory *plus* absolutism.

II. VALUE OF A WILLED ACT

The valuation of a willed act is unlike the valuation of a known object. The former is a matter of feeling. But the latter is feeling with ‘willing somehow involved in it’²¹. In being evaluated, a known object is *exclaimed*. But in being evaluated, a willed content is not only exclaimed but also *extolled* as an *imperative*, an *ought*. So exclamation and imperative, feeling and willing are combined in the evaluation of a moral act. When a willed content is evaluated, the *sacredness of the ‘ought’* is felt. It amounts to saying ‘How good is the act!’ or ‘How good it is that you should act thus!’. This is different from ‘You should act thus’ which is a prescription, not evaluation. To evaluate an act --- as different from an *object* --- is to evaluate it morally and to evaluate it morally is to feel the sacredness of the ought, to *extol* it to a universal, to wonder at it. The Moral Law within fills a Kant’s mind with wonder and amazement.

So Bhattacharyya’s analysis so far can be summed up as follows:-

1. Moral evaluation is no prescription.
 - (a) No evaluation in fact is prescription: the evaluation of a known object is not prescription.
2. While no evaluation is prescription, much less so is moral evaluation.
3. What distinguishes moral evaluation and evaluation of an object on the one hand from prescription on the other is the common element of evaluation in the former two cases and the lack of it in the latter case.
4. What distinguishes moral evaluation from evaluation of a known object is the element of ‘sacredness’ or ‘impersonal obligatoriness’ in the former and the lack of it in the latter.

We should note immediately that, in so far as Bhattacharyya extols the moral ought to a universal, his *affinity with Hartmann* is obvious.

But in the ultimate analysis, Bhattacharyya takes valuation to the level of freedom – an imaginative feat indeed. Let us follow him.

Valuation ranges from the aesthetic valuation of an *object* known to moral valuation of an *act*. There may be (i) moral valuation of an object as ‘clean’ or ‘sacred’,²² where the ‘clean’ suggests ‘purity’,²³ and the ‘sacred’ suggests ‘holiness of impersonal will’,²⁴; and (ii) there may be aesthetic evaluation of an act which looks ‘splendid’,²⁵. And both (i) and (ii) are distinguished from moral valuation of an *act* considered as good or bad. But whatever their differences, all valuation requires that what is valued should ‘have the form of being’.²⁶ So when, e.g., we extol an act to be a ‘splendid act of bravery’,²⁷, ‘the empirical setting’,²⁸ is ‘incorporated’²⁹ into the act. Kant pointed out that though moral acts are noumenally free, they yet take place in the world of natural necessity.

What, then, is the objective ‘being’ of the content of a moral act? What is the being for the act? A morally willed act is free and an act is free when it is freed of empiricity.³⁰ In the case of knowing, ‘the subject of an apparent judgment which is denied absolutely in the judgment is unreal’³¹ Thus when in the apparent judgment it is said ‘That snake is denied absolutely’, the snake is understood as unreal: the judgment is apparent because it does not really have any subject as ‘the snake’ to fasten on to. In the sphere of willing, the moral act is denied all being: the moral act is free from all being, --- it is negation of all being, freedom. Moral judgment, from the point of view of freedom, is at the farthest remove from aesthetic judgment. Moral willing *per se* i.e., pure moral willing is free from empiricity: it is not assessed *in situ*. It is assessed only as ‘inner willing’,³², not as it looks. Pure moral judgment, then, is no judgment, there being no objective situation for it. Moral willing is no free act which could be assessed if it could occur in the situation of natural necessity as Kant thought: it is freedom. In this conception of pure moral willing, which cannot take place in the world of natural necessity and which therefore cannot be the subject of judgment, cannot be either assertible or negatable, in this conception of moral willing as *freedom* as distinct from free *act*, Bhattacharyya goes beyond Kant.

From subjectivism to objectivism and from objectivism to absolutism and from absolutism to freedom or negation - within this wide spectrum Bhattacharyya’s reflection on values moves.

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CHAPTER - 12

Bhattacharyya On Aesthetic Enjoyment

PREAMBLE

Bhattacharyya's reflections on the nuances of the consciousness that aesthetic enjoyment is are contained in his paper 'The Concept of Rasa'¹

It is within the conspectus of the thought of the free subject or consciousness -- elaborated so far in many of his writings -- that this paper has to be placed; otherwise, the *philosophy of freedom, in which this paper is imbedded*, is entirely lost on the reader.

In conformity with Indian thinking, Bhattacharyya turns to understand 'Rasa' which can be translated as 'essence': it is this 'essence' that constitutes the warp and the woof of aesthetic enjoyment. 'Essence', however, in the aesthetic context is no 'universal' of thought. Bhattacharyya is clear on that. Evidently, he reacts against Hegel who would *intellectualise* aesthetic consciousness. Aesthetic consciousness is marked by enjoyment. This is distinctive. It is no psychological state. Nor does it consist in any 'enjoyable look' at an object: in having such a look, the subject feels 'weighed down' by the object.

Now, aesthetic enjoyment is 'free' both objectively and subjectively. One's appreciation of an object (as beautiful or ugly) may confer an enjoying look on it, but aesthetic appreciation is no mere 'look' at an object. The aesthetic contemplator is *free* from an *individual's* enjoyment. The individual subject counts for the aesthetic contemplator only is so far as the former can be taken to *idealize* an emotion. For the contemplator, the essence of enjoyment is an idealized value, 'Heart Universal'.

So aesthetic consciousness may be described as *enjoying understanding* distinguished from (i) any *psychological state*, (ii) any enjoyable look (at the contemplated or enjoyed object) and (iii) intellectual apprehension. And as *enjoying understanding*, rasa is oriented to a universalisable essence which is so in so far as it is free from an *individual's* feeling. *Rasa or Rasopalabdhi*, i.e., aesthetic enjoyment is contemplation of an emotion that surely throbs the connoisseur's heart but then the

connoisseur, in *contemplating* what is enjoyed, *marks himself off* the enjoyer: for the connoisseur, the throb is not any more encased in the individual enjoyer's heart but comes to be writ, so to say, on the universal Heart. The connoisseur's free subject is brought to bear upon his contemplation. Artistic enjoyment, in short, is *detachment or freedom in enjoyment*, a 'duplicated' consciousness of (i) enjoyment which yet is *not glued to or immersed* in the enjoyed object but is (ii) *free* in its contemplation of an 'essence' that is idealized.

One word more. 'Essence' here is not Hartmannian Essence which smacks of ontology. For Bhattacharyya, 'essence' is constituted in consciousness' freedom (in enjoyment, not in intellectual apprehension of *Truth*). Free consciousness may, *alternatively*, be aesthetic as it can be cognitive.

The present paper of Bhattacharyya's has two parts : (i) 'Artistic Enjoyment' and (ii) 'The Beautiful and The Ugly'.

I. ARTISTIC ENJOYMENT

The first part is concerned with, what may be called in Indian terminology, *rasaviçāra*. *Rasa*, as Bhattacharyya notes it, means ‘essence’² and also what is ‘tasted or felt’³. Bhattacharyya points out that in Indian aesthetics these two are combined and *rasa* is taken to mean the ‘essence’ of a feeling which is ‘indifferently’⁴ an ‘eternal feeling’⁵ or the ‘object’⁶ of it. That ‘feeling here should have the final say’⁷, comes out clearly when ‘*rasa*’ as ‘essence’ of feeling is contrasted to a logical universal. *Rasa* or essence is not to be identified with any idea conceived in intellection. ‘It is understood purely through feeling....’⁸

Thus, at the outset, Bhattacharyya brings out the distinctiveness of the Indian idea of *Rasa*. *First*, he understands ‘essence’ (in the present context) as ‘an eternal value that is felt’. *Second*, although Bhattacharyya does not name any western aesthetician, it is clear he has in mind Hegel for whom aesthetic appreciation is not more than a confused apprehension of Idea that is understood in logical thought. Bhattacharyya seeks to mark off Indian speculations regarding aesthetic consciousness from the Hegelian theory. *Aesthetics is not logic, aesthetic feeling is not logical universal.*

Now, with regard to *rasaviciñāra*, Bhattacharyya seeks to *locate the level* of aesthetic enjoyment. He points out that, in contrast to other feelings, aesthetic feeling stands on a new grade or level. Bhattacharyya first addresses himself to the task of locating this level.

But before accomplishing this task, Bhattacharyya gives us the key to the understanding of the difference between aesthetic feeling and other feelings. Here Bhattacharyya asks himself the question ‘What is the implication of the transitive use of the verb ‘to enjoy’?’.¹⁰ Bhattacharyya offers the key to understand the distinctiveness of aesthetic feeling: the distinction between subject and object (involved in knowing or ordinary feeling) has no place here. The object does not appear to the enjoying consciousness as ‘a mere fact’¹¹: it wears an ‘enjoyable look’¹². The subject, again, does not maintain its detachment from object: it feels ‘attracted into or weighed down by the object’¹³.

To get at the level of aesthetic feeling, Bhattacharyya distinguishes between (i) feeling, (ii) feeling of feeling and (iii) feeling of feeling of feeling.

(i) is best understood through its contrast with (ii). One's *understanding* of a feeling, says Bhattacharyya, 'leaves one cold'¹⁴. And one cannot have a feeling like the feeling felt. To sympathise with a person is to feel *him* feeling, not to feel *his* feeling. What, then, is (ii)?

Bhattacharyya seeks to understand it through sympathy 'which is the most familiar form of feeling of feeling'¹⁵. Sympathy stands on a level that is higher than mere feeling. It is 'freer'¹⁶. The first level of feeling projects its expression on the object. Thus, to use Bhattacharyya's example, the child playing with his toy and enjoying it 'projects the joyous look'¹⁷ on the toy. He 'sees'¹⁸ it there. But the person who feels the child's feeling 'imagines'¹⁹ it. So the feeling of feeling is freer than primary feeling - freer from the object felt in primary feeling. 'By reason of this freedom, then, feeling of feeling may be taken as constituting a higher level than feeling of an object'²⁰.

Now, artistic enjoyment has something of the freedom of feeling of feeling. Every feeling, we have seen, confers a look on the object. But feeling of feeling, we have seen again, is *imagining* it. 'The look or aspect that is consciously imagined differs from that which appears to be seen. The latter is presented as one with the given fact, as adjectival to it; whereas the former is presented as detached from the fact - as floating on it or as shining beyond it'²¹. To revert to our example of sympathy, the sympathiser *imagines* something in the object which is not presented with the object but presented as *detached* from the object. Similarly, the beauty of an object is presented as a 'floating expression'²². This is how artistic enjoyment stands on a higher level than object - feeling where what is felt is presented with the object.

But though artistic enjoyment is - like feeling of feeling - freer from the object than the first - level feeling, it stands on a higher level still. It is like *feeling of a feeling of a feeling*. In feeling of feeling, e.g., in sympathy, there is detachment from objective fact but not from the subject. But in feeling⁽³⁾ of feeling⁽²⁾ of feeling⁽¹⁾ there is such detachment. Here feeling can be enjoyed in a detached way i.e., apart from its personal element. To take

Bhattacharyya's example, the grandfather affectionately watches his grandchild playing with the toy. One may have a '*contemplative joy*'²³ at the grandfather's sympathetic joy'²⁴ at the child's joy at the toy. The contemplative joy is detached not only from the child's joy at the toy just as the grandfather's joy is detached from the toy - it being feeling of feeling which is freer than the first or the primary feeling -, but also from the grandfather's joy. *The personal element in the grandfather's joy is detached for one who joyfully contemplates the grandfather's joy.* 'My contemplative joy has ... no personal complexion. I am interested in the child's feeling reflected in the grandfather's heart as an eternal emotion or value. I *enjoy* the essence of the emotion, get immersed in it without, however, being affected by it and thus losing my freedom'.²⁵

Bhattacharyya thus points out that it is on the grade of such 'duplicated sympathy'²⁶, a grade higher than sympathy, that a feeling can be emotionally contemplated.

And artistic consciousness stands on such level. Such enjoyment does not *fasten on to* the subjective feeling of the person who is related to the primary feeling. The second person (the grandfather) sympathizing with the third person (the grandchild) becomes, to the enjoying consciousness, *any* person; and his feeling is, for the enjoying consciousness, 'eternalised in the Heart Universal'²⁷ (which is different from the logical universal of understanding) which is the concentrated essence of the grandfather's emotion.

This scheme of three persons is adopted by Bhattachryya in order to understand the nature and the level of aesthetic enjoyment. The first person is the aesthetic contemplator, the second person corresponds to the grandfather in Bhattacharyya's example and the third person corresponds to the child in the same example. What exactly are the third and the second persons in the aesthetic context? The third person, in the aesthetic situation, becomes an 'indefinite third person';²⁸ and it is his feeling only, *not he as an individual*, that counts in aesthetic contemplation. The contemplator enjoys that feeling or emotion in so far as it is 'idealised'²⁹ or universalized in the second person as the *Heart universal*. This idealized feeling is the object of aesthetic contemplation or enjoyment. When the beauty of a natural object is

appreciated, the feeling that it primarily evokes in an individual is taken, in aesthetic contemplation, to be the *feeling of feeling-persons in general*, and it is this feeling of feeling-persons in general, called 'Heart Universal' by Bhattacharyya, that is enjoyed.

In the terminology of Indian aesthetics, it is '*sahṛdayahṛdaya*' as manifested in the feeling of the second person (corresponding to the grandfather in the 'sympathy for sympathy' example) that is the object of contemplation in aesthetic consciousness.

II. THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY

Writes Bhattacharyya; '.... enjoyed quintessence of ugliness is just what Indian aesthetics daringly recognizes as a *rasa*, viz., *bibhatsa-rasa*. Such recognition does credit to the virility of Indian art and to the Indian theory of art'³⁰.

So far, Bhattacharyya has been concerned with the general level on which the aesthetic-contemplative attitude stands. We have now to see how Bhattacharyya would treat the concepts of the beautiful and the ugly within the conceptual scheme he has provided for aesthetic apprehension. Both these feelings, according to him, belong to the grade of aesthetic apprehension. However, Bhattacharyya seems to be more concerned with accounting for the feeling of ugliness in the context of aesthetic apprehension. But a brief discussion is needed on the term or terms in which the discussion is to be conducted.

At the very outset, as in the first section, Bhattacharyya rules out considerations regarding what there is in the *object* to make it appear beautiful or ugly. 'Symmetry', 'unity in variety'³¹ etc. do not make such an object beautiful. It all depends upon *what the artist feels* the symmetry to be. In understanding the concept of the beautiful and the ugly, Bhattacharyya once again analyses the mental attitude.

In regard to the object aesthetically apprehended, what contemplation does is to idealize it. Such idealization involves the identification in feeling between the subject and the object. In all feeling, there is such identity. Feeling cannot retain the detachment involved in

thought: that would be ‘inanity’³² to feeling. The subject ‘feels itself real’³³ when it is united with the object.

Is the *distinction from object* also felt (in feeling)? In the grade of sympathetic feeling, the distinction is implicitly felt and the identity continues to be felt in primary feeling. In contemplative feeling, both feeling of identity and distinction are explicit. The object gets idealized into a sort of ‘objective mind’³⁴ and the subject ‘feels real in joy by consuming the object’³⁵. If the feeling of identity is enjoyment, the feeling of difference is pain. Enjoyment and pain ‘cannot stand together side by side’.³⁶ ‘When the pain is subordinate to the enjoyment, we have the feeling of beauty. Where the enjoyment is subordinate to pain, there emerges the feeling of ugliness and its congeners’³⁷. A tale of sorrow, e.g., can yet be a matter of enjoyment, because here the pain is subordinate to enjoyment.

But while any feeling *can be* subordinated to aesthetic enjoyment, it *need not* be. The artistic spirit may not ‘swallow’³⁸ it. There are varying depths in the contemplative attitude. Artistic feeling may ‘transmute’³⁹ all feeling, all ‘refractory’⁴⁰ feelings, but when a primary feeling stands out as ‘untransmuted’⁴¹, when in other words aesthetic feeling is not only not able to assimilate a primary feeling but also gets subordinated to it, it turns into a feeling of ugliness.

The appearance of ugliness to the aesthetic attitude may also be understood with reference to the idealization that the aesthetic attitude introduces to the object of aesthetic contemplation.

Ideality is a process. While aesthetic contemplation transforms the object, i.e., idealizes it, there may be left over certain aspects of the object which are not transformed, not idealized. Here there is distinction in feeling between subject and object. While the feeling of identity is enjoyment, the feeling of distinction is pain. But even pain can be aesthetically contemplated when it does not subordinate but gets subordinated to such contemplation. Sorrow, e.g., can be aesthetically contemplated : as a felt object, ‘it is one with the enjoyment, turned into it, transfigured’.⁴² The point is this that any kind of feeling can be aesthetically contemplated. Aesthetic contemplation can bring under its yoke both enjoyment of the primary feeling and pain as an object of enjoyment.

When however, aesthetic contemplation fails to assimilate the primary feeling and gets subordinated to it, it turns into the feeling of ugliness.

But it is still aesthetic contemplation; only, it is under the sway of the feeling of ugliness. It lies ‘untransmuted’ by aesthetic feeling. It is the feeling of an unidealized object, feeling of the ‘inability to enjoy’.⁴³ ‘It is still a feeling on the aesthetic plane, because it would not arise but for idealization or enjoyment, the identity that is already felt’⁴⁴.

References

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39. *ibid.* p. 360.
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44. *ibid.* p. 359.

APPENDIX

A summary of two of Bhattacharyya's articles is given below as they do not seem to be in tune with his overall philosophical viewpoint.

(i)

Objective Interpretation Of Percept And Image¹

The main points in the paper are as follows :-

1. Percept is the object as perceived and image is the object as unperceived. Can the subjective terms 'perceived' and 'unperceived' be translated into objective terms ?
2. To perceive an object is to perceive it with 'definite shape'.² Again, the object can be perceived only in a definite 'field'.³ The outside of the object may or may not be perceived according as it is perceived *with* a definite boundary or *not* so perceived. Existence to perception thus is perceived *spatial* existence, -- which means that the spatial boundary of the object perceived 'constitutes'⁴ its existence.
3. When an object and its outside are perceived together, the former defines the latter and not *vice versa*.
4. The outside of the object may not by itself be perceived (when, i.e., it is not defined by the perceived object).
5. A flame is perceived but not as existent as it has no boundary. 'An object is perceived as existent when it is perceived as defining its outside'.⁵
6. There are two kinds of case where an object is perceived as defining its outside. In the first kind of case, the object emerges in time but not space. This is when, e.g., a scar is seen on a face. The scar emerges in time only. But it is perceived to be *there*, i.e., as existent. In the second kind of case, an object goes out in space. This is when, e.g., a fire is perceived. Its existence is perceived in the perception of its going out in space.
7. The scar exists in space because it does not emerge in space, i.e., cannot be said to happen in space. It only happens in time. The spatial

- field of the scar only constitutes its existence, but as it is not known to emerge at all, it is not known as existent or non-existent.
8. To see the fire going out is to see the field in which it exists ‘getting defined without happening’.⁶ It is only emergence in time that can be said to get defined as happening.
 9. The outside of the object perceived to be existent has itself no space outside it. It is the ‘whole of space’.⁷ ‘It is perceived as space itself’.⁸ A perceived object is distinguished as existent in this whole space.
 10. Percept is the perceived object, i.e., object whose existence is *seen*. ‘Percept is not other than the perceived object’.⁹ There is no introspection into it. It is called a perceived object when its existence is seen.
- Bhattacharyya recognizes that percept ‘has to be taken as a mental object’.¹⁰ But he adds that the mental object is nothing but the external object perceived explicitly as existing. Percept, says Bhattacharyya, is seen as an ‘objective predicament of the object’.¹¹

This reminds us, negatively, of Perry’s charge against Idealism that it is based on the ‘fallacy of argument from ego-centric predicament’. According to Bhattacharyya, the perceived object is object that is *seen*. It is after all an object, but not *object per se*: it is object whose existence is seen without being reflectively distinguished. Perhaps Bhattacharyya would say that it is a ‘floating adjective’, a favourite expression of his which he uses in his essay on ‘The Concept of Value’ and his book on *The Subject As Freedom* (chapter on ‘Knowledge of Absence as a Present Fact’).

11. The scar in the foregoing example is perceived as not disappearing, i.e., as non-cessant and the fire (in the foregoing example again) is perceived as not beginning to appear, i.e., as non-emergent.
12. The scar is perceived as not disappearing but emergent. The space outside the scar, however, is non-emergent. Again, the fire is perceived as not beginning to appear but cessant. The space outside the fire is, however, perceived as non-cessant. The former space is

known as having been and the latter space is known as continuing to be.

13. So in the knowledge of space as outside the object perceived as existent in space, there is the knowledge of persistence (either as having been or as continuing to be).
14. To know a perceived object as persistent and not as existent is to be aware of image.
15. (a) Now the space which is outside the perceived object as existent in space is defined by the perceived object. The outside space has no space outside itself: it is not therefore perceived as existent. Bhattacharyya calls it the ‘spatial negative’¹² of the perceived object because it is known as what the object is not, -- it is defined by the object perceived as existent.
(b) Again, it is perceived ‘along with the perception of the object’.¹³ Therefore, this outside space ‘differs according to the object perceived ...’,¹⁴
16. Also, there is a ‘single perception of an object as in its field or outside’.¹⁵
17. On one and the same field, one can distinguish between the percept of the outside of the object (perceived as existent) and the percept of the object which has the outside.
18. So in the knowledge of space as outside the object perceived as existent (in space), there is the knowledge of persistence (either as having been or as continuing to be).
19. So the perceived content that is known as percipient is as much a percept as the perceived content that is known as existent’.¹⁶
20. But although a persistent content is perceived, it is not known as persistent in perception. The persistent can be known as such, i.e., as persistent only when it is distinguished as what the existent is not. The knowledge of its persistence rests on this negative distinction which is not perception.

21. To know a perceived object as existent is to be aware of percept and to know the perceived object as persistent is to be ‘incipiently aware of image’.¹⁷
22. Once the notion of persistence is obtained, image is understood as what the existent perceived object is not. Understood as what the existent object is not, image is still chained to percept, and an objective interpretation of the image would be in negative terms. It is not indeed the perceived persistent object, but then while the persistent object is perceived, the notion of non-persistence is non-perceptual. This non-perceptual knowledge of persistence is the beginning of the knowledge of image proper.
23. We have seen (in 10) that perceived object or percept is the object whose existence is ‘seen’ in the object without reflectively being distinguished. Under reflection, its existence comes to be dissociated from it. And the same percept, whose existence is dissociated from it in reflection, is understood as what was existent but is not, i.e., is non-existent. This is image proper. This view of image as non-dissociated from the perceived object is consistent with Bhattacharyya’s view of image in THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM.

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(ii)

Reality of The Future¹

The main contentions of this paper are as follows :-

1. On ungrounded expectation, the future cannot be said to be known. On grounded expectation, it is believed. Is such belief knowledge?
2. Something believed on a known ground but not directly known may comprise either of the two cases : (i) the conditional relation 'If A, then B' or (ii) 'Since this A, therefore B will be'.
3. It is open to dispute if a conditional relation is known. In the past we might have seen A and B together and so we may claim to infer 'If A, then B'. But the dependence in such conditional relation is not temporal.

That is to say, the future cannot be said to be known as temporally related to the past (or the present) as two events are known.

4. It may now be said that precisely because the relation between A and B is not temporal, we can infer B from A. The gist of this contention is that the future may not be known to be temporally related to the present and the past, and yet it is known through inference.

There are two objections to this view. First, taking the example above which is supposed to lend support to the view that the future is known through inference, it may be replied that from 'If A, then B' all we can infer is that B can be, not that B 'will be'. That B 'will be' is a matter of non-cognitive apprehension, Second, we could infer that B 'will be' if we could guard against counter-instances. But that there will be no counter-instances is a matter of faith, not knowledge.

5. So the future is only what can be. It is not what actually will be. It may not be actual at all. It is contingent. It is real only as a possibility which is willed or can be willed.

6. But cannot real contingency be admitted ? There is the present-day principle of objective indetermination which goes against the notion that the future is mechanically determined and so must be.
- But this principle cannot be said to be known. What is known must be an ‘accomplished being’.²
7. Can the future be what is ‘potentially existent actualising itself’?³ But then the movement towards actualization can never reach the future.
8. It may be said that the future is known in as much as it can be distinguished from the present (which is known). But the present cannot be known to be ending. So the break between it and the future cannot be known. The distinction of the future from the present ‘amounts only to unrelatedness’.⁴
9. The content of knowledge is what is (or is not). The future, if distinguished at all, is either what is to be brought about or what is looked for. So it is the content either of will or of faith.
10. Thus the future is not a matter of cognitive apprehension. But can it not be inferred from the present? The answer must be in the negative, for what is inferred is necessary and, therefore, non-temporal. Again, the future cannot be said to be justified by the present as a fact known is justified by the explication of its reason. Such justification would be retrospective. But there is a difference between the justification of conclusion within an inference and justification of a fact expected by an inference. An inference may strengthen the belief in a fact. Still the fact is outside the inference, not within it as the conclusion of an inference is.
11. The future is real in two ways – to will and to faith. A voluntarist reduces faith to ideal willing. If faith be ideal willing, it would be ‘imaginary willing of another’s willing’.⁵ Reduction in the opposite direction too is possible. My consciousness of faith may be resolved into my faith that ‘my will is coming’.⁶
12. When I will something, I expect that it will come about. There may indeed be unpredictability of the objective means. Still my will asserts

the continuity between itself and what it wills to bring about. In an ideal extension of will, faith may be incorporated into it. Alternatively, we may start with the faith in the ‘free rationality of persons’⁷ and take the faith to be ‘extending downwards’⁸ and take will to be ‘the last link of this object-behaviour’.⁹

13. When I will to bring about a change, I may have an anticipative idea of the object, though I may not be conscious of the means. Or, I may have a conscious idea of the objective means brought about by me through which I execute my will. I may thus have a feeling of ‘double touch’,¹⁰ with the end. In this way, mechanical causality may be ‘imagined’¹¹ as an extension of my ‘bodily willing’.¹²
14. I may have a general belief in the continuity between my will and its end, and, as just seen, I may be conscious of the means to the execution of my will. There are, however, contexts in which the general belief in continuity is ‘pulled up’¹³ as when, e.g., the means of executing one’s will is a living person. In such cases, there is an ‘objective uncertainty’¹⁴ with which will is confronted.
15. Here faith as the attitude of ‘surrender of will’¹⁵ should come in.

But the ‘satanic will’¹⁶ still lasts. It has an aggrandizing attitude to the world.

And yet there is the persisting belief that though the means are unpredictable, will can execute what it wanted to. In an ideal extension of will thus, faith is ‘incorporated in aspiration with willing’.¹⁷

16. To make a brief resumé :
the future is not a known content;
it is a matter of will or faith;
in an ideal extension of will, it ‘surrenders’ itself to faith;
such ideal extension transcends satanic will; its aggrandizing attitude gives way to faith.
17. In sum, Bhattacharyya understands the reality of the future in the context of drawing the borderline between knowledge and faith.

18. But to wind up our discussion, we must note how Bhattacharyya treats willing to be a part of the faith in the rationality of the world. Will surrenders itself to faith in the rationality of the world and this latter is just a matter of faith. Aggrandizing will must give way to this faith. As Bhattacharyya says, 'faith lours ahead as a dark cloud that refuses to be transparent to reason'.¹⁸ This is also how Bhattacharyya counters the manipulative attitude of science in his essay on 'The Concept of Philosophy' where he disparages the 'predatory' outlook of science.¹⁹ Thus by according ultimate importance to faith in so far as our general attitude to the world is concerned, Bhattacharyya indeed gives the present discussion a novel dimension.

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17. *ibid., p. 278.*
18. Essay on 'Some Aspects of Negation' in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II, *p. 213.*
19. Essay on the 'Concept of Philosophy, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II, *p. 108.*

RÉSUMÉ, OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

The programme of making explicit grades of objectivity and subjectivity, initiated early in the last century in Bhattacharyya's STUDIES IN VEDANTISM(SV), is continued in THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM of 1929-30. And the acmé of the SAF is reached in the notion of 'the subject as freedom'. The place of the SAF in the entire philosophic reflection of Bhattacharyya may be determined or fixed now. On the one hand, the book continues the programme of the SV without of course the manifest Vedāntic setting of the latter. On the other hand, it spreads out to the larger dimension in which the notion of the Absolute plays the most dominant role. This is the notion of Absolute consciousness as (i) transcending articulation in language-symbolism and as (ii) in itself, *sva* in Indian diction.

The approach to the 'Absolute' is through 'the subject'. In expressing itself in 'I', in 'incarnating itself' – to use Bhattacharyya's diction – in 'I' which has a 'meaning', the subject does not appear to itself and does not also make itself appear to others as any 'meant' object or *padārtha* in the Vaiśeṣika diction. But then, that is not the end of the story for Bhattacharyya. For him, there is an intrinsic instability in subject-consciousness (or self-consciousness) that moves it to a larger dimension. Subject-consciousness or self-consciousness is the consciousness of *being* the subject or self, being as *though* the 'I'. Such symbolizing-consciousness necessarily points to the transcendence or negation of meaning. The consciousness of the transcendence of meaning is the consciousness of the Absolute. The Absolute is understood in so far as the subject is incarnated or symbolized in 'I' which has a meaning. Self-consciousness is necessarily symbolizing consciousness and as necessarily does it point to the transcendence of self-symbolizing, to the transcendence of the meaning-symbol (i.e., 'I'). The Absolute articulates the transcendence.

Throughout all its levels, the dialectic of self-consciousness is motivated by the transcendence of meaning. But this dialectic of transcendence is itself overlaid by Absolute-consciousness which overcomes the process of transcendence. It overcomes the process in that the process does not *add any content* to it, is not incorporated into the Absolute-consciousness. Here lies the fundamental difference between Bhattacharyya's

dialectic and Hegel's dialectic. For Hegel, negation is negated and incorporated into affirmation of the Absolute Reality. But for Bhattacharyya, negation of negation is negation, i.e., does not enter bodily into the Absolute-consciousness. While the subject -- in symbolizing itself in 'I' -- negates the meaning of 'I', the Absolute as beyond symbolizing negates even the negation of meaning. In the symbolising consciousness of the subject itself, the consciousness of the Absolute is implicit. The consciousness of the Absolute is consciousness by itself or as it is in itself, as *sva* in Indian diction.

As consciousness in itself, the Absolute negates any symbolization in 'I' or any articulation in judgement, negative judgement included. Here is another important point of difference between Bhattacharyya and Hegel for whom dialectic is the judgemental process of reaching the Absolute : an affirmative judgement is incorporated into a negative judgement and this latter yields place to a more comprehensive affirmation and the process goes on till the Absolute (which is judgemental in character) is reached. For Bhattacharyya, on the contrary, negation of affirmation is negation with reference to the Absolute that is non-judgemental. No judgement, no thought-articulation, no language-symbol can capture consciousness as *sva*, as *itself* according to Bhattacharyya. Here we should add Bhattacharyya's observation in 'The Concept of Philosophy' that in philosophy concept formation is but part of the achievement of consciousness as Absolute as itself.

Thus the book SAF, along with Bhattacharyya's papers 'CP' and 'AAF', forms a conglomerate. The book is either understood as part of the conglomerate or not understood.

And as already pointed out, the book paves the way to Absolutism, *the alpha and the omega of Bhattacharyya's philosophy*.

The Absolute has been conceived by the philosopher as freedom or negation that is not judgemental but negation of judgemental negation. In consciousness in itself, there is no reference even to the demand for outgrowing self-consciousness' symbol which is 'I'. If the subject consciousness is -- implicitly -- negation of symbol, consciousness as absolute i.e., as consciously itself negates even the symbolizing

consciousness of negation that is the subject-consciousness. Thus the absolute is freedom that outgrows all process of negating symbolizations or articulations. It is freedom as freeing from freeing process, i.e., process of outgrowing symbol in subject-consciousness.

The Philosophy of Bhattacharyya in its entirety may be laid down as follows : -

1. There is the symbolizing consciousness of the subject or self as 'I'.
2. Then there is the transcendence of the symbolizing consciousness in the consciousness of the Absolute.
3. Then emerges the consciousness of the Absolute as Freedom. i.e., free from or negating the process of freedom, negating the process of negating object.
4. Finally, there emerges the conception of Absolute Freedom as negation of negation.

The basic difference between Hegel and Bhattacharyya lies in their conception of freedom. Hegel would incorporate objectivity into consciousness of freedom. Bhattacharyya would view freedom as absolute in the sense that no objective situation can be incorporated into it. For Bhattacharyya, freedom is absolute, - it is not political freedom achieved by a nation when it moves from the objective situation of dependence to independence. Nor is it social freedom which has an objective setting. Nor again is it 'emancipation' through the 'grace' of the Lord. Bhattacharyya views freedom as spiritual, as absolute negation which is negation of the entire process of negation of all levels of objectivity (as delineated in SAF).

And finally, following Bhattacharyya's SAF, his exegesis on Yoga philosophy and his papers on Aesthetic Enjoyment and Value, we come to see that freedom may be alternatively -

- i) Cognitive, or
- ii) freedom of willing or
- iii) freedom in aesthetic contemplation or

iv) Value as Absolute.

The levels of cognitive freedom are elaborated in SAF. Here the analysis of knowledge is the process of knowledge probing into its depth -- as the subject distinct or free from 'object'. *It may be said that the tattva of knowledge, the metaphysic of knowledge is the subject.*

In Bhattacharyya's acute exegesis, freedom may be conceived –in the context of *yoga* – *as willing, as willing not to will, and finally as not willing to will.*

The Beautiful again may be conceived as the free Absolute for aesthetic enjoyment.

Or, again, the Absolute may be the Value – absolute.

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